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Summarv and oonclusions 
At each session of ECLAC, the Secretariat has submitted a 
papar examining the external eccnomic relations of latin 
America and the Caribbaan and another on regional cx>-operation 
and integration. In keeping with this tradición of the 
Commission, the Secretariat is on this occasion submitting a 
single document in two parts, in which both of the subjects 
are analysed. 
This is a inore selective document than the reports 
prepared in the other two sessians held during this decade 
(Montevideo, 1981 and Luna, 1984). Thus, rather than 
attempting a full scale, extensiva review of the various 
matfcers ccvered under the heading of econcntic relations and 
regional integration, sene special studies are ncw being 
presentad mhich contain a more f ar-reaching examinaticn of 
certain guestions which nave been regarded as having priority. 
In Bart One of this document, consideration is given to 
the intemational econemie relations of latin America and the 
Carihbean, fren the point of view both of the salient features 
of their development in recent years and factors relatlng to 
the way in which they may develop in the roture and of certain 
policy options before the región as it faces these trenos and 
prospeets. 
Part One has five chapters. In chapter I, which is an 
introductory chapter, consideration is given to the 
development of the world econamy, in particular since the 
1970s, and the main effeets of that development on Latin 
America and the Carihbean, aocount being taken also of various 
data conceming ti» lüoaly econcnic behaviour of the main 
industrialized countries in the near future. On that basis, an 
exploratory effart is nade to come up with possible action 
alternatives feo: Latin America and the Carihbean on the 
regional and intemational levéis. 
The second chapter, oontaining three sections, describes 
in greater detall the trends in the external relations of 
Latin America and the Carihbean. In section A, consideration 
is given to what has been callad the segmentation of 
intemational trade, the main emphasls being laid en the past 
20 years, and attention is callad to ti» conoentration of 
dynamic trade circuits among certain countries and groups of 
countries and certain types of goods. In addition 
consideration is given to the causes, ways and means and 
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repercussions of thls segmentation, all with a view to 
explaining how latín America and the Caribbean itay best 
perform iñ the world economy. In section B, consideratlon is 
given to the béhaviour in recent years of the dcanestic and 
foreign sectors of the United States economy in an attempt to 
appraise the way in which impulses of varying intensity and 
transmitted along many different channels have increasingly 
affected the countries of the región. Sene of the prospeets 
for the economic relations between the región and the United 
States are then examined, and suggestions are nade ooncerning 
ways of improving the position of Latín America and the 
Caribbean within the framewark of those relations. In section 
C stress is laid on the state and contingencies of economic 
relations (primarily trade, oommercial and technolcgical 
relations) between Latín America and the Caribbean and the 
European Economic Ooumunity, and this is followed by soma 
suggestions for expanding and strengthening co-operation 
between the two regions. 
In chapter III, a review is nade of sene of the nain 
features of the exportation of goods fran Latín America and 
the Caribbean. Section A, which deals with commodities, 
contains a description of the unfavourable development of the 
international cenmodities market during the 1980s so far, 
followed by observatians cancerning the causes of that trend. 
Further an, a review is made of possible joint action at 
international and regional level, which the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean could take in arder to erihance the 
contribution nade by conmodity trade to their economic and 
«yrüi development. In section B, consideration is given to 
recent developments in world trade, with emphasis laid on what 
has happened in carmection with the protectionism. practised by 
the industrialized countries; an examination is nade of the 
characteristics of protectionist practices in the United 
States and the EEC, and emphasis is placed on the 
discriminatory nature of the protectionism besetting the 
región's exports in the markets of the developed countries. 
Chapter IV is dedicated to trade in services in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and in particular, to the 
international initiatives taken in this carmection in various 
multilateral forums. An analysis is nade of sene of the basic 
aspeets of the possible insertion of the región in world 
production and international trade in services, and the 
chapter ends with a f éw suggestions ooncerning the f ormulation 
of policd.es in Latín America and the Caribbean in this 
connection. 
The fifth and final chapter of Part One of the study 
deals with problema relating to external financing and debt iñ 
Latín America and the Caribbean. consideration is given to the 
financial trends and prospeets in the región, projections 
being nade up to the mld-l990s; an analysis is nade of the 
origin and nature of the external debt of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and finally suggestions are made with regard to 
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sene ajproaches to regional action relating to the payment and 
serviciiig of the externa! debt. 
Part Two of the document, vtoich is ctedicated to regional 
integratim and cx)-operation, contains three chaptars which 
deal, ^ze^iectíveiy, with negotiations and Instruments for 
revitallziñg regional trade, the search for modas of 
cxxivergence betsreen integration and co-operation and the 
sewioes sec±cor in intra-regicaial trade. 
With regard . to negotiations and Instruments far 
revitalizing regional trade> dealt wlth in chapter I, little 
progrese is apparent in the application of agreements adopted 
ty high gcvernment authorities in various political forums in 
the región convened as part of the procese initiated by the 
Latin American Éoonomic Conferencie held at Quito in January 
1984. An easeption to this rule might be the round of 
negotiations of the countries maribers of the latin American 
Integration Association (AIADI), held in Buenos Aires an 7 to 
9 Aprll 1986 as a result of a decisión tafeen at the Montevideo 
Meeting in March 1985. 
ibis; \round of negotiations was expected to reactívate 
interregional trade, which had been strongly affected by the 
bottlenéck in the external sector, the drop in denestic denand 
and the econetnic orisis experienced throughout the región 
since 1982. It should be noted that the options for 
revitalizing trade among the countries members of AIADI might 
ale» be extended to the remaining countries of the región, 
given the flexibility of the Montevideo Treaty of 1980 and the 
existanoe of ad hoc mechanisms for this parpóse. 
The regional negotiations might concéntrate en the 
strengthening of the trade channels established by medium-
sized and small countries with thoee countries of latin 
America and the Caribbean with the highest level of eoonomic 
development, and acnsideratian might aleo be given to goods 
with the greatest potential for reactivating trade. Ihe 
studies carried out so far show that a oonsiderable impact 
could be had on the depressed state of intemational trade 
flows if action were taken in connection with a small number 
of goods (200 to 300). 
Once the group of projeets subject to negotiation were 
identified, it would be neoessary to select the Instruments to 
facilítate trade in them, in aocordanoe with the specific 
characteristics of the goods oonoerned and the ways iñ which 
they are traded in the respective maritata. It should be borne 
in i«ind that in many cases customs tariffs and iaport duelas 
havt lost much of their impact in the face of non-tariff 
restrictions, suppliers' credits and State purchases. 
Morec-ver, the use of foreign trade instruments limitad to the 
objectives of the negotiation might be expected to keep 
interference in national policies and in the intemational 
commitments of each country down to a mínimum. 
The rearientatian of same trade towards Latin American 
and Caribbean suppliers might help to solve sane big problems 
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such as, for example, the drop in the demand for most 
ccsnnodities, the crisis in the industrial sector and the 
imbalanoes in intra-regianal trade. 
As for the search for mcdes of convergence between 
interregional integratian and co-operation examined in chapter 
II, it has been shown that co-operation initiatives in Latin 
America and the Caribbean are often prcmoted inorganically, as 
in sene notable cases of concertad action (for example, action 
relating to nuclear energy, the latin American Associátion of 
capital Goods Industries, the Aroazon Co-operation Ireaty, the 
Andean Reserve Fund and the latin American Qrganization for 
the Developmsnt of Fishing). 
Furthermore, the subxegional integratian arrangements are 
experiencing a prolonged and far-reaching crisis, in 
particular with regard to programes for the liberatión of 
trade through the application of traditional instruments such 
as customs tariffs and co-ordinated trade policies. 
As a result of the two faets just mentianed, it is 
intended to systematize the premotion of and follow up on co-
operation initiatives, by creating or strengthening units 
specializing in co-operation within the integratian 
arrangements and by strengthening the latin American Eooncnic 
System (SHA), and to engage in taska relating to the regional 
co-ordination of subregional co-operation efforts. 
Finally, in chapter III, relating to the services sector 
in intra-regianal trade, consideration is given to transport 
and insurance, as being the most important of the non-
financial services which figure in the balance of payments. 
On the basis of this examination, it is concluded that 
there is a wide margin for import and export sübstitution of 
transport services in the madium-sized and small AIADI 
countries and also, although to a lesser degree, in thoee 
countries of the Associátion which are more highly developed 
econaiiically. Ths share of national and local transport is 
significantly higher in the valué of the trade among the AIADI 
countries than it is in the valué of the total trade of thoee 
countries. 
The wide variety of Information available makes it 
necessary to extend the analysis of each ocuntry in arder to 
abtain more detailed conclusians. Similarly, in arder to 
advance in the study of possibilities of replacing means of 
transport from outside the área, consideration must be given 
to the physical volume of shipments, and the goods traded nust 
be grouped together in accordance with thelr characteristics 
in so far as transport is concerned. 
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Part One 
THE INTERNATIONAL EOONCMIC REIATIONS OF IATTN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN 

I. THE DEVELOBffiNT OF THE WORLD EOCNOtt AND ITS IMPACES 
CN IATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 
OFTIONS AND POIICEES 
A. INTSCCUCHCN 
In this chapter an attempt is nade to prcvide a frame of 
reference for an analysis of the development of and prospecte 
for the world economy and their impacts on the economy of 
Latin America and the Caribbean and also to throw light on 
some matters which will undoubtedly affect the outlook for the 
regional economy. 
Tbday's international economy appears slower and more 
vmbalanced than it did in its postwar setting, that is to say 
in the pericd 1950-1970. The recessive economy of the 1980s 
has not given way to a vigorous recovery in the centres, 
except in the United States economy, and even it is showing 
signs of weaker expansión. The two sharpest features —which 
have, moreover, persisted throughout the 1980s— of the 
situation of disequilibrium in which the international economy 
is set, consist first in the tremendous lack of adjustment in 
the United States economy and second in the burdensome 
indebtedness of same of the developing eoonomies, including 
those of nearly all the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
The slow growth of the world economy and henee of 
international trade is set against the need of the indebted 
eoonomies of the región to expand their exporte. Similarly, 
the macroeconamic disequilibria of the United States economy 
(fiscal déficit, high real interest rates, trade déficit) 
créate unoertainties which have a particular impact on Latin 
America and the caribbean in view of the región's cióse 
reciprocal trade relationship and magnitude of its 
indebtedness with prívate bariks in that country. Conseguently, 
the prospecte for expanding exporte to the rest of the world 
are closely linked not only to the general dynamism of the 
world economy but also and in particular to the way in which 
the United States seeks to resolve or correct its deep-seated 
external macroeconomic disequilibria. 
The lose of balance and the growing diseguilibrium of the 
world economy has not only decelerated the pace of 
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international trade but is also altering the rules in which 
trade is carried out. Ihe formulas of nanaged trade and 
counter trade, which are not always compatible with the rules 
and spirit of the General Agreement on lariffs and Trade 
(GATT), are proliferating in North-South trade and also in 
relatians among countries of the North, as a counterpart of 
the protectionism which is being practlsed at national level 
by the big industrial centres in arder to preserve their 
national martets and guard their levéis of domestic activity. 
At a more important structural level, changes are 
occurring in the oomposition of international trade and in the 
relative participatian of different countries and regians of 
the world. These changes are not unrelated to the econonic 
restructuring of the centres (growing importance of pxoduction 
and trade in services) or to the emergence of new industrial 
producers and ejqporters in the countries of southeast Asia and 
other regions of the world. 
A careful sounding of this changing and complex world 
scenario gives rise to questions which are difficult to 
answer. The prospects for the economy of Latin America are, 
however, strongly influenced by these processes. This chapter 
represents an attempt to provide a frame of ref erence for same 
of the thiríking in this respect. 
B. IHE INTERNATTCNAL EftNCRAMA AND U S IMPLECATTCMS FCR 
IATIN AMÉRICA AND IHE CARIBBEAN 
1. Chanaes in world econonic trends 
It is in fact ccramon fcnowledge that the 1970s produced some 
facts and processes which had a particular impact on the world 
economy. As regarás prcduction, the growth of the economy of 
the centres observed in the period 1950-1970 slowed down, 
although the Japanese economy showed great dynamism — f ar more 
than that observed in the United States and the European 
Econonic Community. During this period, what are known as the 
newly industrialized countries also expanded. The loss of 
dynamism of the centres and the emergence of new and vigorous 
competitors in the world economy helpad, in particular towards 
the end of the 1970s, to promote new fonns of protectionism 
with regard to the manufactures exported by the developing 
regians, and that in addition to the traditional protectionism 
with regard to farm products practlsed by the Community and 
the United States. 
Within the framework of these trends of a structural 
nature in the realm of production and trade, there were also 
some singular occurrences in the monetary, commercial and 
financial field to which attention should be drawn. The 
surplus of US dollars in the rest of the world and the 
diminishing gold reserves in the United States caused the 
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dallar to be declared iiwonvertible in 1971. In 1973, the 
oil-oqparting countries succeeded in iupoeiig the f iret large 
rise in petroleum prioes. The trade surpluees of the large oil 
exporters «ere recycled through international prívate banks 
and oonverted into substantial loans grantad In particular to 
the developing countries. Financial flcws were increasingly 
taken over by the prívate sector, lntergovernmental credit 
institutions became less irtportant and the same thing happened 
to direct prívate investment in International capital 
movements. 
The unsteadying effects of these processes on, 
International trade were apparent in so far as the déficits 
and surpluses resulting frota the petroleum crisis were 
concerned, «hile they were more embryonic and unpredictable as 
regards changes in the international financial structure. 
During this period, however, the international trade of Latin 
America grew on average wlth considerable dynamism, and the 
economy of the región experienced greater opermess to worid 
trade. This, for the Latin American oil-exporting countries, 
was a reflection of the increase in petroleum prices, and it 
also reflectad an attempt to premióte and diversify exports. 
The greater epenness of the United States, in particular 
towards the oil-producing countries, in its foreign trade 
coefficient was partially responsible for the expansión of 
Latin American exports during this phase. 
This dynamism was maintained, with a few upe and downs, 
throughout the 1970s, both for exports and for imports; during 
this period international prices also followed a relatively 
favourable course in respect of the produets exported by the 
región. In the second half of the decade, financial 
permissiveness origlnating in the prívate sector resulted in 
addit-.low] affluence in the external sector of the Latin 
American countries and helped to promote the process of 
indebtedness characteristlc of this period. Nevertheless, 
during the period 1976-1980, Latin American imports surpassed 
exports by only 2% on average. Thus, the accumulated déficit 
in the gcods account in those f ive years amounted to about 
US$ 5.2 millicm «hile the déficit on current account 
accumulated for that period totalled cióse to US$ 90 billian, 
which was roostly ascribable to financial factor services. It 
may theref ore be concluded that the external debt created its 
own self-sustaining dynamic basad an high real interest rates 
and reschedulings because of the impoesibility of servicing 
the debt. 
However, the trend towards opermess and expansión in the 
región "s international trade carne to an abrupt halt at the 
beginning of the l980s following a relentless reorientatian of 
the ecanomic policy of the United States. With the objective 
of cambating inflationary pressures and promoting economic 
reactivation, a restrictive policy with a manetaristic slant 
was initlated in this country in combinatian with a slackening 
of tax pressure in accordanoe with the supply-side philosophy 
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which, as this prooess was set into motion, tended to 
predcráinate among the efforts towards reactivatian. The 
restrictian of the money supply, which was aimed at ocmbating 
the inflatian, together with the growing fiscal déficit due, 
among other things, to the tax reduction and financed out of 
prívate savings, causad a rise in interest rates and a 
substantial inflew of financial capital to the markets of the 
United States. 
To balance their own financial markets and avoid 
inflationary pressures, the remaiiüng OBCD economies raised 
their interest rates, thereby increasing the financial cost of 
investment in preductian in the entire developing world and 
helping to genérate recessive pressures. As a result, the 
world market decelerated and later on stagnated, setting off a 
collapse in commodity prices which knows no equal in the past 
50 years. The drop in levéis of activity and enployment in 
industrializad countries exaoerbated the protectionist 
pressures which had been building up in the 1970s and became 
particularly notable in connection with agricultura and sene 
manufactures which the developing countries produce with 
canparative advantages. 
The staggering of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, 
variable surcharges, safeguard clauses, compensatory duties, 
technical trade barriers and export and production subsidies 
are sane of the measures cotnmonly adopted by the 
industrialized countries to protect and roanage trade, not only 
within their trade relations with the countries of the South 
but also as part of their reciprocal trade. 
Such protectionist measures have been resorted to by the 
European Economic Qsmmunity and Japan in particular. The GATT 
regulations appear to be losiñg their forcé and are 
increasingly violated in this new setting. The changing 
circumstances are also giving rise to new foreign trade laws 
in the developed world. One of these is the 1984 Trade and 
Tariff Act of the United States of America which gives the 
executive branch new functions and also clarifies the terms of 
reference of the United States negotiators with respect to 
servioes, high-level technology and investment in trade. 
It is common knowledge that the irrpact of these new 
trends and processes on the región has been devastating. The 
rise of interest rates, the reduced demand frem the centres 
due to recessive and protectionist trends, the collapse of 
cammodity prices and the withdrawal of intemational f inancing 
are same of the roajor factors responsible for the stifling of 
the región extemally. The ratio between debt servicing and 
valué of exports has reached limits which are hard to sustain, 
and the situation has grown worse due to the above-mentioned 
reduction in the inflow of capital, especially that of private 
origin, to the point where the región has became a net 
exporter of capital. 
The recessive adjustment made in an attempt to meet the 
debt commitments by producing an adeguate surplus in the trade 
20 
balance has causad a sharp drop in the regían's levéis of 
activity and eaplopent during the 1980s so far, so that the 
present per capita product of latón America and the Caribbean 
is lower than in 1980. 
2. Latín American export prospecte 
The examinatian of the future growth prospecte of Latín 
American exporte is not unrelated to the evolution of certain 
structural trends now observad in the international econcscy. 
In the first place, the OECD countries are changing their 
structures of production by making technological 
transformations which are giving services a greater share in 
the camposition both of the product and of enployment. These 
structural changes are in all likelihood part and parcel of a 
technological transition (microelectronics, biotechnology, 
energy diversification) which will continué beyond the 
twentieth oentury and which has already begun to alter the 
situatian which existed with respect to comparative 
advantages, not only between centres and peripheries taut also 
among the centres themselves. This prccess helps to genérate 
tensión and friction in connection with international 
competitian, which militate against the liberation and 
muí ti 1 ateralization of ccmmercial practices. 
In the long run, during the next century, the develcpment 
of the centres will be affected by profound intemal 
structural changes, which will certainly alter international 
productive specialization and change the fraraework in which 
comparative advantages now opérate and therefore change the 
coraposition and dynamics of world trade. 
Secondly, within the industrial sector, there has been a 
long-term reduction in the conplementarity which existed 
between the industrialized and the industrializing countries. 
Thus, the structures of industrial production have become more 
competitive, in particular because of the emergence of the 
"new industrial countries", whose manufactures are of 
appropriate guality and price to compete on the markets of the 
centres. These structural trends obstructed the 
re-establishment of open, multilateral trade of the kind 
advocated by the Havana Charter, which gave rise to GATT. 
Third, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
are in a different position from that of the other developing 
countries. On the one hand, their econonies are much more 
diversif ied than those of the poorer countries of Asia and 
África, and they cannot hope to participarte with them on an 
equal footing in certain types of official development aid 
intended for the poor nations. Ñor do they benefit from trade 
concessions, such as those provided for in the Lomé Agreement, 
which the European countries tend to grant to their former 
colonies.l/ On the other hand, however, their economies have 
not achieved large-scale, highly diversified industrial 
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production capable of competing on the martets of the centres, 
such as happens, for example, in the case of goods available 
for export from the countries of southeast Asia. 
C. EROSEECIS POR THE WORLD ECÓNOMO AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON IATTN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
The prospects for the world economy are uncertaiii, and it 
would be particularly risty to attempt to forecast them. None 
of the many causes of this uncertaiiity is particularly 
relevant for Latin America and the Caribbean; i.e., the future 
trend of international interest rates and of the valué of the 
región's potential export earnings. 
In general, these variables are affected by the rise or 
reduction in dynamism of the industrial centres and their 
consequent demand for imports frcm the periphexy and by the 
pattern of protectionism, which vill determine whether these 
import demands are met. The economic recovery of the centres 
will be beneficial for Latin America: i) if it is acconpanied 
by a reduction in protectionism; ii) if it actually makes it 
possible to increase the volume and unit valué of Latin 
American exports and iii) if, it also involves a reduction in 
real interest rates, v*tich nave a harsh impact on debt 
servicing. 
It is not possible in this introductory chapter to make a 
detailed examination of the factors underlying the behaviour 
of these variables in the central economies. This task is 
tackled more systematically in the chapters which. follow. A 
few observations are, however, called for concerning the 
present trends and prospects of the Uhited States economy 
because of its decisive impact on the behaviour of the 
international monetary and financial field. In additian, the 
course followed by the North American economy has, as everyone 
knows, a particular impact on the regional economy. As has 
been repeatedly stated, there is a cause-and-effect 
relationship between the magnitude of the déficit of the 
Uhited States, the high level of real interest rates and the 
fragility or inadequacy of the economic recovery of the 
centres. On the other hand, the strong dollar, which goes 
along with high interest rates, sustains and increases the 
enormous trade déficit of the United States, which helps to 
stimulate exports frcm certain countries of the centre, in 
particular those of Japan; from the newly industrialized 
countries and also from Latin America and the CarJbbean. 
1. structural maladiustments in the econamv 
of the United States 
What is the likelihood that the fiscal déficit of the United 
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States, which is a decisive factor in keeping interest rates 
up, can be larought rapidly under control? It would be 
hazardous to attempt to reply categorically to this question, 
but several altematives can be seen which would have varying 
effects on the economy of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The first of these, which was advocated by the so-called 
"supply side" economists of the United States, assumed that 
eoonondc growth would result in increased tax earnings and 
that greater earnings would be achieved with lcwer tax rates. 
It vías also assumed that the high interest rates would be 
offset by an increase in domestic private savings, under the 
Ímpetus of those high rates and the tax reductions. This 
increase in domestic private savings would, for its part, also 
exert pressure to drive the interest rates down. As it 
happened, however, the recent growth of the United States 
economy did not reduce the size of the déficit or 
significantly relieve the pressure on interest rates. On the 
other hand, domestic private savings have not lived up to 
expectations, and extemal savings constitute the major source 
of financing the fiscal déficit of the United States at the 
present time. Por the first time this century, the United 
States has become a debtor economy. In addition, the strength 
of the dallar has led this country into an unprecedented trade 
déficit. Thus, the expectations to which this scenario gave 
rise have not materialized, and instead we have the present 
situation, which, in the case of latin America and the 
Caribbean, is characterized by high rates of interest which 
créate a debt-servicing burden, and by a notable increase in 
exporte towards the United States. 
Another scenario worthy of note might hypothetically 
include a classical structural containment of the fiscal 
déficit (reduction of public spending, increased tax earnings 
or both), which would have recessive effects on the North 
American economy due to the drop in domestic spending. On the 
other hand, these recessive effects could be partially offset 
by the reduction in interest rates and by the gradual 
devaluation of the dollar which would increase the 
competitiveness of United States products. Where the región is 
concerned, this alternative would be favourable because of the 
reduction in interest rates and the possibility of a partial 
"settlement" of its debt, but it would nave an unfavourable 
effect on the sale of its exporte in a depressed United States 
market. On the other hand, it would increase the 
competitiveness of commodities guoted in dollars and exported 
by the región to Europe and Japan. 
Another projection might embody the expectations of 
foreign investors now purchasing dollars in the rest of the 
worid in order to invest them financially in the United 
States. If these sizeable savings were more or less radically 
reduced as a result of the proverbial volatility of the 
psychological factors involved, the main source of financing 
the fiscal déficit and making up for the déficit in the 
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balance of payments of the United States might be weakened. If 
the rooney supply remained restricted and real interest rates 
rose even further, as the result of an effort to recover the 
external savings lost and even to avoid a suelden and excessive 
weakening of the dollar, this altemative would be 
particularly harmful to the indebted countries of Latín 
America. Of course, if this process took place too intensely 
and abruptly, the very stability of the international 
financial system might be affected. 
2. ühoertainty concernim future scenarios and ways 
and means of international trade 
The above digressions, incomplete and superficial though they 
may be, are, however, useful in that they demónstrate the 
weakness of the región in the face of external factors and the 
impossibility of forecasting the future warld saenario. The 
alternatives briefly outlined above are only a few of the 
possible scenarios. They may be put together in roany 
combinations, may materialize at different rates or may 
embrace possibilities which nave not been considered here, 
such as, for example, inflationary financing of the United 
States déficit. 
The vulnerability of the world economy to financial 
speculaticm and the political options adopted in the developed 
wcrld, especially in the United States, are the factors which 
cause the most difficulty in forecasting the future. However, 
in view of the widespread uncertainty which exists with regard 
to growth and in the light of the tremendous disequilibria 
which now prevail with respect to trade, payments and 
indebtedness, it seems reasonable to adopt prudent and 
cautious strategies which do not rely too much in the dynamism 
of the international economy or on the receptiveness of its 
markets. 
Various factors are responsible for the collapse of the 
prices of commodities exported by Latín America and the 
Caribbean (a decline of over 32%, excluding petroleum prices, 
in the period 1980-1985). The f irst of these was the 
overvaluation of the dollar, which had a generally harmful 
effect on cammodity exports quoted in dollars, causing them to 
become less competitive on the markets of Europe and Japan. 
The second factor was the rise in interest rates, which on the 
one hand increased the cost of maintaining enormous stocks of 
commodities and on the other reduced the overall prospeets for 
economic growth and thereby dampened hopes for a future rise 
in the prices of the commodities affected. Third, the 
agricultural protectionism practised by the United States and 
EEC not only caused a drop in imports of farm commodities by 
the OECD countries but also made it necessary to compete with 
increased supplies in other markets. Fourth, the technological 
changes and new patterns of consumption caused an even further 
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reductian in the product elasticity of deroard for sene 
industrial inputs (steel, copper, etc.) and the inceme 
elasticity of demarri for same foodstuffs (such as sugar-cane) 
in the countries of the centre. Finally, in spite of the 
recovery nade by the United States in the 1983-1984 biennium, 
the econcBdc growth of the GECD countries in the f irst f ive 
years of the 1980s was lower than that maintained in the past, 
in particular where industry was concerned, and, as everybcdy 
knows, camnedity prices always fluctuate more than does the 
econemie growth of the centres. 
The slow economic growth of those developed countries 
which tend to trade the most with Iatin America and the 
Caribbean and the disequilibrium characterizing the 
international markets are the itain factors which militate 
against the liberalization and multilateral aspect of trade 
policies. Governments participated more directly and 
ef fectively in trade negotiations as their hopes regarding the 
stabilizing effeets of the market f orces fell. As long as the 
disequilibrium now observed in the world economy persists, 
governments will probably exercise increased vigilance over 
their trade balances with different regions and countries, 
adopting attitudes of reciprocity based on principies and 
mechanisms which deviate increasingly fren those which 
characterize free, multilateral trade. 
The clearest and best known example of this new bias in 
the direction of "managed trade" is to be found in the new 
Trade and Tarif f Act recently passed by Oongress and put into 
practice by the Executive branch of the United States, which 
strengthens the facilities opened to the President to bend the 
rules and legislate with regard to trade in sexvices. 
Attention should also be drawn to regulation 2641/84 of the 
European Economic Coramunity relating to the strengthening of 
the oommon trade policy. Another conspicuous example of this 
trend towards managed trade based on the principie of 
reciprocity and on direct bilateral negotiations is the 
increase in counter trade and, in particular, in counter 
purchase. Counter trade is aimed at alleviating trade 
diseguilibria, the shortage of foreign curreney and market 
reducticns and losses due to these factors. It is a 
traditional form of trade between East and West, which has 
been increasingly extended to North-North negotiations and 
also to North-South negotiations thanks to the active 
participation of transnational marketing corporations. In 
South-South trade, counter trade generally involves the active 
and direct participation of the governments concerned, and may 
opérate not only bilaterally but also multilaterally when 
practised within the framework of regional or subregional 
integration and economic co-operation agreements. 
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3. Same conclusions 
This restrictive scenario based on an unstable financial 
picture and the increasing prevalence of managed trade and 
counter trade, is likely to become inore important in the 
remainder of this decade for reasons which may be sumnarized 
briefly by way of conclusión. 
First, the loss of dynairdsm of the world economy, and in 
particular the current slow growth of the centres, will 
prdbably continué in the short and médium term, creating 
employment problems in the centres themselves and thereby 
giving rise to protectionist pressures, which w ü l opérate 
selectively, side by side with the mechanisms and expedients 
of managed trade. It should be noted that this observatian by 
no means exeludes the possibility in the longer term of a 
sharp resurgence of the dynamism of the centres, as a result 
of the new technologies vitada, are emerging. 
Second, the shift of the product and of employment 
towards service activities in the centres is part of a 
thorough-going technological transformatian (accampanied by 
advances in miexoelectronics, biotechnolcgy, energy 
diversification, etc.), which is now in full swing. This great 
structural transition causes additional friction as regards 
employment in the goods-producing activities, and the 
emergenee of new industrial activities as a result of the 
technological progress made in the centres is beginning to 
change the framework of comparative advantages inherited from 
the past. While this transformation is oceurring, the 
protectionist pressures on the more traditional sectors of the 
econcmy are increasing. 
Third, within the structure of manufacturing at world 
level, the relative shares of the contribution of heavy and of 
light industry in the generation of the industrial product 
have been leveling off. Many peripheral countries at an 
intermedíate stage in their development, and in particular the 
"new industrial countries" have begun to cárpete on the world 
market using goods produced by their heavy industry. This 
could strengthen ccramercial competition — i n the short and 
médium terms—, particularly in the cases of the larger and 
more highly developed countries of the región, which are 
already venturing into these fields. In the longer run, it is 
to be expected that the exportable production of the centres 
will shift in the direction of activities in which higher 
technology is used, which are now in the most active stage of 
their development. But the revolutionary technological 
alternatives which are smarging could also be used to revive 
the competitiveness of industries at present obsolete in the 
centres. 
Fourth, within the framework of these restrictive 
scenarios, the región is in a special and different position. 
On the one hand, its industrial produets —and this probably 
exeludes the produets of Brazil— will not, in the short term, 
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reach levéis of ccrapetitiveness in the worid market comparable 
to, for example, those which the newly Industrializad 
countries of southeast Asia can offer. On the other hand, the 
diversification of the región's production and its mid-level 
standards of living teep i t , at least to same extent, frcm 
enjoying the "catparative advantage" associated with the lew 
viage costs, «Mch tend to prevail in the poorer countries of 
Asia and África. Ñor, on the other hand, dees its position as 
a semi-developed región allow it to aspire fully to the credit 
assistanoe and trade preferences granted within the framework 
of international co-operation. 
Fifth, in the context of the North-South type of vertical 
relations, the reglón as a whole cannot hope to particípate in 
the preferences which the major European countries extend to 
their former colonies or to benefit from the special 
comntercial and financial ties which Japan has been 
establishing with the countries of southeast Asia. The primary 
orbit of its relationships has its hub In the United States, 
which has provided no special cantnercial preferences with 
respect to it. The recently established CarJbbean Basin 
Initiative seems to nave nade a number of its concessions and 
benefits conditional upon a certain type of behaviour and on 
political guarantees on the part of the recipient countries in 
the subregion. On the other hand, it should be reiterated that 
the recent increase in exports towards the United States is 
due to the economic recovery of that country but that the 
short-term forecast is for a weakening of the growth trend in 
the United States and that in the médium term, its trade 
déficit appears to be approaching limts at which it will be 
difficult to sustain. 
In light of these factors and of the general exacerbation 
of protectionist pressures, it will not be easy for the Latin 
American countries to achieve a fluid and dynamic expansión of 
their exports to the markets of the centres or, in general, to 
compete at international level. The future plans for the 
región's external trade activities should give consideration 
to this restrictive international scenario which threatens to 
continué throughout this decade, thereby affecting the 
international financial situation of the región. 
4. TVÍO complementary lines of action for the región 
Adherence to two central guidelines may, perhaps, help to 
orient the action of Latin America and the Caribbean. They are 
oomplementary, and each one strengthens the other. On the ene 
hand, the need is emerging to organize and exert stronger 
bargaining power which can stand up to the rest of the world 
arid, in particular, to the developed countries. On the other 
hand, it has become imperative to check the deterioration of 
intra-regional trade and to seek mechanisms and instruments 
which can be applied intensively to its revitalization by 
strengthening regional integration and co-operation. 
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These two basic approaches are based on guiding 
principies which are pentanently valid but take on new 
significance in the present world and regional eoonomic 
scenario. Awareness of the current crisis has been expressed 
in political and institutional frameworks of such importance 
as the Iatin American Economic Conference held at Quito in 
January 1984. The joint consideration of the problem of the 
debt also gave rise to a series of meetings held under the 
Cartagena Consensus, in which emphasis has been increasingly 
laid on the cióse relationship between debt and trade in the 
present regional crisis. 
D. POSSIELE ALTERNATIVES POR ACITON 
1. Sane strateqy elements: export prcrootion 
and import substitution 
at regional level 
B» objective of prcsnoting exports is clearly understood by 
the Latín American countries at the present time, and there is 
no need to dwell on it in this document. The unusual reduction 
of imports during the first five years of this decade was 
associated with the all too well-known and painful recessive 
phenomena to which consideration has already been given. The 
social cost of the policy responsible for this reduction is 
difficult to sustain in the médium term and must be replaced 
by a policy of import rationalization and selective 
substitution in order to supply the basic needs of the 
pqpulation and satisfy the urgent reguirements for inputs and 
eguipment needed to reactivate domestic productive apparatuses 
and to resume economic development. 
The development and promotion of exports and the 
selective rationalization and substitution of imports are two 
camplementary and indispensable ways of generating the trade 
surpluses needed to relieve the external asphyxia due to the 
debt burden now borne by the región. This dees not mean 
overlooking or underestimating the need to continué the 
struggle, in the financial realm, for a more equitable 
distribution of the tremendous burden of the external debt. 
The foreign economic policy of each country of the región 
is affected by a variety of factors peculiar to each of them 
which are associated with the nature and composition of their 
exportable production and their absolute and relative economic 
size and also with the demands and problems which arise out of 
the economic situation (inflation, unemployment, etc.) which 
obviously differ significantly in each case. Each country's 
commercial policy provides for foreign trade instruments, such 
as subsidies, tariffs and exchange rates, many of which also 
reflect, at least partially, conditions due to the domestic 
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econcnác situation. Biis, however, constitutes no obstacle to 
the exploration of áreas of convergence and co-operation 
within the general structure of the comercial policy which 
the various countries may adopt in the future. 
Import substitution and export promotion are two 
interdependent and complementary strategies with a regional 
dimensión, which can be viewed in combination with the efforts 
which each country must make at national level in this field. 
Many individual canmercial policy instruments may be used 
together at regional level with the objective of export 
promotion and import substitution. In this connection, it is 
noted in an ECIAC document that "potentially the growth of 
intra-regional trade has a doubly dynamic effect. Over the 
short tena, it allows for the utilization of installed 
capacity by increasing exports. Moreover, as far as importe 
are concerned, the efforts made by individual countries to 
substitute them can, to a large extent, enhance the productive 
capacity of the región as a whole, thus substantially 
diversifying the opportunities for substitution. In order for 
this two-fold effect to take place, it will be necessary 
simultaneously to strengthen regional trade and financial 
arrangements in order to make it possible to reduce the use of 
intemationally convertible currencies. To the extent that it 
did not affect exports to third countries, the intensification 
of trade and of the concamitant effort to substitute importe 
at the regional level would free resources that could be used 
to import fram the centres those goods which Latín America is 
not in a position to produce".2/ 
An import substitution process established at regional 
level works in combination with and provides a necessary 
complement for export promotion at national level. If all 
Latin American countries increase their imports from Latin 
America and the Caribbean, they will all, as a logical 
counterpart, be promoting their exports to the región. In this 
connection, the document guoted above goes on to make the 
following observation: "There is, however, a group of 
countries that are in a better position to promote both the 
import substitution process and the intensification of 
intra-regional trade. These are the large countries and same 
of the medium-sized countries which carry a great deal of 
weight —or could s o — in intra-regional trade. Same of them, 
such as Argentina, Brazil and México, export a relatively high 
volume of manufactures to the región. In the case of 
Vemzuela, its high purchasing power is due to the fact that 
it :'.s an oil exporter. These countries could increase their 
salet". within the región if they first increased their 
purchases fram the región. Their more highly diversified 
productive power enables them to offer a much wider variety of 
goods to the región".3/ 
Those countries which are relatively less well developed 
economically and produce a smaller variety of goods for export 
may have to pay a certain additional cost on purchasing 
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manufactures from the more highly developed countries of the 
región, by comparison with what they would pay for the same 
manufactures imported fram the centres, but the possibility of 
making such a sacrifice would be offset by the savings made in 
convertible currencies and the internal economic reactivation 
realized as a result of paying for merchandise with exports of 
other merchandise. 
Viewed in this way, import substitution on a regional 
scale operates luce an export-promotion policy for each 
country participating in it, and a process is conceivable, or 
in any case lies within the realm of possibility, in which the 
región provides substitutes for imports at such a rate that 
its coefficient of trade with the rest of the world declines 
while at the same time each country within the región 
increases its trade as a result of its openness to trade with 
the other countries in the región. Hdwever, the strategy 
outlined by no means calis for a shift, even in relative 
terms, in the region's econony since, strictly speaking, the 
reduction in imports has been caused by the recessive 
adjustment. The approach proposed is aimed rather at 
rationalizing imports from the centre countries. In view of 
the current reduction in our import capacity and at creating 
conditions more apt to favour an increase in exports outside 
the región. The latter would result from the increased 
ccnpetitiveness which the region's goods would gradually 
acquire on the world's market through the well-known econcmies 
of scale and the specialization achieved as the regional 
market expands. From this point of view, the inward-directed 
development and integration process also promotes the region's 
autonomy and bargaining power vis-á-^vis the outside world. 
Within the framework of these general guidelines, mention 
may be made of same mechanisms suitable for use in the 
attainment of such objectives. 
These instruments are, in general, able to function on 
both levéis (inward-directed development and integration and 
outward-directed concertation and bargaining power) in 
illustration of the fact that everything which increases 
regional cohesión, also increases the region's autonomy and 
bargaining power vis-á-vis the rest of the world. 
2. Regional action 
Concrete measures for increasing the economic links within the 
región and solving the pressing problem of the external debt 
include, first and foremost, those already agreed to by the 
governments at the Latin American Economic Conference held at 
Quito and the second meeting of the Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Relations of the Latin American Integration 
Association (AIADI) and in the Cartagena Consensus. 
Measures which might help to bring intra-regional trade 
back to the levéis at which it once stood include: 
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i) use of the puxchasing power of the State to increase 
trade vith other cxuntries and to arrange negotiations with 
third-party cxuntries. The State, either directly or through 
its independent enterprises, purchases, on average, cióse to 
40% of all the imports of Iatin American cxuntries in the 
exterior. It is also a significant inporter of capital goods, 
fuels and focdstuffs. Negotiations between State entities and 
enterprises ainad at diverting sane of those purchases (sene 
10% perhaps) touards the región would nave an imnediate effect 
on the level of regional trade. It should be borne in mind 
that a large number of State-oontrolled bodies are exempted 
from the payment of customs duties and other charges levied on 
imports which malea such negotiations difficult. Furthermore, 
if State purchases are nade primarily in the econamically less 
well developed oountries of the región, which find it more 
difficult to realize their export potencial on the world 
market, it will be possible to do away with scme trade 
imbalances which are largely responsible for the paralysis in 
world trade; 
ii) freezing non-tariff restrictions on regional trade and 
proceeding towards their gradual eliminación, in view of the 
fact that such restrictions seriously jeopardized the 
achievement roade in reciprocal trade after a great deal of 
effort. Iatin American countries suffer major imbalances in 
their economic relations with the industrialized centres, 
particularly in those balance-of-payments items which pertain 
to services, so that there is no justification for applying 
non-tariff restrictions to regional trade as rigorously as to 
trade with third-party countries; 
iii) extensión of the regional tariffs preference beyond 
its present symbolic meaning. The real effectiveness of this 
mechanism depends on its application in conjunction with other 
measures, such as the eliminación of non-tariff restrictions 
on regional trade, the actual application of tariffs to State 
purchases and the lifting of the many provisions for 
exceptions which exist in Iatin America and the Caribbean; 
iv) systematic exploración of the possibilities for 
counter trade in bilateral and multilateral approaches to 
reciprocal trade, making use, wherever appropriate, of the 
institucional frameworks and mechanisms contained in regional 
and subregional economic integration arrangements. 
Consideración of the usefulness of this mechanism in trade 
relations with developed countries and their transnationals 
and in trade with other regions of the world; 
v) joint consideración of the prospeets for and viability 
of a scheme whereby the more highly developed countries of the 
región, which are usually the most active participants in 
regional trade, would form multinacional marketing enterprises 
aimed at promoting greater fluidity in the reeyeling, within 
or outside the región, of produets purchased under counter 
trade agreements, in particular produces from Latin American 
and Caribbean countries whose exportable production is nct 
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very diverse. The presence of such marketing enterprises, 
organized in the manner of those in the developed vrorld, would 
favour interregional trade, the formalization of counter trade 
agreements and the possibility of selling, in the región or 
abroad, products which the least developed countries in the 
región are able to export; 
vi) enhancement of reciprocal payments and loans 
agreements by extending the real payment periods, increasing 
credit margins and channelling a large share of regional trade 
through such agreements; at the same time trylng to link this 
mechanism to counter trade agreements in so far as the 
f inancial and monetary part of the payments is concerned and 
examining the possibility of extending initiatives such as 
that representad by the Andean peso of the countries in the 
Andean group to the rest of the región; 
vii) strengthening and development of export credit 
financing and insurance mechanisms, in particular with regard 
to manufactures of durables and to capital goods. In 
connection with the latter, it is possible that, in view of 
the large variety of possibilities offered by the capital 
goods produced for export among the countries of the región, 
it would be preferable to use export subsidies for sene of 
those Latin American countries which are farthest ahead in 
this branch of industry instead of grantlng tariff preferences 
in the less well developed purchasing countries. Thus, the 
cost of the subsidy in local currency would be borne by the 
exporting oountry rather than by the purchasing country, which 
would pay in foreign currency a price equivalent to that which 
would be paid for a product fram an industrialized country; 
viii) exploration of mechanisms designed to ensure that the 
surplus countries of the región —usually those of large size 
and further ahead in development— would use same of the 
foreign currency derived fram their trade to promote joint 
investments which would diversify and increase the products 
available for export in their déficit trading partners; 
ix) consideration of the advisability of sponsoring 
negotiations among entrepreneurs in the publie and private 
sectors and including the importers and exporters of the 
región for the purpose of setting up new trade liriks on the 
countries and holding discussions with the agents most 
directly involved concerning the potential and obstacles of 
intra-regional trade. Initiatives aimed at those goals have 
already been taken in the Andean Group. It is also necessary 
to créate a flexible and up-to-date system of Information on 
possibilities for reciprocal trade and regional import substi-
tution, which would facilítate the formulation of policies 
designed not only to increase intra-regional trade but also to 
co-ordinate the bargaining power and negotiating efforts of 
Latin American countries \Aúdn are purchasers or exporters of 
a product caramonly traded in the rest of the world. There are 
of course only a few of the measures which may be applied to 
activate the economic links among the countries of the región. 
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At the institutional level, stress should be laid on the 
need to strengthen regional and subregional integration and 
co-operation bodies and malee them more operational, since 
those are the entities which can implement the agreements and 
guidelines issued by governments at the highest political 
level. There Is need to find out how to narrow the gap between 
political will and the implementation of decisions, which are 
in many cases watered down or are far removed fresa the purpose 
for which they were originally designed. 
One particularly significant issue is the strengthening 
of the lihks within A1ADI between the Andean Group and the 
other member countries, since this could provide the 
Asscciation with a new dynamic and at the sane tinte strengthen 
the Andean Group itself. 
3. International necrotiations 
a) The extemal débt 
Ihe tremendous size of the extemal debt and its 
burdensome servicing is one of the most serious problems with 
which the región has had to cope. It has created a thorny 
situation involving an extemal bottleneck and clearly 
demonstrates the dependence of the countries and the 
limitations on their freedom to adopt the economic policy 
decisions which they regard as most appropriate when viewed iñ 
the internal and extemal contexts. 
There can be no doubt that the management and 
renegotiation of the extemal debt has engaged the ef f orts and 
capacities of the economic authorities of the región to the 
hilt, in particular over the past two years. In spite of the 
fact that the renegotiations were carried out separately for 
each country of the región with IMF and the creditor banks, 
progress was also nade in the direction of agreeing on same 
basic criteria and establishing a flexible and effective 
consultation and follow-up mechanism through the Cartagena 
Consensus. These basic criteria were laid down by 26 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries in the (Jiito Plan of Action, 
while ten countries members of ALADI (Paraguay was not 
present) and the Dominican Republic participated in the 
Cartagena Consensus. 
The extemal debt will continué to be a crucial issue for 
the large majority of countries of the región for many years, 
in particular if the high real interest rates and currently 
feeble and inadequate financial flows are maintained. 
The scenarios which are suggested, if there are no 
decisive changes in interest rates and in the access to new 
financing which is less burdensome than at present, reflect 
situations involving a serious bottleneck in the extemal 
sector of many Latin American countries, at least for all that 
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remains of this decade and into the 1990s, which will 
undoubtedly have a negative iitpact on their rates of ecxanomic 
development. 
Ihe alternative of carrying the discussion of the Latin 
American debt into the political arena of the industrialized 
oountries seems to have taken shape in the proposals recently 
nade by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States 
(the Baker Plan). The oountries of Latin America have, 
however, nade the inadequacy of this proposal clear, in 
particular through the Cartagena Consensus. Moreover, the 
accumulation of factors which are negative for the región, 
such as high interest rates, the curtailment of financial 
flows, the deterioration in the terms of trade, the growing 
protectionism practised by the industrialized centres and 
certain structural maladjustments in the world economy which 
have still not been corrected, can induce —and indeed are 
inducing— cxxmtries to take a more categorical attitude than 
they have so far. Thus, for exaraple, the recent sudden and 
very pronounced drop in oil prices will doubtlessly forcé sane 
of the región's large exporters to change their negotiating 
position where the debt is concemed. 
b) Conditions for strencrthenina internaHonal trada 
International co-operation continued to be necessary for 
solving many of the problems besetting the world economy. The 
North-South dialogue has deteriorated in the 1980s. Its 
indispensable revitalization calis for a new strategy and for 
approaches to negotiation, in which the groundwork and rules 
of play used in the past are exchanged for others which will 
allow the developing countries greater participation and 
weight in international negotiations. 
i) Content of the negotiations. A lesson which can be 
usefully drawn from the experience gained in North-South 
dialogue in a number of forums involves the restricted and 
segmentad content or climate in which these negotiations have 
been carried out. 
For the developing countries, this segmentation of issues 
and of the negotiations in general has been very costly, 
basically for two reasons. First, it has made the process of 
co-ordination and joint action more difficult for them, and 
second, it has brought their bargaining power to very low 
levéis. 
ii) Ways and roodes of neaotiation and procedures followed. 
Experience with previous rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations, in particular those conducted within the 
framework of GATT, has shown that a global negotiation has 
limitations in so far as an attempt is made to co-ordinate and 
intégrate the interests of all countries. 
Given the asymmetry in the powers deployed by developed 
and developing countries, it has always turned out that the 
34 
negotiations are focused primarily on solving the trade 
problems besetting the industrialized oountries, and the 
United States, the European Coamunity and Japan in particular, 
in their reciprocal relations, so that the interests and 
objectives of the developing oountries are oonfined to a 
marginal position. 
The altematives to a new round of multilateral 
negotiations with global participation by developed and 
developing oountries could be either a basically North-South 
negotiation or an arrangement whereby the developing countries 
enter into these negotiations with each of the main 
industrialized countries or groups of countries separately 
rather than with all of them at once. Another altemative or 
complementary possibility which might be worth exploring would 
be to seek to hold a special regional negotiation on problems 
which confront it more specifically in its dealings with the 
developed market econamy countries and with countries with 
centrally planned economies. Without abandoning the 
negotiating platf orm which the región has constructed with the 
other developing regions (in particular, the Buenos Aires 
platform adopted in 1983), negotiations could be sought with 
these groups of countries on problems and issues of particular 
importance in their international econamic relations. 
It should, however, be stressed that a basic prereguisite 
for developing countries being able to enjoy and benefit from 
any of the types of negotiation suggested above will be the 
strengthening and enhancement of the mechanisms for 
concertation and co-ordination among them in organizing a 
reply to the challenge represented by the stagnation of 
international oo-operation and a joint strategy for dealing 
with it. Cbviously, the preparation, co-ordination and 
implementation of this ambitious and difficult task would be 
much easier if the Group of 77 had its own specialized 
secretariat, such as OECD represents for the industrialized 
countries. 
c) New rules and principies governing trade relations 
The main reguirements for the success of a new and more 
equitable, healthy and dynamic system of trade have already 
been noted by UNCIAD and are briefly outlined as follows: 
i) The trade system of the future has to support the 
process of dynamic growth and structural change of the world 
econamy. Protectionism and its discriminatory aspects in 
particular are to a significant degree a reflection of the 
structural rigidities which characterize the world econamy. 
The hypothesis that structural adjustment would autamatically 
take place if the market forces were brought freely into play 
has preved historically incorrect. It is therefore necessary 
to regard structural adjustment policies as a new dimensión of 
the future trade system. 
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ii) There is need to créate a satisfactory system of 
safeguards in order to be certain that the problems and 
difficulties which will inevitably arise at times are solved 
in a transparent, predictable, nan-^iscriminatory and 
equitable manner. 
iii) It is necessary to pay attention to the way in which 
processes outside the present system of trade or not absorbed 
adequately by it are dealt with in the future. Ihese processes 
include restrictive trade practices, a large share of farm 
aanmodity trade, trade in services, and the transactions of 
transnatianal corporations and of State trading enterprises. 
iv) The trade system of the future must provide a 
framework in which the development of trade relations among 
subsystems can be provided for satisfactorily. Not only do 
integration and economic co-operation groupings, such as EEC, 
the European Free Trade Asscciation (EFIA) and the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), exist In Europe, but there 
is also a grcwing tendency towards such subsystems, at the 
subregional, regional and interregional levéis, in the 
develcping world. 
v) Another important aspect of the new system concerns 
the treatraent which should be granted to developing countries. 
The Generalized System of Preferences meets this issue only 
partially. Apart from the fact that it has still not been 
permanently incorporated into the trade system, its scope and 
impact have been weakened by the introduction of new concepts 
such as those of graduation and reciprocity. The future trade 
system should resolve all these shortcomings and establish a 
meaningful link between trade and development. 
vi) The multilateral trade system which was created in the 
postwar period was never called upon to opérate in Isolation 
but had to be supported by other mechanisms in order to obtain 
the objectives of full employment, currency stability and 
transfer of sufficient resources to developing countries. 
It is obvious that the achievement of the objectives 
referred to, which are geared to a New International Economic 
Order, will not depend exclusively on action undertaken by the 
developing countries in this connection. 
An isportant consideration which will have to be 
highlighted in future negotiation is that the present order 
does not work for the developing countries. The changes and 
reforms which must be negotiated must be aimed at meeting the 
interests of all the parties to the benefit of the 
internatianal community as a whole. 
d) The haltina and reversal of protectionist trends 
The action which could be agreed upon at regional level 
is basically of two kinds. The first kind of action is 
basically of a preventive nature and is aimed at avoiding the 
application of new measures, and the second kind is aimed at 
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responding to protectionist measures which are applied to the 
región and affect its interests. 
It would also be of great importance for the región to be 
able to obtain accurate Information ooncerning the operation 
of mechanisms for taking protectionist decisions in the main 
industrialized markets so that they can attempt to take action 
which prevents injury and does not result in interminable 
processes of reprisal. 
With respect to measures taken in response to 
protectionism, Latin America should be better prepared to 
apply retaliatory measures to exports to the región from 
developed countries. A symmetrical treatment could also have a 
preventiva side in that industrialized countries considering 
the application of protectionist measures would give careful 
consideration to the negative impact which the retaliatory 
measures which the countries of the región could adopt might 
have on their economies or enterprises. At the same time, the 
use of such measures would put the negotiations on a more 
political footing; broaden their scope in that they would no 
longer be confinad to a single sector or commodity once the 
range of cornmodities covered in them was extended, and 
increase the participation of various interests affected tay 
such measures. Tnis would make it easier to look at the 
problem as a whole and could result in more appropriate and 
rational solutions from everybody's point of view. 
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II. TRENDS IN THE EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATICNS OF 
IATTN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
A. SEGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRACE 
1. Nature of the segmentación of intematlonal trade 
The c«ncentration of the large trade circuits involving 
certain countries to the exclusión of others and certain types 
of produces (services are not considered here) and not the 
rest is a phenomenon which may be termed "segmentation of 
international trade". 
The segmentation of trade may nave its origins in ancient 
historie, ecanemie and political sources, sene of which are 
related to past colonial or political ties binding nations 
which are now independent. Nevertheless, our main concern in 
this paper is to examine the processes which nave heightened 
this phenomenon over the past 15 years. 
Foremost among such processes are those rooted in certain 
policies applied by governments, which have given risa to 
great debate in international gatherings. Sene discriminatory 
trade practices which are inportant at present were adopted 
shortly after the Second World War and integrated into the 
GATT regulations. Trade preferences among economies making up 
regional or subregional groupings aimed at increased 
integración constitute the most typical example. 
However, discrimination with regard to trade flows fren 
and among countries not participating in such groupings has in 
recent years been expressed in new ways which have tended to 
prenote the segmentation of international trade. These new 
forms of discrimination have been related in particular to the 
kind of protectionism which has predeminated in the trade 
policy of the industrialized countries and its practice 
outside the purview of the rules and obligations associated 
with the application of the GATT regulations. 
The protectionism which has emerged particularly in the 
past decade is essentially bilateral and is increasingly 
foreign to the use of the principie of multilaterality to 
resolve current problems. Agreements with voluntary restraints 
based on bilateral reciprocity have become more common, and, 
what is more, new schemes of preferences have sprung up as a 
result of this process. 
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Ihe various kinds of counter trade (barter, counter 
purchase, buy-back deals, or bilateral, triangular and 
multilateral payments agreements) have been supported or 
proraoted by public authorities, and might now embrace 20% to 
25% of world trade, according to estimates made by UNCIAD. 
The accentuation of the ccramercial and financial 
disequilibrium observed in intemational economic relations 
may have given rise to the increase ín these discriminatory 
practices. A recent study on counter trade states in this 
connection that when market machinery appears to be 
illusionary or non-existent in so far as its ability to keep 
the balance is concerned, and the mechanisms of intemational 
co-operation demónstrate their inefficiency to check the drift 
towards structural disequilibrium (or even their total failure 
to opérate), it is then that the new rules of play based on 
reciprocity come into forcé. The déficit and debtor countries 
are urgently compelled to seek eguilibrium by exercising 
vigilance over their balances of payments at bilateral level 
or with the main surplus countries as a whole.4/ 
The large marketing enterprises have played an iiportant 
role in arriving at these counter trade and managed trade 
agreements. They have also taken very significant action in 
other cases to créate trade circuits or to activate circuits 
already in existence and have succeeded ín opening up or 
expanding markets for the caratodities in which they trade. 
The f inancing granted by intemational banks over the 
past decade has also been an important factor in maintaining 
and expanding dynamic trade flows in this setting of growing 
disequilibria of the world economy. The internationalization 
of bahking has been another salient characteristic of the 
world economy, especially over the past decade. 
Both in the period of rapid expansión of intemational 
liquidity to which they contributed prior to 1981 and in the 
period of the debt crisis which more recently affected the 
developing countries, the large intemational banks have 
openly influenced the development of intemational trade. The 
figures relating to the external debt show that it is very 
much concentrated in a small number of countries. Those 
countries enjoyad advantages in the conduct of their foreign 
trade by camparison with other econcmies which did not have 
similar access to sources of private financing. 
The internationéilization of production processes is 
something else which has gathered steam ín the past 15 years 
and has contríbuted to the segmentation of intemational 
trade. Thus, the stages of work necessarily involved in the 
production of a final good are divided frcm design to 
termination, in various packages of operations carried out in 
planta located in different countries. 
The novelty here does not lie in the actual división of 
the seguence of production on an intemational scale since 
this has been traditional in industrial processes relating to 
the use of raw materials and other inputs of agricultural or 
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mining origin. In the past 15 years, however, this practioe 
has been intensified by incorporating two special features 
which affect the trends of international trade. 
First, the internationalization of prcduction prooesses 
has been extendéá within the various branches produclng 
manufactures, and secondly it has been promoted by large 
transnational corporations. The latter frequentLy produce a 
given article fram the design to the marketing stage, and this 
sets up trade flows among different countries within the same 
firm; in other cases, the corporations control the entire 
process through direct means, campleting only part of it 
directly. Finally, there is also the case of simple 
co-participation in which there are no special control 
instruments but all the participating enterprises nave a very 
direct interest in the output of the total process. 
An examination of the growing internationalization of 
prcduction processes shows the leading role played by 
iaportant economic phenomena which, although they do not 
always cause them, lie at the root of the new discriminatory 
trade practices of govemments and the activities of large 
marketing enterprises and international banks, which nave 
affected the conduct and structure of international trade over 
the past 15 years. 
The internationalization of production reflects the 
degree of dynamism shown by international capital movements, 
the effects of technological change on the productivity of 
production factors and the differences in the cost of the 
latter. Thus a combination of economic forces are brought into 
play, and they are responsable for the basic conditions needed 
for the creation of trade flows and for the replacement of oíd 
trade flows by new ones. 
2. Same asvrametries in world trade in recent decades 
In the past 20 years, the world economy has been marked by 
instability and growing diseguilibria. In global terms of 
production and trade, however, different stages are observad, 
which are reflected in the figures shown in table 1. 
In the last five years of the 1960s, the postwar cycle of 
expansión ended, and in the next five years the first signs of 
the crisis now afflicting the central economies became 
evident. The raonetary system based on the Bretton Wóods 
agreements brote down, and the first inpact of the rise in oil 
prices was felt. The resulting instability ended in 1975 with 
the contraction of world production and exportation. This was 
followed by two 4-year periods with opposing cáiaracteristics. 
As table 1 shows, there was a period of revived expansión 
between 1976 and 1979 followed by another period of unrelieved 
stagnation between 1980 and 1983. 
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Table 1 
WORLD PROOUCTION AND TRADE 
(Average annual percentage change in volunte) 












































Within this global evolution of world production and 
trade, the tendency of the latter to segment has increased. 
Instability, disequilibria and segmentation seem to be related 
to similar phenomena which have structurally affected the 
development of the main market economies. Some of these 
phenomena are consldered below; however, the phenomenon which 
Is a caíase for concern In and of itself is not reflectad in 
the aggregated indlcators shown in table 1, but rather in the 
asyinmetries displayed as its component parts have developed. 
The tendencies of international trade to segment are 
reflected in the changes in the camposition of international 
trade and also in performance of trade flows by types of 
products and by countries of origin and destination. World 
trade trends during this period show great asyinmetries owing 
to the concentration of the more dynamic trade flows on 
certain types of goods (it is worth repeating here that this 
analysis does not take services into aooount) and among a 
limited number of countries. 
a) The dynamism shown bv trade in manufactures 
The most cutstanding feature in the development of the 
composition of world trade by types of products is the sharp 
decline in the relative share of primary products, with the 
exception of mineral fuels. Between 1960 and 1980, their share 
in world trade fell frcrn 43.2% to 23.5% (see table 2). The 
sharpest contraction recordad was in agrlcultural raw 
materials (from 10.8% to 3.8%). 
The share of mineral fuels in commercial trade remained 
relatively stable during the 1960s and the f irst years in the 
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Table 2 
SHARES OF MAJOR COMHODITY GROUPS IN WORLD EXPORTS 
(Percentages) 
Products (showing SITC 
sections and chapters) 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
All food producís (0+1+4+22) 
Agricultural raw materials 
(2 minus (22+27+28)) 
Hiñerais, ores and metáis 
(27+28+67+68) 




Total valué of world exeorts 
fin billions of US dollars) 127.9 
Excluding fuels 
All food ítems 
Agricultural raw materials 
Hiñerais, ores and metáis 
All primary commodities 
Manufactures 
All products excludina fuels 
Total valué of world exoorts. 
excludina fuels (in billions 







(5 to 8 minus (67+68)) 















33.3 26.8 23.5 
9.2 19.4 23.7 
55.5 52.1 51.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 































283.4 703.0 1 505.4 
Source: UNCTAD, World Coimxxlity Trade: 
1983. 
Review and Outlook (TD/B/C.1/236), Geneva, 4 Hay 
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1970s, declining only slightly between 1960 and 1970 (fran 
9.9% to 9.2%). The increase in petroleum prices resulted in a 
sudden change in their percentage share, which rose to 19.4% 
in 1975 and to 23.7% in 1980. Since then this figure has 
tended to decline. 
Trade in manufactures followed a path qpposite to that 
observed with regard to primary products. Their relative share 
in total world trade rose notably in the 1960s (from 45.7% in 
1960 to 55.5% in 1970). 
The dynamism of trade flows of manufactures is more 
apparent when mineral fuels are excluded, as may be observed 
in the penultimate line in table 2. The relative share of 
manufactures inereased steadily, rising frcm 50.7% in 1960 to 
61.1% in 1970 and to 67.2% in 1980. 
This demonstrates a fact of impórtanos for the analysis 
of the segmentation of international trade: dynamic flows in 
international trade in goods occur primarily in connection 
with manufactures. In the course of the two decades 
considered, manufactures inereased their share in world trade 
(excluding fuels) frcm half to over two-thirds. 
The drop in the share of trade in primary products in 
general has been characteristic of the entire postwar period, 
upholding the forecast made by ECIAC back in 1950. Those 
estimates were based on consideration of the following 
factors: 
"a) The share of primary goods in global spending or 
demand declines as income rises; 
"b) Commodity substitutions are becoming increasingly 
widespread; 
"c) As technical progress is made the share of primary 
inputs in the valué of finished goods decreases; 
"d) Protectionist policies and other instruments in the 
industrialized countries narrow the access of 
commodities to markets."5/ 
These factors have remained valid, having a negative 
effect on demand for primary products. In recent decades, 
technological progress seems to have intensified the 
substitution of the commodities referred to in b) and c) 
above, with consequent effeets on both their volume and their 
terms of trade. 
b) The predominance of the developed countries 
in world trade 
The many alterations which have been made in 
international economic relations during the past twenty years 
have resulted in no substantial change in the geographical 
orientation of the main trade flows. The centre-periphery 
system has continued to be characterized by the predominance 
of the industrialized market economies in international 
trade 6/ (see table 3). 
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Table 3 
WORLD EXPORTS BY MAJOR ÁREAS, 1963-1982 
(In billions of US dollars and showing percentaqe shares) 
\^>estination 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3 shows that during the 1960s, the 1970s and the 
first years in the 1980s, the industrialized martet eoonomy 
countries naintained a share in world trade higher than 601, 
whether they were countries of origin or cjountries of 
destination of exporte. Although the rlie in real prices made 
their share go dcwn in 1975 and 1980 (a drop of nearly 5% on 
the first occasion and of over 1% on the second), there has 
been no sustained drop in these trade circuits. In addition, 
trade by the industrialized countries among themselves 
represents over 40% of world exporte. 
Exporte by the countries members of the Organizatian of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which are designated in 
the table as "traditional oil-exporting developing countries", 
have, of course, behaved in accordance with the vicissitudes 
of the international hydrocarbons market. In any case, this 
group has been the recipient of an increasingly large trade 
flow. 
Exporte from "other developing countries" show a dynamism 
which was unexpected in view of the drop in the share of 
primary products in world trade. Ine share of these export 
flows in total world trade has been rising steadily since 
1975 (11.3% in 1975, 12.9% in 1980 and 13.8% in 1982). 
This trend reflecte the rapid growth in exporte of 
manufactures from a group of third world countries, a point 
which will be dealt with later on. 
Ihe increase in trade among developing countries, 
including those which are not members of OPEC as well as those 
which are, is also worthy of note. From 1973 on, their share 
in world trade has risen steadily —from 3.9% in 1973, to 6.9% 
in 1980 and to 7.1% in 1982, when international trade flows 
contracted. Nevertheless this still represents a relatively 
small share of world trade as a whole and does not threaten 
the primacy maintained by the industrial countries in it. 
Ihe pre-eminence of the developed countries in 
international trade shows up more clearly in the case of 
manufactures. Table 4 shows that over 80% of export flows of 
manufactures originate in the industrialized countries and 
also that over half of the manufactures traded are traded 
among those countries exclusively. 
In addition, the participation of the developed countries 
in trade in primary products, which increased in the I960s and 
the 1970s,7/ is developing in a way which strengthens the 
position of those countries' econamies in world trade as a 
whole. Ihe hefty rise in productivity, particularly in the 
United States, and the increase in protectionism in the 
industrialized countries ih general, in combination with the 
insufficient growth in production shown in the developing 
countries have been decisive factors in this phenomenon. Thus, 
the econamies of the northern hemisphere have been less 
strongly affected by the marked decline in the participation 
of primary products in world trade mentianed above. 
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Table 4 




















































































































































*/ Manufactures: SITC, Sections 5 to 8 mi ñus Chapter 68. 
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The role played by the developing countries as a martet 
for exporte from the developed countries has been üportant to 
the developent of trade of the latter. During the 1970s and 
up to 1971, the third world countries were the destination of 
a growing share of the exporte of the industrialized 
eoonomies. As nay be seen in table 3, the share of such export 
flows in total world trade rose from 12.9% to 15.5% during 
this period. 
Hhere manufactures are concerned, this phencnenon is 
sharply pronounoed. As may be seen in table 4, in 1970 exporte 
of manufactures from developed roarket economy countries to 
developing countries rose to 17.1% of total world trade in 
manufactures, a figure which vas to rise to 23.5% in 1981. In 
1982, sales of manufactures to developing countries 
represented shares in total exporte of manufactures of 40% for 
Japan, 38% for the United States and 22% for the EEC 
countries. 8/ 
The developing countries nave become important markets in 
the main industrial branches as a whole and, in particular, to 
those devoted to iron and steel, metal axticles, engines and 
machinery and electric goods. 
c) Expansión of exporte of manufactures bv the develcoincr 
countries as a whole 
The primacy maintained by developed countries in trade in 
manufactures has, however, suffered a relative decline in the 
past tuo decades owing to the thrust of industrial exporte 
fren the developing countries as a group. Tabla 4 shows an 
unmistakable rise in the share of this group in trade in 
manufactures, which stood at 4.1% of the world total in 1965 
and had risen to 10.7% in 1982. 
The dynamism of these flows was greater than thcee 
originating in the developed market economy countries and 
those from the socialist countries. The share of the former in 
world trade dropped from 85% to 80.6% between 1970 and 1982, 
while that of the latter fell from 11.6% in 1965 to 8.1% in 
1981. 
Up to 1981 the growth of industrial exporte fretn the 
third world countries as a whole was brisk. Although this 
growth was lower than in the period 1965-1983, in the eight 
years following that period these exporte continued to 
increase rapidly, far surpassing, in volume terms, the growth 
shown by other commodities, as may be observad in table 5. The 
recessive economic situation in 1982 affected this trade flow, 
but it cantracted less than did that of exporte of 
manufactures from the developed countries, as may be deduoed 
from the figures shown in table 5. Available estimabas point 
to another increase in 1983, smaller than that observad iñ the 
1970s but still very significant in the international context. 
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Table 5 
EXPORTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, BY CLASS OF PRODUCTS 
(Averaae annuat percentage change in export volunes) 





































This expansión of exporte of manufactures frcm the 
developing countries has radically changed the share of the 
various types of proctuct withln the total merchandise exporte 
by these oountrles. Qn the basis of UNCTAD data, the share of 
manufactures in total exporte in 1965 may be estimated at 
11.7%; in 1982 this share had nearly doubled (22.9%). If fuels 
are excluded, the dlfferenoe is even more sharply acoentuated, 
with the estimated share rising from less than 20% to cióse to 
50% during the same period. 
One aspect of this phenomenon which deserves 
consideración is the destinación of these exporte. The 
developed countries have provided their main market, absorbing 
cióse to 58% of them (see table 6). The manufactures traded 
among developing countries have been maintaining a stable 
percentage of cióse to 37% of the total industrial exporte of 
the group. As for purchases by the countries with centrally 
planned economies, which represented only 5% of total sales iñ 
1970, they subsegúently fell to under 4%. 
Although the majority of exporte of manufactures by the 
developing countries are directed towards the developed 
countries, their impact on the domestic consumption of these 
countries remains slight. The World Bank estimates their 
average share in that consumption at 3.4% in 1980, with 
figures higher than 15% shown only in cormecticn with wearing 
apparel, footwear and leather goods. Next in arder of 
importance are radio and televisión sete (6.7%) and textiles 
(5.4%).9/ 
Even though exporte frcm developing countries represent 
a very small proportion of the consumption of industrial 
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Table 6 
















































a/ Total valué of exports from developing countries to all regióos in the world, in 
current dollars for each year. 
cxmtcdlties in the developed cxxmtries, their share in that 
cxansumption is significantly different in each case. The 
United States and Japan reoeive a higher proportion of 
Hianufactures frcm the third warld than does EEC, although 
the latter imports more in relation to its consumption. 
In 1980, only 5.7% of all the manufactures imported by 
EEC carne from developing countries; that share was as high 
as 21.4% for the United States and 26.3% for Japan (see 
table 7). 
There are of course various degrees of comnercial 
openness. It is greater in the case of the Community, but 
there flows from developed countries and, in particular, from 
other members of EEC, still play a leading role. On the other 
hand, the United States and Japan have increased their 
openness to imports of manufactures from developing countries, 
tightening their economic liriks with those countries in áreas 
which are not confined to ccmmerce. 
Table 7 shows great dynamism in trade in industrial 
ccmmodities towards the United States and Japan frcm the 
countries of South and South-east Asia, whose share in 
imports of manufactures by the Uhited States was 6.5% in 1965 
and rose to 18.2% in 1980. With reference to Japan, their 
share rose from 0.5% to 22.8% during the same period. It may 
also be seen that these flows are replacing flows from Europe. 
In the case of Japan, there has also been a decline in 
industrial imports from the United States, to the benefit of 
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p. 89 • 
a/ SITC, Sections 5 to 8, minus chapter 67 and 68. 
b/ Excluding Western Asia. 
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d) Oonoentration of exporta of nanufactures in a feu 
developjncr oountries 
Exports of maíiufactures fren developing oountries are 
distrüxited very unevenly aaeng those oountries. ühere is, 
moreover, a tendeney towards oonoentratlon which has persisted 
over the past decade, sinos those economies which initially 
took the lead have maintained it. 
Table 8 shows the participaticn of sene regions in trade 
circuits; the pre-eminence of the Asian oountries (the Mlddle 
East is excluded fren the table) in these circuits is readily 
apparent fren table 8. The AIADI oountries maintained a growth 
rate similar to, and, up to 1975, even higher than, tiíat shown 
by the Asian oountries. In the past decade, however, the 
thrust of exports from the Asían econendes vas greater than 
that of the other regions in the world. Moreover, in the two 
décadas covered, exports of manufactures from developing 
African oountries have been unable to keep up with the growth 
shown in other regions, and thelr partlcipatian in total 
exports of manufactures has steadily declinad. 
Table 8 
















































a/ Valué of exports of manufactures from all developing countries, in billions of US 
dollars at current market prices. Relates to total exports shown in the first colum. 
b/ Excluding Western Asia. 
Table 9 gives sepárate entries for the oountries whlch 
lead the developing countries in exports of manufactures. Five 
Asian oountries —Taiwan,*/ South Kbrea, Borig Rong, Singapore 
*/ Ihe aúnese Province of Taiwan. It has been included 
in this list and in others further on in this document for 
practica! purposes only. 
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Table 9 
FOSmON OF THE SEVEN DEVEIDPING OCUNTRIES WHICH LEAD 

















Source; Clairmonte and Cavanagh (1983), on the basis of UNCTAD 
data. Cited by C. Ominami in Les transformations dans 
la crise des rapports Nord-Sud, Nanterre, October 
1984, p. 101. 
a/ Percentage share of exports of manufactures from each 
country in total exports of manufactures from developing 
countries. 
by Chinese province of Taiwan. Included in this list of 
countries for practical purposes only. 
and India~ are shown as having the largest shares in this 
trade. They alone were responsable for 50% of industrial 
exports by developing countries in 1965 and for 61% in 1980. 
However, within the growth pattern under discussion, 
significant changes have occurred. Taiwan and the Republic of 
Kbrea, which accounted for only 6% of the manufactures which 
all the developing countries sold outside their borders in 
1965, exported one-third of those manufactures in 1980. At the 
other extreme is India, whose share in this trade dropped 
sharply from 18% to 5% in a period of 15 years, causing India 
to fall frcm first to sixth place among developing countries 
exporting industrial gcods.Hbng Kong, which was in second 
place in 1965, has also seen its share drop (from 19% to 14%), 
but even so its dynamism made it worthy of inclusión by OECD 
in the category of newly industrializing countries, along with 
Taiwan, the Republic of Kbrea and Singapore.10/ 
Brazil and México are the only non-Asian countries which 
rank high among the developing countries which export 
manufactures, and they have been included in that same select 
group. Brazil has seen its exports of industrial goods grow at 
a rate which has been surpassed only by the Republic of Kbrea 
and Taiwan and has decisively increased its role in external 
sales of manufactures by countries members of AIADI and by 
Iatin American countries in general. In 1970 its share in the 
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former amounted to 29.4% and in the latter, to 23.0%, \jhile in 
1982 these figures were 56.3% and 50.1%, respectively. 
On the other hand, the participation of México in 
regional exports of manufactures has dMnished. Its share in 
those of AIADI fell frcm 31.7% in 1970 to 14.5% in 1982. Even 
the third ranking exportar of industrial goods in Latín 
America -Argentina- has perfomsd nore dynafflically, althou^i 
its share in exports of manufactures by AUDI countries also 
fell, fren 20% to 13.5%, during the same period.U/ 
It may be observed that together with the tendeney 
towards concentration there is also a certain amount of 
diversification in the developing countries which gives rise 
to significant flcws of manuf actured exports. Actually, the 
number of countries which exported over US$ 100 million (at 
1975 prices) worth of manufactures rose from 18 in 1965 to 22 
in 1970 and to 47 in 1979.¿2/ Table 10, preparad by OECD, 
groups 37 of these 47 countries by valué exported and growth 
rates in the period 1972-1978. (The countries excluded for 
various reasons are China, Irán, Jamaica, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela and 
Vietnam.) 
The OECD analysts focused their attention on the 
countries shown in the last column in the table. Five of them 
(subgroup A) are regarded as island economies dedicated 
basically to the labour-intensive production for export of 
sirrple manufactures. They may be regarded fundamentally as 
extra-territorial centres of production of other countries. 
This accounts for their having managed to exceed the limit of 
US$ 100 million so fast. It is most due to the establishment 
of a complex of economic activities of an industrial natura 
which would próvida a foundation for a sustained penetration 
of the international markets for produets manuf actured in 
secondary processing activities. On the contrary, the 
trade restrictions in the industrial countries will limit the 
expansión of their exports as they manage to control a 
significant portion of the market for the categories 
(primarily textiles and wearing apparel) in which these island 
economies specialize. 
The economies of the countries in subgroup B are more 
complex, but they do not show significant industrial 
development either. Processing for other countries, in their 
capacity as extra-territorial production centres, appears also 
to have played an important role in these countries, and in 
Tunisia in particular. Indonesia has the size of market and 
the resources derived frcm petroleum needed to allow it to 
develop a more extensive industrial foundation. However, even 
in 1979 manufactures representad only 3% of its exports (cióse 
to 8% if petroleum is excluded). 
As for Chile, Perú and Uruguay, they seem to have 
achieved positive results in the years considered in the 
table, owing primarily to policies which favoured the 
expansión of certain export lines. However, the achievements 
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TabLe 10 
DEVELOPING CCUNTRIES EXPORTERS OF MANUFACTURES, BV GROWTH RATES OF 
EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES, 1972-1978 a/ 
Dollar valué 
in 1979 b/ 
Less than 
6.9% c/ 
6.9X to 13X Over 13X d/ 
USÍ 100 mi Ilion 
toUS$ 1 billion 
us$ 1 billion 
to US$ 2 billion 
US$ 3 billion 
to US$ 6 billion 
Over US$ 10 billion 







































exDorters". in The OECD Observer. Paris. 1982. 
a/ Average annual growth rates at constant prices (1975). 
b/ Valúes at 1979 prices and exchange rates. 
c/ 6.9% is the average growth rate for the world. 
d/ 13% is the growth rate of the newly industrialized countries not inembers of OECD 
(four Asían countries, Brazil, México and rugoslavia). 
e/ Chinese province of Taiwan. Included in this list for practical purposes only. 
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«ere nct firnly based since between 1980 and 1982 exports of 
manufactures fren these three countries declinad sharply 
—frcni US$ 417 millicn to US$ 261 millicn (37.4%) in the case 
of Chile; fron US$ 553 million to ÜS$ 384 millicn (30.1%) in 
Perú and freo US$ 402 millicn to US$ 330 million (17.9%) in 
Uruguay. 
Iba eoonomies of Thailand, Malaysia and the Ehilippines 
seemed to be f ollowing in the steps of the Republic of Kbrea 
and Taiwan, although the Philippines has arrived at a stage of 
stagnation in the 1980s. In the three cases referred to, 
industrial goeds aooounted far over 20% of their total exports 
in 1979. 
Ihe rise of industrial exports from these three countries 
have received strong support from the f our eoonomies of south-
east Asia which were their forerunners in this type of 
development (Taiwan, the Republic of Kbrea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore). Same production processes and same liries of 
produets have been transferred, by meare of subcontracting or 
direct investraent, to these three countries when wage oosts 
rise in the four relatively more industrialized countries. 
These four countries have also been purchasers of cheap manu-
factures produced in Thailand, Malaysia or the íhilippines. 
However, not even the latter three countries have 
produced export flows which can contain the tendeney to 
concéntrate industrial exports sinos the five developing 
eoonomies which play the most significant role in exports of 
manufactures are generating approximately two-thirds of that 
trade. Of those five countries, of which Brazil is ane, anly 
the "gang of four" (Taiwan, the Republic of Kbrea, Hong Kbng 
and Singapore) have nade production for the international 
market the keystone of their growth. 
In short, it can be confirmed that the dynamism shown by 
the circuits of trade in goods is conf ined to manufactures and 
to trade amomg a small number of countries, anly about half a 
dozen of which are developing countries. 
3. Dvnamic circuits and seomentation in 
international trade 
The rapid review of trends in international trade carried out 
in the preceding sections has made it possible to identify a 
general tendeney towards concentration of the more dynamic 
trade flows in a limitad number of countries and among goods 
of a certain type. This resulte in what has been defined as 
segmentación of international trade. Before an examination is 
nade of same of the factors which seem to have contributed to 
this phenomenon, attention should be drawn to sane dynamic 
links which work together to créate a climate of segmentation 
in vorld trade. 
In the first place, meritian should be made of the trade 
links among developed market economies. In particular, it is 
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worth being more specif ic concerning the relations between the 
United States, EEC and Japan, which respond more directly to 
increases in productivity, changes in relative competitiveness 
and the growing internationalizatian of the productian 
processes and financial activities observed in recent decades. 
In the second place, the links created in trade within 
EEC are a case apart and the result of an economic integration 
procese which has been very dynamic in the past two decades. 
Third, reciproca! trade among the CMEA countries also 
deserves special consideration because of the special 
characteristics of the ties which bind them and inf luence 
their ccsnmercial behaviour. 
A fourth case, finally, is that of the developing 
countries which have managed to intégrate their trade into the 
most dynamic flows of oommodity trade. Here the limitations 
imposed by the centre-periphery relationship did not prevent 
sane half a dozen countries from contributing to the expansión 
of trade in manufactures and taking the lead in that 
phenomenon. 
a) Conanercial links between developed 
market eoonamy countries 
Trade among developed market economy countries grew at an 
accelerated rate during the third guarter of this century. 
Between 1950 and 1975, merchandise trade among them increased 
at an average annual rate of 8%, being largely responsible for 
the fact that their economic growth achieved comparatively 
high rates (higher than 4% a year).13/ 
Many factors have been influential in the dynamism 
observed in the trade flows between Europe and North America. 
Geographical proximity of course eliminates one natural 
barrier to trade —transport costs. The fact that these 
commercial ties date back many years means that áreas of 
specialization have already been created among the countries 
involved and that markets are known and adapted to foreign 
products; in other words, the passage of time has meant that 
various aspects of their productian and consumption structures 
now camplement each other. 
But in the postwar period, the most noteworthy feature of 
this phenomenon was the vigorous development of transnational 
corporatians which extended beyond national borders and set up 
branches in other countries. The expansión of these corpora-
tians was geographically centred in the United States, Canadá 
and Europe. The financial houses were not left behind in the 
internationalization of activities so that financial links 
which were already operating intensely prior to the War grew 
in number. 
All these developments have resulted in stronger 
technological links and have given rise to fairly brisk 
campetition caused by the different levéis of productivity of 
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the industrial systems of the various oountries and the factor 
papents nade by them. Technology and productivity have not 
played the sanie role in the agricultural sector since, for a 
number of reasons, the developed countries have tept agricul-
ture out of their conercial dealings with each other. Thus, 
for example, way back in 1955, the United States fcoally 
decided to exclude trade in farm occrarodities from the GATT 
regulations. 
The protactionist trente which took shape in the 
mid-1970s have tended to affect other sectors, including 
industrial sectors, such as the textile and steel sectors. 
However, the mgnitude of the trade relations among the 
developed countries, the intensity of the financiad. Unte 
involved and the strong bonds created by the political and 
military undertakings among the governments conoerned have 
given rise to an array of negotiating fatuos and instrumente 
which mate it dlfficult for significant regression to tafee 
place. 
A distinctian needs to be drawn between the commercial 
relations of Japan with the developed market eooncmies of 
Europe and North America and those anong the latter. VJhile it 
is true that Japan 's relations have followed a pattem similar 
to that of the other countries for more or less the same 
reasons, the Japanese economy has displayed very special 
features in its postwar behaviour. 
In the first place, Japan has an outstanding capacity to 
take the lead in the technological progrese made in nunerous 
fields of industrial production. The growth rate of its 
production also stands out as being higher and more sustained 
than in the other developed countries, partly as a result of 
the increases in productivity and the high investment rates 
maintained throughout the years. 
From the point of view of international trade, attention 
should be drawn to Japan's efforts to reduce the entry of 
foreign merchandise into those martets for specific goods in 
which competition from imports is considered undesiráble. In 
spite of a signif icant increase in the degree to which it is 
open to the exterior, Japan has tenaciously protected 
industrial branches which are at a disadvantage vis-á-vis 
external competition until they can succeed in conquering 
markets in the exterior. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that Japan's 
transnational corporations have played a relatively minor role 
in the country's external relations, by comparisan with that 
played by such corporations in other developed economías. 
Hdwever, large enterprises specializing in foreign trade 
("sogo-shosha") have played a very important role in the 
development of Japan's commercial relations. 
In the development of the oentre-periphery system during 
the postwar period, the hegemony of the United States as a 
vorld economic centre has decliñed substantially due to the 
more dynamic expansión of some European countries and, in 
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particular, of Japan, which became a leading worid econcmic 
power in the 1950s. 
Japan1 s share in worid trade has been growing. Its 
exports, which represented 4.5% of total worid exports in 
1965, saw their share rise to over 7.5% at the beginning of 
the 1980s. In the three-year period 1980-1982, the main 
destinations of those trade flows were the United States, 
which absorbed nore than 25% of them, followed by the Asian 
countries, which together accounted for somewhat less than 
ane-fourth and, third, Europe, with 15% (EBC, 12%). Latin 
America and the Caribbean and developing África received 10% 
of all Japanese exporta, while the remaining 20% were divided 
among Canadá, countries with centrally-planned econcnties, the 
OPEC countries and Australia, New Zealand and South África. 
The Republic of Kbrea, Taiwan, Hang Kong and Singapore 
received over 60% of all Japanese exports to Asia (17%, 161, 
15% and 13%, respectively), while smaller percentages went to 
Indonesia (12%), Malaysia (7%) and the Hálippines (5%). 
During the 1970s a significant change occurred in the 
origin of foreign merchandise absorbed by the Japanese 
econamy. In 1970 its principal suppliers were the United 
States (30%), the market ecanomy countries of Eastern and 
Southern Asia (15%) and the countries of the Middle East 
(13%). In 1980, 13% of its imports originated in the Middle 
East, 23% in the other market economies of Asia and only 17% 
in the United States. 
This change is very much attributable to the fuel iiports 
so essential to Japan which it receives from the Middle East, 
Indonesia and Malaysia. However, these figures also reflect 
the tremandous dynamism achieved fy importe of manufactures 
from developing Asian countries, in particular the Republic of 
Kbrea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hang Kong and the Ehilippines. 
The notable increase in worid trade in the postwar period 
resulted in much greater interdependence among the central 
economies as well as between peripheral economies and their 
centres. Over the past three decades the valué of the exports: 
gross-domestic-product ratio has doubled in all parts of the 
worid, both developed and developing. This ratio rose 
significantly, although to a lesser extent, in the socialist 
countries (see table 11). 
Thus, the pressure exerted by the effective external 
demand on national levéis of production and employment has 
increased. At the same time, the global damestic demand now 
has a greater impact than before on production in other 
countries. In many cases, a sharp distinctian is no longer 
drawn between internal and external policies. Actually, tax, 
sectoral or investment-promotion policies may have as much or 
even more of an impact on tariffs or guatas in international 
trade flows. 
This being the case, the reduction of those flows or the 
application of restrictive policies produces an immediate 























































negative effects which reach them from the exterior. In this 
raspect, it is synptomatic that the «ave of protectionism «as 
aooentuated just after the 1975 drop in trade and that a chain 
reaction then took place in respect of the first measures 
adoptad by the United States and EBC. Ihe seocnd «ave of 
protectionism «as noted in 1981-1982, in the aidst of a deep 
world recession and severe exchange rate disequilihria. 
The special links which exist between various econanies 
are of relévame for coping with protectionist trenas. These 
links are forged to prevent the reduction of the trade flows 
affected by protectionist measures. Thus privileges are 
created in respect of sane countries, «hile there is 
discriminatian against the rest. In this «ay the protectionism 
applied recently has been of a bilateral nature «hile 
multilaterality is used less and less as a basic principie in 
resolving existing problems. 
b) The European Economic Oommunity (EBC) 
The links created within EBC are part of a successful 
economic integration process adopted among developed market 
economies. The proportion of world merchandise trade generated 
anrmq them is higher than that generated by any other country 
or associatian of countries. Although their grówth rates «ere 
lowtr than the average rates for the rest of the world in the 
1970.?, both their export and their inport trade has 
represented over 30% of the world total since the beginning of 
the l980s. 
In the period of greatest expansión, the economies of the 
countries members of the Community grew as a result both of 
the expanded market, particularly in their industrial sector, 
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and of ccnnion. policies adopted in respect of trade with 
third-party oountries, especially in their farm sectors. 
Intra-regional trade rose from somewhat higher than one-fourth 
the foreign trade of the member oountries as a whole in 1948 
to half that trade in the 1970S and early 1980s. 
In the 1970s, the rate of expansión fluctuated and 
subsequently declined, resulting in a serious situation of 
stagnation from 1980 on. At the same time growing 
protectionism emerged against the rest of the world, which 
only a few oountries in a privileged positian vis-á-^vis the 
members of the Oomnunity have managed to overeóme. Protection 
is particularly notable with regard to farm commodities, iron 
and steel, textiles and Chemicals. 
c) Oountries members of the Oouncil for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
In 1949 the eastern European countries with centrally 
planned economies and the Soviet Union set up a new kind of 
economic community. Public ownership of the means of 
productian and the oentralized planning of economic activities 
by the State means that the international trade of these 
countries dif fers from that of other countries in that it 
reflecta a priority set by the government in economic plans 
which allocate tasks and resources at various levéis to the 
different units which make up the economic system of each 
country. 
Since its establishment, CMEA. has dedicated itself to the 
task of narrowing the gap in the levéis of economic 
developraent achieved by its members. For this reason, the 
pattern of trade relations has not been structured in 
accordance with the elassie división between producers of 
primaxy goods and producers of manufactures. 
From the point of view of international trade flows, an 
outstanding feature of CMEA is the preponderance of trade 
among its own members. This has slackened off in the past 15 
years largely because of the changes which have oocurred in 
trade in fuels. But even so, durlíig the first years in the 
1980s, these countries continued trading over 50% of their 
exports among themselves. 
There are political as well as economic reasons for the 
concentraticn on reciprocal trade. In connection with the 
economic reasons, attention should be drawn to the wide 
variety and abundance of natural resources in the Soviet Union 
and the enormous demanda and possibilities associated with the 
intensivo developraent of the CMEA countries, in particular by 
aoceleratlng the industrialization of the least developed 
among them. 
During the first two decades of CMEA's life, martod 
priority was granted to the economic develepnent of its 
members to the detriment of their relations with the rest of 
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the warld. Although during the past 15 years trade wlth the 
rarket eooncnies has appeared more dynaíaic, the necessities 
üoposed by eoonanic planning cali for médium and lcng-term 
agreements based on counter trade, so that special trade 
circuits have been created which can be changed only through a 
ccnplicated procedure in which they are adaptad to national 
eccñoác plans. 
In short, the segmentaticn of the international trade of 
the ocuntries msribers of the CMEA, which was fostered for 
political and eoonomic reascms and because of the demande 
iiuposed by the planning processes in the socdalist ocuntries, 
appears to be having an attenuating effect on that trade, 
which had been raarkedly exclusivist since the 1950s. However, 
the fact that foreign trade is now broader in scope dees not 
alter the nature and characteristics of trade in centrally 
planned eoonomies. The special circuits have been made more 
ocoplex but they are still determined by the objectives and 
targets established in the eoonomic plans. 
d) Leadinct exportare of manufactures 
ampng deyelopjm cpuntrjes 
The Republic of Kbrea, Taiwan, Hbng Kbng and Singapore in 
Asia and Brazil in Latín America are the countries which have 
thus been able, in their own right, to enter the rapidly 
e^anding international trade in manufactures. As has been 
seen the dynamism of their trade has been as great or even 
greater in many aspects as that of the trade originating in 
the industrializad countries. 
These four Asian countries' experienoes with 
industrialization for cs^ort purposes have merited special 
attention because of the impressive rate of growth and change 
of their structure of production over the past three decades. 
In this respect, one currently held view of these experienoes 
which has gained general acoaptance lays stress on the high 
degree of openness of these eoonomies and on a supposedly low 
degree of public intexvention. 
Hbwever, there are elementa which are more basic to the 
successes achieved by these eoonomies. Ferhaps the raoet 
important of these is the preference for industrialization 
reflected in the development strategies applied. This 
industrialization is of course aimed at penetrating 
international martets. However, the fact that the goods 
exported were of industrial crigin had a dynamic iapact which 
would not have been cbtained with strategies based on the 
exploitation of natural resources, which, moreover, are not 
found in great abundance in these countries. 
In the Bepublic of Kbrea, the industrial product in 1954 
represented 5% of the national product. The share of the 
industrial sector rose to 32% in 1978, while that of the 
primary goods sector dropped from 50% to 19%. In Taiwan, the 
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share of industry in the product rose frcm 10% to 42% between 
1952 and 1979, while primary production dropped fren 37% to 
11%. m the city-State of Singapore, the share of industry in 
the product rose fren 13% to 24% between 1960 and 1979 at the 
expense of the share of services, which dropped frcm 79% to 
70% in the same period.24/ 
A salient feature of the industrialization precesses of 
these countries is the oonoentration on the exportatian of 
oonsumer gcods with a high iaported content, whose production 
is highly labour-intensive. Thus, a special link has been 
established between this group of countries and Japan, which 
differs fren that between them and the United States and 
Europe. 
Actually, their exports nave successfully penetrated the 
markets of the United States, Europe and other GECD countries, 
resulting in a trade surplus. In 1979, they were responsible 
for 29.3% of the wearing apparel isports of all the OECD 
countries; 16.9% of the leather, footwear and travel articles 
inports; 18.5% of all únports of wood and cork manufactures 
and 10.5% of those of electric machinery.15/ 
On the other hand, with respect to Japan and Japan alone, 
these four econanies nave shown persistent and significant 
trade déficits (see table 12, in which these déficits are 
shown as positive balances in favour of Japan). 
It is worth pausing to oonsider the trade relations 
maintained by these four newly industrialized Asian countries 
with Japan. These relations are characterized by the 
establishraent of highly dynamic trade circuits ¿n the 
roanufacturing sector which are, however, very mich confined to 
these countries. These two characteristics of their trade mean 
that these countries are following the main trends which have 
led to the segmentation of international trade in recent 
decades. 
In a recent study the structure of the trade relations 
between Japan and the Republic of Kbrea, where 
industrialization has perhaps arrived at the highest degree of 
diversification, is analysed as follows: "Textile products, 
together with yarns and threads, represent 57% of Kbrea's 
exports to Japan. Clear specialization is to be observed even 
in the trade relations within this branch, since RDrea mainly 
exports clothing, silk products and ootton yarns, while 
inporting capital- and technology-intensive products such as 
synthetic fibres and garments made therefrom. The second most 
important branch of Kbrea's exports to Japan is that of 
electrical and electronic equipment, \ihere a clear tendeney to 
specialization oonnected with the 'technological density' of 
these products is likewise to be observed. This branch 
includes household appliances, electronic components and 
electrical machinery and equipment, Kbrea's specialty being 
the export of such household appliances and goods as radios, 
televisión sets, watches and pocket calculators —all 
labour-intensive Ítems. In the other two groups, the advantage 
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Tablft 12 
JAPAN'S TONE BAIANCE WTIH THE KKR ASÍAN EEVEIOPING 
OOUNTRIES WHICH IEAD IN EXPOKES OF MANUFACTOPES 
(Millions of 1)5 dollars at aarkst crioes for eacfa year, 
















Balance - 336 1 122 2 376 
Souroe; QBCDf Anuarfo ri«¡> r¡g«¡>jnpio. varicus issues. 
a/ Exports frota Japan to each country. 
b/ Inports to Japan from each ocuntry. 
c/ Chínese province of Taiwan. Included in this list for 
practical purposes only. 
is on the side of Japan. Even vithin the branch of electronic 
ocsnponents there is a special ization, since Japan is a net 
importer of batteries and integrated circuits —for which the 
production technology is welUmown— while it sxports 
semi-<xaiduGtorsM .16/ 
The same type of link has existed between Japan and the 
other three countries in the group, althcugh there is a 
greater degree of ocnplementary specialization between Japan 
and Kbrea. Thus, the relative loes of markets in the United 














































experience because of the penetration of manufactures from 
these three ccuntries is offset by the exportatian of capital 
goods and intermedíate products of Japanese origin 
incorporated in such manufactures. 
With regard to the activity of the transnational 
cozporations in the nine industrialized Asían ccuntries, it is 
true that such corporations nave played a decisiva role in 
sane industrial branches and that in Singapore sales of 
products to the exterior predominate. Hbwever, this cannot, 
by extensión, be said of the experienoes of this group of 
ccuntries as a whole. 
A number of studies nave shown that national enterprises 
control over 70% of the industrial exports of the Republic of 
Kbrea and 90% of those of Hong Kdng, while for the ccuntries 
of scutheast Asia as a whole it has been estimated that the 
share of exports nade by transnational corporations dees not 
amcunt to 20%. Actually, the activities of these corporations 
in developing ccuntries in general nave not been 
preferentially oriented towards exports but rather towards the 
domestic market. 
In spite of this, it roay be seen that certain industrial 
branches nave been decisively favoured by transnational 
corporations. Ihis is the case of the electronics branch in 
Kbrea. Japanese and North American corporations, whether they 
are mixed or work through single-ownership branches, scught to 
benefit from the comparative advantages associated with lew 
labour costs by subcontracting work and managed to control 54% 
of the production and 72% of the exports of this sector. 
However, it is estimated that foreign corporations were 
responsable for only 15% of the exports of the manufacturing 
industry as a whole. 
Transnational corporations nave played a decisive role 
in the development of certain lines of export, but 
the same cannot be said of their contribution to the 
overall results achieved by these Asían ccuntries. The 
impact of foreign enterprises as a whole has been only 
modérate (except in the case of Singapore). In addition, 
their role has been made subordínate to strategical 
industrial objectives, which are defined internally in each 
oountry. 
Brazil is the only oountry in Latin America which has 
managed to maintain a growth rate of exports of manufactures 
comparable with those recordad by the four principal Asian 
developing ccuntries which export industrial goods. México was 
also classified as a newly industrializing country by OECD in 
its 1979 study cited above. More recently, however, the 
dynamism shown by its exports has been charmelled towards 
petroleum, so that in 1970 and 1982 the growth rates of its 
exports of manufactures were lower than those for Latin 
America as a whole. Moreover, the share of manufactures in 
total Mexican exports dropped from 32.5% in 1970 to 9.5% in 
1972, the latter figure being lower than the 17.2% recorded 
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for the región as a whole the same year. in Brazil, on the 
other hand, industrial goods, vívich represented 13.31 of the 
ccurrtry's total exports in 1970, saw their share rise to 38.3% 
in 1982. 
The outocne of Latin America's export effort may also be 
neasured on the basis of Hirselman's index, in vhich the 
ccfloentration of exports by product is measured. Between 1960 
and 1970, this index shrank by more than half (falling fren 
0.58 to 0.22), reflecting a substantial diversification in 
exports of goods.17/ 
Brazil's sucoess with exports is in soné aspeets similar 
to that of the four Asian oountries oonsidered above, although 
it differs in many other aspeets. One of their main points in 
otxtmon is the tenacious effort nade to industrialize, and this 
has been characteristic of the national developneritstrategy 
persistently applied in Brazil for a nuntoer of. decades. 
Thus, an industrial apparatus which had already nade 
significant progress in the 1950s has continued to be 
diversified. 
However, not only is there a difference between 
Brazil and the four Asian oountries oonsidered in the 
degree of industrialization which had been attained 
when the export effort began. Brazil has been 
industrializad by having recourse basically to its vast 
domestic market; exports play an important role in the 
industrial effort, but they are not the decisive element on 
which it rests. 
Transnational corporations nave also played a inore 
significant, although less than a decisive, role in Brazil 
than in the Asian oountries; their share in total exports 
amounts to cióse to one third, whila they accounted for one 
half of the country's industrial exports iñ 1979.18/ Moreover, 
Brazil has subjected them to a clearly defined policy which 
ensures that they contribute to the objectives of its 
industrial strategy. In this it has differed from a number 
of Latin American countries in which policies more 
liberal towards transnational corporations have been 
followed.19/ 
4. Econcmic prooesses plavinq a predomlnant role in 
the seamentation of intern»t^q,)a'1 +T*** 
The four types of trade links briefly described in the 
preoeding section by groups of oountries opérate in very 
diverse situatians. They are, however, alika in that their 
dynamism springs from trade in manufactures and that they 
opérate between economies which are relatively highly 
industrialized or are in the procesa of rapid 
industrialization. From a more functignal point of view, 
reference will now be mads to those econcmic precesses which 
play a predominant role in the segmentation of trade. 
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a) Preponderarle of the industrial dvnamics 
International trade in manufactures has shown notable 
growth in contrast with the much slower growth rate where 
primary products are concemed. This means that the growth of 
international trade is af fected by the constantly changing 
approaches taten to industrial develcpnent in the different 
countries and groups of countries, in particular the inore 
advanced. The latter are therefore seen as the principal 
actors in the expansión of international trade, and what 
happens in their industrial apparatuses sets the trend f or the 
structuring of patterns of trade. 
The concentration of comnercial dynamism in trade in 
manufactures and the f act that it is concentrated in countries 
with suf f icient industrial developnent to react to the rapid 
changes undergone by productive processes are tino sides of the 
same coin. 
The segmentation of international trade appears to be 
rooted basically in the same structural gap which separates 
the industrialized world from those countries which must 
continué to depend basically on the producticn and exportation 
of primary products. Oountries in this situation remain 
outside the more dynamic trade f lows because their industrial 
activities have not reached that stage of development at which 
they can adapt to and particípate in the new modes adopted for 
the production of and trade in manufactures by those centres 
which are the most advanced in the production of technology 
and by those which succeed in raising their productivity 
appreciably by applying them. 
The high technological content of industrial activities 
even helps to raise productivity in the production of primary 
goods in the developed eooncmies. In those countries it is 
easier for technological innovatians to emerge and be put into 
general vise in agriculture and mining. This is one of the main 
reasons why the developed oountries have, to the surprise of 
many, been able to take the lead in trade in primary 
commódities over developing countries specializing in their 
production. 
In the last analysis, the application of technological 
innovations to industry, which has resulted in considerable 
improvements in the productivity of the production factors, 
and the irrternationalization of the manufacturing processes 
seem to be the two phenomena responsable for the most 
significant changes in world trade flows. 
b) Two staaes in the segmentation of international trade 
The achieveraent of very high levéis of productivity gives 
rise to changes in production and trade which have extensive 
and variad social and political repercussions. Those who stand 
to gain from this have a choice of ways in which to divide the 
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benefits, sirce the degrees to which labcur, capital and the 
State particípate may be different. There are also various 
ways in which the agente reoeiving these prof its ray allocate 
them to different types of consunption or investment. Those 
who stand to lose because their systems of production have 
beoone obsoleta are confrontad with similar cpticne regarding 
the distribution and allocation of their losses. 
Logically enough, these decisions are easier fbr the 
profit-makers than for the losers. The latter must decide 
Where the heaviest loss must be borne rather than what sector 
to advance. It is not unusual, in cases of eooncadc and social 
transformation of slgniflcant sccpe and impact, for the 
political authority to intervene and establish public policías 
in an atterapt to raanage the losses. Khan ti» economy as a 
whole is in expansión, such losses are usually absorbed or 
offset internally. If this does not oocur, an attempt is 
frequently made to cut the losses at the ««pense of third 
parties. inis is tzue of protactionist policías, and it is not 
by chance that they have re-emerged at tistes of reosssion and 
crisis. 
Fren this analysis it may therefore be asen that there 
are two stages in the prcoess of trade segmentation. An early 
stage, which may be temed "spontaneous segmentation", 
consista in the conoentration of export flowB in those 
countries which tatos the lead in increased prcductlvity in a 
given branch of industry. Exporta from economies which are 
unable to stay anead in the race for innovations and cost 
reductions lose mementum and tend to be overtaten. 
However, when this happens, the reaction is to manage the 
losses (smaller earnings on capital, reduction or stagnation 
of wages, unenployment, etc.), which leads to the 
establishment of protectionist policies. Ihis would be the 
secend stage, which might be called "intentional 
segmentation". 
The advántages achieved by countries in the lead in 
technological progress usually enables them to successfully 
offset the effects of protectionism, if only in categories not 
subject to protection, since they have increased their 
economic power and also their bargaining power vis-á-vis 
countries protecting themselves against the advances they have 
achieved. However, ©comercial trade will remain hamstrung in a 
number of ways. 
Third-party countries which have not initially 
participated in the competition suffer more pezmanent ef fects. 
It becomes more difficult to engage in aespetition. They must 
compénsate for the protectionist barriers as well as for 
differences in productivity, with the result that the 
acquisition of ccanparative advántages becomes more uncertain, 
time-consuming and costly. In -this second stage of the prcoess 
of segmentation, a deliberately stronger effort is made to 
exelude these countries from conmercial competition; however, 
in practioe, the exclusión mechanism has already been set into 
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metían when the application of technological innovations had 
created differences in productivity and given rise to oosts 
which had not existed previously. 
c) International-tzaHon of the production prooesses 
Oost dif ferences created in order to prenote inter-
natianal trade in a given category are ef fected not only by 
applying technological innovations to the production 
prooesses. They are also obtained by having recourse to compa-
rative advantages resulting from each country's peculiarities 
in terne of the resources it possesses, its social and 
institutional organization and the levéis at vftiich it 
renunerates the production factors and its ways of doing so. 
Technological progress is not unoonnected with the 
capacity for benef iting from these cenparative advantages and 
is of course fundamental in transport, oanmunicatians and 
trade. But this capacity is used differently in each 
individual category for the express purpose of reviewing the 
impact had by other factors wMch provide a more direct 
explanatian for the internatianalizatLon of the production 
prooesses. 
Actually, although the internationalization of production 
processes is depicted as being very characteristic of the 
evolution of the world eooncnty in recent decades, there is 
nothing new about It since It was involved in all 
inter-country trade In raw materials and other goeds already 
widely traded at world level in the past oentury. 
Meanwhile, it raay be sald that the present rate and type 
of internationalization are characteristic of this age. It is 
practised within the various industrial branches and often 
also within a single enterprise. 
Frora the point of view of the segmentation of 
international trade, there is need to ask why 
internationalization has been concentrated in a few countries, 
of which basically only five are developing countries, to the 
exclusión of the rest. The truth is that in the early 197 Os 
this was not expected to be the case. It was oomrronly 
predicted that a new international división of labour would be 
established, which would result in a substantial redeployment 
of industry in the direction of a large nuniber of developing 
countries. These countries would take over the 
labour-intensive industries, while the developed countries 
would specialize in industries with higher technological 
content. 
There were sene differences in the way in which this 
prospect was viewed. Soma people felt that the developing 
world, or at least a significant part of it, would enter into 
new stages of its industrialization. Others argued that, as a 
consequence of what the transnational corporatians were doing, 
the subordinate and dependent position of the developing 
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oountries wculd becooe even further Consolidated. Everyone 
agreed, however, that títere would be a very extensive 
industrial redeployment f avouring a wide variety of thlrd 
world (xuntries. 
Contrary to these predictions, the past 15 years have 
been wM by a oonoentration of the dyimic trade flora and 
a tefidency for investnent to be directed very selectively 
towards the developed and a few developing ocuntrles. This has 
oocurred in an intemational context of growing disequilibaria 
and latent instability, particularly in the financial realm. 
d) International relocation of Industrial activities 
The transnational corporatians have played a majar role 
in the relocation of industry which has taken place in this 
period, since their activities have proliferated rapidly. 
Aooording to estimates nade by the United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporatians (CTC), at the beginning of the 
1970s there were cióse to 10 000 transnational corporatians 
which controlled 30 000 subsidiarles all over the world. It 
vas estimated that by the end of that decade the number of 
those corporatians would rise to sene 11 000 and that there 
would be over 80 000 subsidiarles. The transnational 
corporatians have created their own sphere of action which to 
a large extent is not touched by hational oanditions and in 
fact determines them. 
Direct foreign investments were not, however, attracted 
primarily by the cost of labour as had been expected by those 
who were predicting an industrial redeployment over a decade 
previously, but rather sought to re-establish the levéis of 
profitability by trying to benefit more from other 
characteristics of the economies receiving them. 
In the first place, the size of the domestic market seems 
to have been a more important factor than cheap labour. This 
would explain the concentratian of investments in Europe and 
the United States and, among the developing oountries, in 
Brazil and México as well as, to a comparatively lesser 
extent, in the oountries of southeast Asia.20/ Among the 
latter, the world market has been a priority concern among 
national enterprises, exoept in Singapore. Another factor, 
which is relatad to market size, is the attractian exerted by 
the integratian prooesses; but this is not only a matter of 
having greater acoess to integrated markets, but relates in 
particular to the comparative adVantage enjoyed by 
transnational corporatians in international operations, owing 
to the very nature of their activities. 
These corporations are also attracted by economies in the 
process of rapid industrialization with high ratas of 
investment because they enable the corporations to benefit 
from the dynamic effects of the thrust generated by industrial 
growth. Other technological and financial factors, such as the 
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availability of natural resources (the Chemical industry in 
the Middle East, for example) and gecgraphical proximity 
(e.g., aixOTtracting firms in México), nave played a 
significant role in decisions to invest in transnational 
corporatians. 
Thus, the trade flows set in motion by the ínter-
nationalization of the production processes which these 
corporatians nave to a large extent developed have benefited 
not the poor countries where wages are lower but other 
countries with other characteristics and have been 
concentrated in the irdustrialized and, also, more recently, 
in the nevly industrializing countries. 
Ihe relccation of industries seems to be part of a 
defensive strategy devised by the transnational corporations 
to ensure that markets are not penetrated by competitive 
imports. Instead of seeking an autononous increase in the rate 
of returns under an offensive strategy, they have tried to 
re-establish their position in their markets partially by 
operating under conditions conparable to those of their 
competitors. 
In conclusión it iay be observed, with regard to the 
developing countries, that this defensive strategy calis for 
the partial transfer of specífíc operations and does not 
result in a massive redeployraent of production. Ihus, 
relocation operates on a restricted basis in that an activity 
already under way is not transferred but its grcwth is, so 
that production and eirployment losses in the country of origin 
are limited. In addition, these relocation processes are 
reversible since technological progress may make it again 
prof itable to conduct an activity in the country from which it 
was originally moved. 
B. THE EOQNCMIC BOIJCTES OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND THEIR EFFECIS ON IATTN AMERICA 
ANO THE CARIBBEAN 
Eooncmic trends of current inportance include the grówing 
interdependenoe of a nurrber of national and regional 
econcmies, and this deserves special attention, not only fren 
those engaged in scientific research but also froto 
governments, which need to give oonsideration to numerous 
external factors, which sometimes have decisive effeets on the 
developuent of national eoonemies. 
"Interdependence" in this sense by no means inplies an 
egalitarian or balanced view of international economic 
relations. Actually, the emergence of such expressions as 
'•North-South" and "oentre-periphery" now suggests a real 
possibility of potentially vmegual situations and positions in 
which the degree to which a country is dependent is inversely 
proporcional to the amount of economic power it wields and the 
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extent to which it is ctevelcped. Ihe vulnerability of a 
national eooncny In the present intemational situation is 
determined by inany factors of a variety of types. However, it 
is in general true that the irriustrialized countries are n x e 
often pressure-roakars than the objects of ¡rasure, while the 
developing countries are in the opposita position. 
No national econamy may be ccnpared with that of the 
United States a s a pressure-inater owing to the weight that the 
latter country carries in the world economic setting. Thus, 
the performance of that country is a factor of majar ispact on 
the International soene, and any relationship of 
interdependenoe there may be between the United States and 
Latin America and the Caribbean will inevitably be unequal and 
unbalanoed since the United States dependa very little on the 
tone set by the latin American and Caribbean econamies while 
the latter are extremely vulnerable to the conseguences of the 
real and financia! performance of the United States. 
In this situation, ocnsideration of the present state of 
and trends followed by the United States eooncny and of the 
mechanisns whereby the course taken by one eooncny puts 
pressure on the performance of other eoonanies to sane extent 
related to it will be of help in forecasting the effects it 
may have on the región. In addition, the central econamy acts 
on the so-called peripheral economies in certain speciflc 
ways, váiich shculd be taken into aocount. 
1. Ifae evolution of the United States economv and 
its mechaniams for exiertinqr influénoe 
on the OBuntrias of Latin America 
and theiCaribbean 
a) The econamiff TJQlJW "f the Uhited States in recenfc vears 
Freo the moment they tcok power in January 1981, 
President Ronald Reagan and his Bepublican Administration 
announced a radical change, of markedly anti-statist bias, in 
the economic policy of the United States. Its approach to the 
stxuctural and long-^term problems of the United States econamy 
consisted bosically in reducing the State's intervention in 
economic management and slowing down the more spontaneous 
elements in the operation of the market mechanisas. 
As early as February 1981, President Reagan presented the 
United States Congress with an economic recovery programme in 
which it was proposed to reduce the growth of government 
spending and taxation, reform or eliminate unnecessary and 
unproductive or counterproductive regulations and prenote a 
coherent monetary policy aimed at maintaining the valué of the 
dollar.áL/ 
In addition, convinced that the rising prices, high 
uneraployment and the slow rise in productivity were the result 
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of too nuch government regulatlon, Presldent Reagan called for 
a change in oourse and sald that the government's power to tax 
should not be used to regúlate the economy or bring about 
social change.22/ 
In the pollcies for the 1980s defined in the Economic 
Report of the Presldent of Fébruary 1982, the predominant 
theme was also that of a free market: "My first and foremost 
objectlve has been to improve the performance of the economy 
by reducing the role of the Federal Government in all of its 
many dimensions ... We should leave to prívate initiative all 
the functions that individuáis can perfora privately".23/ 
In that report Presldent Reagan sald he was sensitive to 
the fact that domestlc economlc policy in the United States 
could have signlficant impact on its trading partners and on 
the entire system of world trade and finance, but he insisted 
that a sustained and vigorous growth at heme would be the most 
üoportant contribution the United States could mate to the 
development of the world economy. 
According to the same report, "the Administratian's 
approach to International economlc issues is based on the same 
principies which underline its domestlc programes: a belief 
In the superlorlty of market solutlons to economlc problems 
and an emphasis on private economlc actlvity as the englne of 
non-inflatiQnary growth" .24/ 
Reaffirming the Administración's conndtment to free 
trade, Presldent Reagan has said that the expansión of the 
international trade system is the main tool of economic growth 
for many of the developing countries. His preferenoe for 
economic liberalism and intemal economic adjustments as a 
means of contributing to world development has gene hand. In 
hand with a conservative and at the same time active approach 
to North American foreign policy. Thus, the energy with which 
statist practices are being eliminated from the United States 
can be compared with the restrictive treatment accorded to 
governments regarded as being not very co-operative. In actual 
fact, the policy governing the international economic 
relations of the United States and the practica of that policy 
are imbued with the prevailing ideological and political 
spirit. 
The United States Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 stipulates 
that beneficiarles of that country's Generalized System of 
Preferences may not include countries members of OPEC or 
oonnunist countries, unless they are not dominated by 
international communism. For its part, the Government of the 
United States makes use, for purposes of negotiation, of trade 
embargoes and restrictions and rejeets financial assistance 
for political reasons, and the same is true of its dealings 
with multilateral economic bodies. 
Just as in economic relations with developing countries 
the basic principie followed by the Republican Administration 
is "trade, not aid", the direct effect of the economic policy 
of the United States on Latin America and the Caribbean is 
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detendDecl primarily by the degree of comercial protectioniem 
which it authorizes cr introduces. 
When toe broader repercussions of that eoonomic policy on 
the countries of the región are examinad, it nust be borne in 
mind that within the aacroeaxoác policies, epecific policies 
such as the industrial, technological, fiscal, icnetaiy, 
cxxnmercial, labour and other policies, may be distinguished. 
Because of the pressures exerted by groups with different 
interests, the objectives and accanplishments of different 
specific policies can hardly coincide, and in fact they 
frequently contradict each other, which tends to mate the 
macroaoonomic policy less oonsistent and to rob it of its 
identity in that various combirations of specific policies are 
generated. The commitment which emerges from these complex 
interactions is often far removed fren the objectives 
proclaimed explicitly, and for that reason the diagnosis must 
focus more on practical results than on inteñtions and 
purposes. 
This explains why, for example, at a time when the United 
States is involved in a heated debate ooncerning the 
advisability or othexwise of having any industrial policy at 
all, there is in fact a policy which includes federal 
prograimiies providing for aid to industries. Among such 
progranimes mention should be nade of the system for 
accelerated depreciation of fixed assets, the preferential 
treatment accorded to capital gains and crédit on investraents 
deductible from cozporation taxes. 
The importance of the specific eoonomic policies of the 
United States resides in their capacity to exert an influenoe 
on the International situation at any given moment and to 
affect bilateral and multilateral eoonomic relations. Thus, 
its monetary policy may cause a rise in the interest rate or 
may contribute to its decline, with corresponding reper-
cussians on the external debts of the Iatin American and 
Caribbean countries. Its investment policy may contribute to 
the growth of United States investments abroad or may 
stimulate the flcw of foreign capital towards the United 
States. An effective labour policy which is heedful of social 
needs may to same extent alleviate the protectionist pressures 
applied by wcarkers, which, in the absence of such a policy, 
would be hard to resist. A restrictive fiscal policy can keep 
inflation uhder control and limit the fiscal déficit and the 
federal debt, thereby impacting an interest rates and on the 
parity of the dollar (two variables of Importance for the 
external sector of the Iatin American economies); but at the 
same time it can slow the growth of the United States eoonomy, 
exerting a strong recessive pulí. 
OWing to the confliets between them, the various specific 
eoonomic policies of the United States frequently counteract 
each other. It may, however, be ooncluded that in recent years 
they have resultad in a sharp rise in real interest rates, a 
significant revaluation of the dollar, a massive and 
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increasingly larger inflcw of fareign capital into the United 
States and growing recourse to pixtecticnism by that cxuntry. 
In actual fact, real interest rates in the United States 
(calculated by taking into cxansideration the nominal 
preferential rates and the price deflators implicit in the 
gross naticnal product) did not exceed 2.5% a year between 
1970 and 1978, averaging 1.6% during this period. In 1979 the 
real rate rose to 4.1%, in 1980 to 6.1% and between 1981 and 
1984 it averaged 8%, 25/ 
The dollar, for its part, recovered notably between 1981 
and March 1985, and, in spite of having lost 25% of its valué 
between the latter date and Decentar 1985, it remains 
relatively strong. 
Although the United States is one of the world's inost 
open markets, in recent years it moved in the directian of 
greater protectianism. The proportion of manufactures subject 
to nortariff restrictions rose fran 20% in 1980 to 30% in 
1983,26/ and the number of investigaticns relating to anti-
dunping and countervailing duties rose fren 62 in 1980 to 
160 in 1982 (exports fran the región were the subject of 6 and 
37 of these cases, respectively). 27/ Mareover, the United 
States has recently introduced new restrictions en the imports 
of meat, sugar, footwear, steel, leather goods and textiles. 
Although the United States was a net exporter of capital 
prior to 1982, that situatian was reversed that year, and in 
1984 net capital entries to the country amounted to 
US$ 102 billion.28/ 
The consequences of the processes referred to for Latin 
America and the Caribbean are varied and will be examined in 
detail later in this paper; hcwever, sane negative net effeets 
may be anticipated fran now an. 
In a study published by SHA in 1984 on current economic 
policies of the United States and how they affect the región, 
a detailed analysis is nade of specific economic policies of 
the United States, the debates held on thern in that country 
and their impact on the performance of the United States 
economy in 1983 and on the región. The conclusión reached in 
this study is that the combination of an expansiva fiscal 
policy and a restrictive monetary policy results in an 
economic policy which is not very stable and that in the 
United States domestic economic policy decisions are in 
general taken without due consideration given to the effect 
they wculd have internationally. As a result, the región is 
facing a potentially conflictive situation in various áreas 
and will be called upon to make a great effort to somehow 
disassociate the servicing of the external debt from the terms 
prevailing on the international financial markets and, in 
particular, from the instability resulting from the 
combination of specific policies comprising the economic 
policy of the United States.29/ 
In theory, that economic policy affeets the rural 
economies in two different ways. When acted upan directly and 
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in the short term, they are rnoet affected ty the type and 
degree of prctectioniBa engendered by the specific eooncmic 
policies as a whole and by their repercuseiaie on interest 
rates and capital novements. The developirg countries vill 
also be affected (and probably to a greater extent) indirectly 
and in the médium and long term by the «ay in Which the 
eoonomy of the United States reacts to its currertt policías. 
Thus, a more efficiant maczoeoxncnic policy which manages to 
lay the groundwork for the eoonomic growth of the United 
States within a new eoonomic cycle of long duration oould oon-
tribute to the development of the developing countries, 
provided that the growth shown by the United States involves a 
xeasonable amount of participation by products from periphexal 
economies. 
b) Main ccmqonanta of ti» economv of ti» Dnited States and 
how its behaviour affects the.Tnt.in ftmffFirian ooiinfcries 
Ihe mechanism by naans of which the econcmic evolution of 
the United States affects the economice of other countries is 
nade up basically of factors which genérate pressure, the 
charmels through which that pressure is transmitted and the 
basic characteristics of those other countries which malee them 
receptive and vulnerable to the iitpact. 
Virtually every sector of the United States eccncny mates 
itself felt in the Latin American and Caribbaan economies. 
Sene sectors, such as industry, construction, energy, 
transport and canmunications, have repercussions on the 
economies of the región because they consume imported goods; 
on the other hand, other basic industries and agricultura have 
an influence because they are competitors. In addition, in a 
number of industries the importar and ooapetitor functions are 
superinposed in that they consume raw naterials from the 
región and produce manufactures and semi-UBnufactures which 
acópete with similar products from Latin America and the 
Caribbean on the markets of the United States, the región and 
the resto of the worid. 
Scientific and technological iimovations and the growth 
of labour productivity in the United States as well as 
structural changes in ti» econcuy of that country result in 
reduced consumptian of basic oonnodities and traditional 
semi-manufactures, and this has repercussions in ti» countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Within the área of domestic trade and services, the 
folliTwing elemente of the United States economy aay affect 
thesc. countries: domestic consumption of various products, 
volume of sales, level of stocks of commercial enterprises, 
prices of goeds and services, consumar spending and structure 
of the consuicption of goods and services. 
In the financia! área, the behavicur of ti» following 
variables in ti» United States eoonomy is particularly 
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relevant to the ecancmic evolutlon of latín America and 
the Carifcbean: the parity of the dollar, interest rates, 
the fiscal déficit, the dcraestic debt, liquidity and 
inflation. 
As the dollar has become an internationally recognized 
means of payment, currency in circulation and as means of 
savings, its fluctuations have acquired particular 
significare» for nearly all other economies and malees itself 
felt both negatively and positively both when its valué is 
high and when it is low. 
The preferential interest rate established for their 
clients by the bariks of the Uhited States is of considerable 
iaportance for latín America and the Caribbean because the 
larger share of the extemal debt of the región Is contracted 
at a variable rate of interest. In addition to affecting the 
IIBQR rate and other International interest rates, the 
preferential rate also has an effect on that part of the 
región's debt which vas not contracted with banks of the 
United States. 
The upward raovement of the preferential rate produces the 
following adverse effects on the latin American and Caribbean 
economies: i) loans ana credits beccne more expensive; 
ii) there is an increase in the cost of servicing the debt 
contracted at a variable interest rate; iii) the enterprises 
of the United States tend to reduce their stocks and reserves, 
forcing the prices of raw materials down; iv) it bacanes more 
attractive to invest in the United States, with the result 
that the availability of capital on the International 
financial market declines and v) the growth of the Uhited 
States economy is restrained, which affects the econcmic 
expansión of latin America and the Caribbean. 
The evolution of the extemal sector of the economy 
of the United States has had various effects of great 
forcefulness; those of its aspects which have most 
affected the countries of the región include exporte, 
importe, trade in services and the movement of Uhited States 
capital. 
The volumes, valúes and structure of exporte from the 
United States to the countries of latin America and the 
Caribbean have been more limited in their influence than have 
imports from the región; nevertheless, they can affect trade 
balances, domestic price levéis, structures of production 
and consumpticn and employment. Exports of services may 
also help to change the structure of production and 
consumption. 
The movement of capital away from and towards the Uhited 
States has a constant repercussian on Latin America and the 
Caribbean, both directly and in the way it affects the Inter-
national financial market. Capital enters and leaves the 
United States in the following main flows: direct foreign 
investment, foreign portfolio investment; oanmercial bank 
credits; trade financing; government loans; lending through 
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International financial organizations; deferred pápente and 
flight of capital. 
In the capital exporta of the United States, each 
of these flore has its cwn iiopact en the eocncny of the 
recipient country; nevertheless, there are always positiva 
and negativa aspeets of that inpact, of vMch the former 
prevalí in the start ató radium tem ani tha latter in the 
loxf ten» 
North American iaports of foreign capital reduce the 
availability of resources on the international financial 
aarket and help to empty the reglan of capital through 
repatriation of profita and interest, retum of prívate United 
States assets and flight of capital. 
The impact had ¿y the behaviour of the various elemente 
of the eooncmy of the United States is transmittad to 
other oovmtries through the channels alemg vhich bilateral 
and multilateral economic relations are conducted: 
i) trade in goods, ü ) trade in services, üi) direct 
investroents, iv) credit relations, v) manetary/financial 
relations, vi) transfer of technology and vil) developnent 
assistanoe. 
The behaviour of the various componente of the eooncmy of 
the United States may affect the eoonomies of the región, 
reaching it along eme or inore conduits, and the inpact may 
have opposite effeets when transmitted through different 
channels. Thus the application in the United States of a 
technological prooess which permits savings in a given raw 
material may, when transmitted by trade iñ goods, produce a 
depressive effect in a country which eaqports the oommodity in 
cjuestion. The impact of the same action, when transmitted to 
tiie same country through transfer of technology, may, 
in a longer term, help to modernize its industry and reduce 
domestic consumption of that raw material. 
The relativa strength of the impact is determinad by the 
correlation of various factors, such as the power of the 
impulse generated, the intensity of those foros of 
international relations along which the impact may be 
channelled and the vulnerability of the recipient country to 
the impact received, which depende on its significance for 
that country's eoonomy. 
In short, the objectively unavoidable prooess of 
increasing the participation of the regional eoonomies in the 
international economic circuit, neoessarily mates them 
increasingly vulnerable to the impulses generated within that 
circuit siñee when the receiving end of the channels of 
transmission is enlarged, the impulses of greater intensity 
are internationalized, and the effect produced is more 
extensiva and far-reaching. 
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2. Present situation of and prospecte for the econcroy 
of the United States 
a) Natura of the structural adiustmenb In the 
economv of the United States 
Ihe recent phase of expansión experienced in the United 
States has been atypical in sane aspects and has revealed a 
situation in which a nuniber of dissimilar conditions combine. 
Ihe singularity of that expansión is due to a complex 
interaction between the canjunctural factors involved 
(interest rates, parity of the dollar, flow of importe, etc.) 
and the special type of economic cycle which began with the 
crisis of 1980-1982. 
Ihe duration of that crisis is considered to nave 
been three years since the first and third quarters of 
1981 provided only a brief breathing spell and did not 
mark the beginning of real economic reactivaticti. Its length 
and its particularly harsh nature are attributable to the 
fact that it marked the conclusión of a very long economic 
cycle, which began with the Great Depression, and the 
beginning of a new cyde, created and fueled by the so-called 
scientific and technological, or third industrial, 
revolution. 
The most salient characteristic of the present cycle 
(which, according to N. Kbndrátiev, is a wave of long 
duration) is a considerable change in the economic and social 
structure of developed capitalism. The scientific and 
technological revolution in the United States has brought the 
progress made by the society into conjunction with its radical 
transformation, in terms of production and enployment as well 
as of distribution and consumption, giving rise to trends and 
impacts which are going to determine the structures of society 
for several decades. 
Now more is needed than the type of adjustment called for 
by a "normal" cyclical crisis, which is designed to correct 
the lack of proportion accumulated during the previous cycle 
and to put the econcroy on a more even keel by adjusting 
production and consumption. What is imperiously required at 
present is a structural adjustment, a substantial change in 
the structures of production and consumption, and the 
adaptation of the prcductive forces to a higher level of 
operation since they need more approprlate conditions if 
progress is to be made. 
In the course of a transformation of this kind, the 
sectoral structure of the econcroy and the composition of each 
economic sector change; i.e., the process is one of 
intersectoral and intra-sectoral adjustment. In the econcroy as 
a whole, the production of services gains on the production of 
goods, and as this cccurs, the balance among different sectors 
also changes. Ihe relative importance of the ccraponents of 
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each industrial sector is altered, as sane fall behind and 
others advance at different growth rates. 
In practioe, in the United States the replacement of the 
goods-producing sector by the services-prodocing sector has 
taken place over a long period of time hit has accelerated and 
oonsolidated In recent years. Between 1978 and 1984 (both 
years of high econcnic grcwtii), jobs in the manufacturing 
industry drcpped by more than one million, vihile the nuaber of 
employees in services grew by nearly 10 million (see table 
13). While in 1978 each job in the roanufacturing industry was 
matdied by 2.95 jobs in services, in 1984 the latter side of 
that ratio rose to 3.62 — a very rapid change for a period of 
anly six years. The econony of the United States has been 
becoming increasingly service-oriented, váth services no 
longer constituting an auxiliary and ccnplementary sector of 
the econony and now functioning relatively autonomously. 
At the same time, the industrial structure has changad as 
a result of the expansión of the high technology sectors, the 
decline of traditional industries, which for decades were 
regarded as the backbone of development and its most dynamic 
element, and the change in the structure of consunptian, both 
personal and industrial. 
In the poütical orbit, the initiation of tiie structural 
adjustment coincided with the ccming into office of President 
Reagan and the Republican Administration. Although the free 
market policy of the Administration, which allows the process 
of adjustment to follow its natural course, probably played an 
indirect role in making the crisis and the depression more 
severe and widespread, at the same time it permitted 
a more efficient and forceful adjustment, whose more 
spantaneous dynamic began to introduce important improvements 
in the econamic and social structure of the United States and 
marked the appearance of same direction-changing trends in the 
development of the industrializad capitalist countries. 
b) Characteristics and evolution of seetors producincr aoods 
and services 
After the cyclical crisis of 1980-1982, the economy of 
the United States recovered rapidly in 1983 (the gross 
national prcduct grew by 3.4%), grew in 1984 (6.6%) and 
slackened in 1985 (2.3%).30/ 
Ihe prcduct growth data do not adequately reflect the 
notable differences which characterized the performance of the 
various economic sectors and their components. As a result of 
the structural adjustment, the recovery and expansión of the 
economy were markedly unequal and did not even af fect soma 
sectors. A number of industries experienced only a slight 
upturn, barely enough to rise above the levéis recorded during 
the recent depression and below those reached during the 
previous expansión, which meant that their relative importance 
to the economy diminished irreversibly. 
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00 Table 13 
STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT I N THE UNITED STATES 
(Not seasonaUy adiusted: thousands of p e r s o o s a s o f Deccntoer of each vear ) 






Servi ce-produc i ng 
Goverrment; federal, 
State and local 
Unenployed 
Rate of unemployment 



















97- 2 8 2 
3 3 9 4 
1 0 6 9 
4 3 8 7 -
2 0 1 7 5 
6 5 3 1 8 
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T 7 8 5 




























































7 . 2 
Source: United States Department of Carneree, Survey of Current Business. S e p t e m b e r 1979; August 1981; Septentoer 1981 and August 1982, 1983, 1984 
and 1985. 
Scsmething can be learned about the present situation and 
about certain tendencies on the part of the production sector 
of the ecanomy of the united States by examining the evolution 
of that country's iron and steel industry (see table 14). In 
1978 steel production reached its highest level —137 million 
short tons- , «hile in 1984 only 92,5 million tons were 
smelted; in the same period the installed capacity fell from 
158 million to 135 million tons. 
Although this phenomenon Is in part explained by foreign 
competition as reflectad in the rise in imports and the 
decline in exports, its most irtportant cause was the lower 
consumption of steel by the economy of the United States. 
While the share of iaports in the United States steel market 
expanded considerably, this occurred more because the market 
shrarik than because imports increased. In six years the 
apparent oonsunption of steel dropped by 38 million tons, 
which shows that the steel produced in the United. States is 
being replaced more by other materials which compete with it 
than by steel from abroad. 
A phenomenon deserving of more detailed study is the 
pattern of consumption of basic inputs by the North American 
economy. Table 15 supplies the available statistics on 
apparent consumption of eight basic inputs which for decades 
were regarded as vital for the development of an 
industrialized economy —petroleum, iron ore, aluminium, 
refined copper, lead, tin, zinc and natural rubber. Between 
1972 and 1984, their consumption experienced various 
conjunctural fluctuations in keeping with the two economic 
cycles of that period, but more long-term trends can also be 
observed, such as the downward trend in their consuirption in 
both relative and absolute terms (see table 16). 
In order to yield the same magnitude of gross 
national product, the economy of the United States needs 
an increasingly lower level of basic inputs. Thus, for every 
billion dollars of GNP in 1972, 5.1 million barréis of 
petroleum and 1 728 tons of copper were consumed, while in 
1984 (at constant prices) only 3.5 million barréis of 
petroleum and 1 242 tons of copper were required. Ihe same 
pattern was followed in nearly all the cases examined. 
Of even greater importance is the drop in cansunption of 
basic inputs in absolute terms. All of them, with the 
exception of aluminium, reached their máximum levéis of 
consumption between 1973 and 1978, after which their 
consumption began to decline more or less rapidly. In 1984, 
when its econcny was in full swing, the United States used 
less petroleum, iron ore, lead, tin and zinc than in 1972, 
less copper than in 1973 and less natural rubber than in 
1977. 
Ihe downward trend in the relative consunption of basic 
inputs in recessive crisis phases is the reason why its 
decline in absolute terms has been more marked than that of 
the gross national product. 
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00 Table 14 
SITUATION IN THE IRON AND STEEL SECTOR IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1977 -1984 
(Thousands of short t o n s "i a/ 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Instal led capacity 
Raw steel production 
Exports of steel m i l i 
products 




































Source: United States Department of Conmerce, Survey of Current Business. Decenfcer 1 9 7 9 , 1980, 1 9 8 1 , 1982, 1983 and 1984 and September 1985. 
a/ One short ton = 0.90718 metric tons. 
Table 15 
CONSUHPTION OF SOME BASIC INPUTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1972-1984 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Gross national production 
(billions of US dollars at 
1972 prices) 1 171 1 235 1 214 1 202 1 275 1 341 i 399 1 483 1 481 1 514 1 485 1 535 1 639 
Petroleun, domestic demand 
(millions of barréis) 5 990 6 317 6 078 5 958 6 384 6 728 6 870 6 757 6 224 5 861 5 583 5 559 5 756 
I ron ore, consunption at 
i ron and steel plants 
(millions of tons) 121.9 139.3 131.1 107.9 116.2 110.2 118.2 116.9 90.8 96.5 56.1 62.2 6 7 . 0 
AluniniLm (production + 
imports - exports) 
(thousands of tons) 5 109 5 258 5 629 4 702 5 333 5.961 6 215 6 103 5 561 6 726 5 179 5 572 6 824 
Refined copper (thousands 
of tons) 2 023 2 217 1 960 1 398 1 810 1 998 2 193 1 890 1 890 1 855 1 624 1 767 2 036 
Lead (thousands of tons) 1 347 1 398 1 451 1 177 1 296 1 435 1 300 1 358 1 070 1 059 1 075 1 149 1 207 
Tin (thousands of tons) 70.3 75.8 65.8 55.8 62.9 68.0 63.1 62.5 56.4 54.4 53.5 55.8 5 0 . 4 
Zinc (thousands of tons) 1 287 1 364 1 168 839 1 029 1 001 1 023 1 008 811 834 710 775 « 9 
Natural rubber 
(thousands of tons) 651 696 720 670 731 780 765 739 586 635 661 676 751 
03 Source: United States Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. August of each year betueen 1975 and 1985. 
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00 Table 16 
CONSUHPTION OF SOME BASIC INPUTS IN THE UNITED STATES, IN RELATIVE TERMS, 1972-1984 
(For every USt 1 b i l l ion of aross national product. at constant pr ices for 1972) 
Gross national product 
(billions of dollars) 
Petroleun, domestic demand 
(thousands of barréis) 
I ron ore, consunption at 
i ron and steel plants 
(thousands of tons) 
Aluminium (production + 
imports - exports) (tons) 




Natural rubber (tons) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
1 171 1 235 1 214 1 202 1 275 1 341 1 399 
5 115 5 115 5 007 4 957 5 007 5 017 4 911 
104 113 108 90 91 82 84 
4 363 4 257 4 637 3 912 4 183 4 445 
1 728 1 795 1 614 1 163 1 420 1 490 
1 150 1 132 1 195 979 1 016 1 070 
60 61 54 46 49 51 
1 099 1 104 962 698 807 746 
556 564 593 557 573 582 
1 483 
4 556 
1 481 1 514 1 485 
79 61 64 38 41 
1984 
1 535 1 639 






















































Source: United States Department of Conmerce, Survev of Current Business, issues during the per iod 1975-1985. 
In its structural adjustment ptrocess, the induBtry of the 
United States has seen its situation worsen en aooount of 
short-tem factors such as high real interest rates, a 
revalued dollar, the entry of imports on a nassive scale and 
the loss of COTpetitiveness of sene sectors. 
The most seriously ai fected industries have been those 
proaucing textiles, footwear and l é a t e goods, m 1984 
iupcrted shoes aooounted for over 70* of all the shoes sold; 
during that year, one shoe factory dosed every four days, on 
average, At present, jjiprts of wearing apparel supply cióse 
to 401 of the clothing market of the United States, and the 
country's wearing apparel industry stays afloat only because 
of import quotas.31/ 
lhe oountry's machine tool industry is gradually yielding 
the demestic market to imports, since they are growing more 
rapidly than the demand. The transport and farm raachinery 
industries are in a similar situation. 
At the same time, within the goods producing sector 
varicus industries are maintaining a higher than average 
grcwth rate, showing relatively stable expansión even in the 
face of stronger foreign oompetition. Since the high 
technology sector is the benef iciary of the present structural 
adjustment, it has ampie room for development and expansión, 
although some Consolidated áreas are now showing signs of 
saturation because competitors have become more nuraerous. 
Industries which continued to show rapid growth in 1985 
and whose prospecte for the coming years are good, even if an 
economic crisis should oceur, include those producing chips; 
electronic connectors; electranic components; electronic 
medical eguipment; oomputers; radio, televisión and 
communication eguipment and lithographic plates. 
Industries which supply the Pentagon, either with weapons 
or other materials, are in a special position. Finns in the 
industrial-military complex have a stable market whose growth 
is ensured owing to the present Administration's intention to 
créate new weapons systems, on which billions of dollars will 
be spent, and to continué to raise military budgets in the 
years to carne. 
The production of goods in general is no longer a salient 
ciiaracteristic of the economy of the United States, in which 
services are increasingly taking a leading role. While in 1972 
the production of goods generated 47% of the gross national 
product as opposed to 42% in the case of services, since 1976 
the production of services has exceeded that of goods, and in 
1984 services were responsible for 48% of the product, as 
opposed to 42% in the case of goods.32/ 
Because of the special nature of the services sector 
(multiform and heterogeneous), there is no camión measure for 
gauging its expansión, and the data used to demónstrate its 
dynamism are in many cases indirect (enployment, sales, 
inventories, wages and salaries, etc.), so that the picture 
which emerges is varied and vague. 
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A large segment of the sector is nade up of govemment 
purchases of services, represented first and foreroost by the 
wages and salaries of local, State and federal government 
employees. One área of great importance is the acquisition of 
services by the defenoe sector of the federal govemment 
—ÜS$ 57.8 billion in 1984 (or 25.5% of all government 
purchases of services).33/ 
Domestic trade is one of the most extensive activities of 
the services sector, and the pattern of its sales by periods 
and the growth of its inventories may provide a fairly 
reliable idea of the trends prevailing both within the sector 
and in the econoray as a whole. 
In 1984 retail sales amounted to US$ 1.3 billion, showing 
an increase of 10.5% over 1983, and the rise in consumer 
demand gave a sharp bcost to the production sector in spite of 
the large share of imports in the supply. In the first half of 
1985, hcwever, retail sales grew by anly 5.8% over the same 
period in 1984, which suggests a slackening in the growth rate 
of desiand.34/ Analysts warn that buying náght have slowed 
because of weak growth in disposable personal income and a 
record level of consumer debt, which has reached 19.2% of 
disposable inocme.35/ 
The United States Department of Carneree, has, on the 
basis of the employment c r i t e r k , named the following 
servioes as high growth áreas: data prooessing; personal 
supply; securities broterages; radia, televisión and music 
stores; office work and legal services,36/ The growth of 
employrosnt in services between 1978 and 1984 shows that the 
services sector, lite the agricultural sector, is less 
vulnerable to cyclical factors than are the manufacturing 
industry and construction. It is by nature aleo very stable 
when confronted by foreign competitian and may even be able to 
benefit from the inflow of imported goods. 
Price trends in the economic reactivation phase of the 
current cycle have been atypical in some respects, as a result 
partly of monetary control by the Federal Reserve and partly 
of the revaluation of the dollar and the entry of imports on a 
massive scale. Owing to these anti-inflationary factors, 
producer and consumer prices rose slowly, growth rates in 
consumer prices being 3.8% in 1983, 4.0% in 1984 and an 
estimated 3.8% in 1985.37/ 
As services are less markedly affected by foreign 
competitian, their prices are comparatively less susceptible 
to being driven down by the increase in imports. Thus, in 1984 
service prices rose by 5.6%, vAiile goods prices rose by 3.1%, 
and the general index, by 4%.38/ 
The performance of employment and unemployment in the 
recent expansión phase has confirmad the trend of the past 
three decades towards a rising rate of unemployment with each 
successive economic cycle, in both its low and its high phase 
(see table 17). A number of scientific and technological 
advances, including the autcroatization of industry, bear same 
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Table 17 
UNEMPLOTMEMT IN THE UNITEP STATES IN PHASES OF CRISIS 
AND EXPANSIÓN, 1969-1985 
(Thousands of persons. data not seasonally adíusted) 























of unemployed 5 146 8 250 12 036 2 846 4 100 5 774 8 127 
Nunber of persons 
affected by long-ten 
une«ployment 
(15 ueeks or more) 1 084 2 529 4 732 392 756 1 086 2 264 
Nutber of persons 
affected by long-term 
unemployment as a 
percentage of to ta l 
nunber of unemployed 21.1% 30.7% 39.3% 13.8% 18.4% 18.8X 27.9X 
00 (O 
Source: United States Department of Carneree, Survev of Current Business. May 1970, 1971 and 1974; December 1975 and 1979; May 1983 and Novenber 
1985. 
of the responsibility for a high and steadily rising rate of 
chronic and structural unemployment and for a substantial 
change in the social structure. 
Although a large nuniber of new jobs are being created in 
the economy of the United States, this is not happening at a 
rate high enough to reduce unemplqyment. Services have not 
expanded enough to absorto the growing labour forcé, and the 
direction taken by the Ur Lted States economy and by sama other 
developed econamies, presages that this phencmenon of growing 
structural unemplqyment may continué into the future. 
Gbviously, the behaviour of the economy of the United 
States between 1980 and 1985 reflected both the classical 
vicissitudes of a typical cycle and the camplexities of a 
profound structural transformation. (Xring to the free market 
econcmic policy of the Reagan Administration, the adjustment 
of the economic and social structure has come up against a 
minimum of barriers and obstacles which might have slowed it 
down and given it less impact. 
The adjustment process in this relatively open economy 
has been accelerated by extemal competition, which has made 
the structural transformation more painful but at the same 
time more intense and rapid. 
If far-reaching and radical protectionist measures were 
to be taken, the industry of the United States might 
experience scme relief, so that the production of same 
activities would raise and unemployment would fall a little, 
even in the final stage of the period of expansión prolonging 
it samewhat. The calculations made by a nuniber of economists 
confina that this would be viable in the short term, but they 
say that the cost of continuing to protect the industries in 
the midst of a structural adjustment process would, in the 
médium and long terms be greater than the advantages obtained. 
Trends in recent years show that the traditional basic 
industries are handing their role of engines of the United 
States economy over to new industries which can contribute 
more consistently to efforts to increase production, show 
greater agility in the application of new materials and 
technologies, are better able to supply the market with new 
products on short notice and, above all, show greater 
flexibility and capacity in adapting to changes which occur in 
national and intemational markets. 
c) State of the f inancial svstem and the external sector 
The evolution of the United States financial system in 
1985 reflected the growing concern of the Administration and 
the Federal Reserve over the fiscal déficit and the federal 
debt. 
In the United States the déficit for fiscal year 1985 
(October 1984-September 1985) amounted to a record 
US$ 212 billion,39/ which raised the total federal debt to 
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US$ 1.8 trillion. Net interest payments aroounted to 
US$ 128.1 billion in 1985, and it is estimated that they will 
amount to US$ 137 billion in fiscal 1986.40/ 
Ihe threat to the financial stahility of the United 
States led to a cxsipxnd.se between the Mministration and 
Oongress with regará to spending reductions, and in Decenber 
1985 legislation vas adoptad which calis for balancing the 
federal budget in 1991, establishing a déficit oeiling of 
US$ 144 billion for fiscal 1987, which begins in 1 October 
1986. 
Iargely because of the heavy responsibility borne by the 
high interest rates for the rapid increase in the debt, the 
Federal Reserve laid less stress on anti-inflatianary measures 
and expanded the money supply. In May 1985 the Federal Reserve 
banks lowered the discount rate fram 8% to 7.5%, and the 
preferential rate fell fron 10.7% in Deoember 1984 to 9.5% in 
June 1985. 
Although the real average interest rate fell frctn 8% a 
year in 1984 to 6.4% in 1985, it may still be regazded as high 
in comparison with the historie valúes. Reasons for the 
persistence of high real interest rates include the 
excessively high fiscal déficit, roonetary control and high 
real rates of return on capital. Ihe accelerated depreciation 
of capital goods applied since 1981 was responsable for a 
rapid rise in returns on capital invested in the production 
sector, so that in order to compete with this, the financial 
sector has been offering somewhat higher rates. As for the 
productive sector, it has been inclined to borrow at 
relatively high rates, provided it obtains a high rate of real 
return on investment. 
In addition, the swollen fiscal déficits have forced the 
State to compete increasingly with the private sector in the 
capital market, which tends to forcé interest rates up. 
Although the preferential rate has been fixed since June 
1985, in the financial market there has been doubt as to its 
future, even in the short term. An important factor behind 
this situation is the behaviour of the Federal Reserve, which 
seeks to avoid a resurgence of the inflation without raising 
the cost of money. Combining a restrictive strategic posture 
with the pragmatic tactic of injecting more liquidity in the 
economy, the Federal Reserve is succeeding in taking a 
flexible approach to the fluctuations of the present ecanomic 
situation. However, this policy is hard for the eoonomic 
agents to interpret and provides no degree of certainty 
concxrning the way things may go in the future, because the 
eoonomic situation may be such that the interest rate could 
again fluctuate within relatively wide margins. 
Similar uncertainty has surrounded the performance of the 
dollar, which experienced large changes in the period 
1984-1985, giving rise to doubts cxsncerning its future. And 
since the correlation of those factors which determine the 
movement of the dollar is highly volatile, the latin American 
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countries will continué to face an unstable and uncertain 
roonetary market in the next few years. 
The foreign trade of the United States in the period 
1983-1985 was marked by growing disequilibrium, in that 
exports remained below their 1981 level, while imports were on 
the rise (see table 18). It is estimated that in 1985 the 
trade déficit exceeded US$ 140 billion, i.e., the equivalent 
of 4% of the gross national product of the United States. The 
massive entry of imports into the United States seems to nave 
been caused primarily by a marked growth in demand during the 
1983-1985 expansión phase, while many other economies had a 
relatively depressed domestic demand. The loss of the 
conpetitiveness of United States industry (partly due to 
higher wages) also played an important role in the feeble 
behaviour of exports and the strong perfontiance of imports. 
The rise in the dollar contributed to the loss in 
conpetitiveness of the United States vis-á-vis the Western 
European countries, although it did not have the same effect 
in countries with currencies tied to the dollar. The largest 
increases in sales to the United States were realized by 
Canadá and Japan, in spite of the fact that their currency 
depreciated only moderately with respect to the dollar. 
Inports absorbed a substantial proportion of the growth 
in demand, taking over fren national production, which saw its 
growth slowed by foreign ccrapetition. The significant increase 
in the share of inports from developing countries in inports 
of the United States (tarice as high as the increase in the 
share of Western Europe and 7.5 times as high as that of 
Japan), as well as the notable trade déficit with the majority 
of the developing countries has enabled the present 
Administration to claim that its "Trade, not aid" policy has 
been basically right.41/ 
So long as there are countries which stand to gain by 
promoting their exports to the United States, a selfish 
attitude on the part of other countries with respect to trade 
with the United States would be mistaken and even 
counterproductive. An effort to obtain the máximum surplus 
balance in bilateral trade, without worrying about the 
position taken by the United States, would reflect a 
short-term view, an immediatist position, which, if applied 
universally, would be almost bound to produce negative 
results. If the United States did not succeed in increasing 
its exports and reducing its trade déficit, protectionist 
pressures would be stepped up, there would be a greater 
possibility of new trade restrictions, the expansión of the 
United States econamy would slow dcwn to same extent and its 
déficit on current account would grew, thereby increasing the 
need for external financing, causing interest rates to rise. 
In recent years current account of the United States has 
tended to move in a way which is increasingly unfavourable for 
the country, showing a déficit which is very much on the rise 
(estimates for 1985 come cióse to US$ 120 billion). Although 
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Table 18 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(MiUions of dollars) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Exports of merchandise, 
excluding military 
Imports of merchandise, 
excluding military 
Trade balance 
Exports of services 
Imports of services, 
Balance of trade 
in services 
Balance on current 
account 
United States assets 
ebroad, net increase 
Direct investment, 
net increase 






in hands of foreign 
individuáis, net increase 
223 966 236 254 211 217 200 257 220 316 
249 308 264 143 247 606 261312 328 597 
-25 342 -27 889 -36 389 -61 055 -108 291 


























50 261 77 921 87 866 81 722 97 319 
10 854 21 301 10 390 11 299 22 514 
2 679 2 932 7 004 8 731 22 440 
Source: United States Department of Commerce, "U.S. International transactions ...", 
Survev of Current Business. December 1981, 1982 and 1983 and September 1984 and 
1985 (table 1-2). 
the primary cause for this growing disequilibrium is 
undoubtedly the increasingly higher trade déficit, there are 
other factors which mate the situation worse. In 1981, 
earnihgs orí assets of the United States abroad were 
US$ 46 fcdllian higher than outflows due to foreign held assets 
in the United States. In 1982, that surplus fell to 
US$ 42 billion; in 1983, to ÜS$ 36 billion, and in 1984, to 
US$ 19 billion, as a result, in every case, of rlsing payments 
of frofits on the foreign capital currently invested in the 
Uhited States. During the same period the earnings/outflcw 
ratio in respect of a number of other services worsened, so 
mich as that the surplus in the services account is no longer 
large enough to cover an appreciable share of the growing 
trade déficit. 
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The radical shift ixi the mcvement of United States 
capital has been of exceptional economic and financia! 
importance. Traditionally, more capital left the United States 
than entered it, which meant that the country was a net 
exporter of capital to the rest of the world. A change in this 
trend carne in 1982 when a surplus of US$ 11.3 billion was 
recorded in the country's capital account. In 1983 the surplus 
reached US$ 36.8 billion, ar;d it is estimated that in 1984 it 
amounted to US$ 101.7 billion.42/ 
This treraendous influx of capital in the United States 
has been used to wipe out the current account déficit. The 
country has absorbed a large additional amount of goods and 
services corresponding to its current account déficit and has 
paid for them with rooney on loan from foreign sources, 
corresponding to its capital account surplus. 
The United States is able to live so far beyond its own 
economic means only because it issues the vrorld economy's key 
currency —the dollar—, and its external debt is made up 
almost entirely of its own national currency. Thus, the United 
States is able to take advantage of the privilege of issuing 
this key currency to f inance both its consumer needs and the 
needs of its economic growth out of external savings, thereby 
offsetting the relatively low rate of damestic saving. 
According to OECD statisticians, in the pericd 1963-1983, the 
average rate of saving of the United States (gross savings as 
a percentage of the gross national product) was only 18.9%, 
compared with 25% in the other OECD countries and 34% in 
Japan.43/ 
More than 80% of the capital entering the United States 
has been concentrated in portfolio investments —barik 
deposits, shares, bonds and Treasury securities. Ihese 
securities have become an important instrument of external 
financing of the United States economy; in 1984 alone, their 
purchase by foreign individuáis and governments experienced a 
net rise of US$ 27.1 billion.44/ 
The country's financial experts recognize that a 
considerable proportion of the foreign capital entering the 
United States is not included in the govemment statistics and 
that foreign investments are actually far higher than the 
amounts reported. 
The flight of capital from many countries in the world, 
including the Latín American and Caribbean countries, towards 
the United States is caused both by the politically, 
economically and financially unstable conditions prevailing in 
those countries and by the attraction of the United States as 
a relatively secure haven — a factor which would continué to 
apply even in a less favourable economic situation. 
When both the volume and the proportion of the resources 
which the United States receives from the intemational 
financial market increase, the conseguences are similar to 
those which occur when the Federal Government exerts pressure 
on the national financial market in obtaining financing from 
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it. On an intematicral scale, the sane phenomenon *(hereby the 
weaker ccnpetitors are displaced occurs, with the sane 
consequences for rarket conditions — a shortage of liquidity, 
a risa in interest rates, harder teños for debtors, etc. 
Whereas flcws of capital iiported by the United States 
toe taeased, the flcws o£ capital mj tm this oountry 
are declining notably. The net inorease in its assets toad 
anorted to US$118 billion in 1982, ard dropi to 
US$ 49.5 billion in 1983 and to US$ 20.4 billion in 1984.45/ 
Many United States eooncmists are hignlighting the 
grcwing vulnerability of the financia! system of the United 
States, ora of the pillara of which is short-term foreign 
investment, and are calling atbention to the negativa econcndc 
consequences which might aoccnpany a withdrawal of speculative 
capital. 
In conditions of high fiscal déficits, a sharp reduction 
in the inflow of foreign capital wculd raise interest rates 
and cause investments in capital goods and housing to contract 
notably, having short- and long-term negativa effects on the 
United States economy. 
In short, the United States is experiencing a serious 
financial diseguilibrium internally (fiscal déficit) and 
externally (current acccunt déficit) but is managing to 
redress it to a considerable extent through the inflow of 
foreign savings. However, since the problem has not been 
resolved, but is spreading, the litoelihood is growing that a 
serious domestic and internatlonal financial crisis vill be 
unleashed. 
d) Prospects for the evolution of the economv 
of the United States 
The expansión phase of the ecoronic cycle now underway is 
already showing signs of exhaustion, characterized by growth 
rates which are markedly lower than in the period 1983-1984. 
The present period of recessive growth may be regarded as the 
phase iwmediately preceding a new cyclical crisis which may 
well cccur in the seoond half of 1986 or the first half of 
1987. 
Actually, the duration of the present expansión and 
the beginning of the next cyclical crisis will depend on 
a variety of short-term factors, such as the Administration's 
fiscal policy and the Federal Reserve's monetary policy. 
The econcmy may even continué to grow for scme time if 
consumers continué to spend freely, if the inflation 
remains lew, if interest rates do not rise suddenly and if 
the growth of inports decelerates sufficiently to allow 
national industry to increase its share in the meeting of the 
demand. 
For this oombination of factors to oceur, a number of 
different economic trends and policies will have to be brought 
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into line. An expansive monetary policy can start an 
inflationary spiral, causing interest rates to rise sharply; 
nevertheless, an overly restrictive policy can have a similar 
effect. Another sudden drop in the dollar or a crisis of 
confidence among foreign investors can reduce the foreign 
capital entering the United States, which would tighten the 
competition between the governnient and the private sector on 
the domestic capital market, resulting in a rise in interest 
rates. 
A drop in the dollar would mate imports more expensive, 
tending to drive inflation up. In a reoent buying spree, 
consumers piled up an unprecedented débt and left accumulated 
savings at the lowest level ever, so that at any moment 
consumer spending may begin to contract. As excessively high 
fiscal déficits are driving interest rates up, the 
Administration is trying to cut budget expenditures, but a 
reduction sufficiently drastic to have a significant impact on 
the déficit could result in an across-the-board contraction of 
the domestic demand. 
This delicate balance is precisely what is causing 
uncertainty with respect to development prospects. Any sudden 
upheaval In the national and intemational eccraic situatian 
can gradually ttaw the situaticn out of balance, putting the 
ühited States eooncf in seriáis difficulties in a mtter of 
nonths. Of the three pillars on which its present eoommic 
expansión rest (increased domestic demand, inflow of external 
savings and the armaments race), only the armaments race 
displays any degree of stability. Actually, increased military 
might now plays the same role of motivating and prolonging 
econcmic growth as that played by the Kbrean war in the 
1949-1953 expansive phase and by the Vietnam war in that of 
1961-1969. 
The latest tax adjustments in the United States, which 
have increased dlsposable personal Incorae and thus motivated 
greater spending by consumers, have also lowered fiscal 
earnings, contritouting to the déficit and therefore having 
opposing effects on the econoiny. 
Between 1980 and 1985, the international situatian had 
increasingly itiarked repercussions on the traditionally highly 
self-sufficient econoiny of the United States, owing to the 
accentuated growth of commercial, credit, monetary and 
technological flows. In this respect, the growing 
vulnerability of the United States to external factors could 
be seen in the serious effects which the inflow of imports in 
1984 had on industrial production, the structure of 
employment, the indexes of inflation and the balance of 
payments on current acoount. 
The intense internationalization of the dollar has tended 
to rob the econamic authorities of the United States of a 
considerable portion of their control over their national 
currency. According to diverse estimates, same US$ 150 billion 
to US$ 200 billion, or the equivalent of 20% of the annual 
budget of the govenanent of the United States, changes hands 
throughcut the worid every dáíy & twyihbf and selling 
cperaticms. 
In such circumstanoes, the measures taken by the 
Mmiiüstration and the ífedéral Raserve to bring the dollar 
dcwn or to support it would have a faitly littiteá range 
because basically the parity of the dollar is deteriuined in 
the ihteernatianal marte* on the basis of the conf idertoe in it 
inspires by the rateof rétíurn on ihSreáfafents in the tMtett 
Statesr, thé tánáitíaiisr üffeaxd by the ooühtry as a safe háven 
and the outlobk for its eoonoray. 
A more lüceiy way to suooeed would be that of cbnoerted 
intesvantion by the central batíks of the Group of pive (the 
UniteS States, the Feaéral Republic of Gerfflany, EcanOe, Japan 
and the UnitiGd Kingdom) to keep the valué of the dollar a t a 
level where the indispensable flexibility is ocnbihed with a 
oertain araount óf stability. Sti this cormecfcjeii, a tacit 
agreemant on the establishraent of the margins deéired for the 
valué ofi thé dollar would help tb próvide a oertain amount of 
stability for the iait«rhaticfial '•'> mónetary markst íf it were 
followed by the closer aligrtment of the fflonetary and fiscal 
policies of the leading industrialized' countries and, above 
all, of the hational tax systems which havé an effect on 
saving, investment and capital movéwents. 
So long as no solution is found to its trade andr fiscal 
déficit problem, the ühited States will probably require a 
treraendoue inflow of esternal sávingtí and will theréfbré have 
to keep the confidence of fóreign investors. Interest rates 
will probably have tb stay relatively high in order to attract 
foreign capital to the country. 
By and large, recent trends in the econany of the United 
States deraaristrate its capacity for adjustttent tó the 
requirements of the scientific and techndlbgicál revol\ition. 
In spite of a oertain amount of inertia which can be explained 
by the very vastness of the econany and its polyraorphic 
character, the market mechanism has responded to the inpact of 
the adjustment, as is reflected in the ccntrast bétwéen the 
traditional production structure and the multdtttdinous 
technological innovations. Nevertheless, in the absence of a 
clearly defirted industrial policy and active participation by 
the State in the transformation of the econanic Structure, 
this growth process is taking the form of spontaneous 
interaction of maricet forces, giving rise to uhfavourable 
social effects which are, moreover, aggravated by intense 
foreign conpetition. 
It is also possible that as new econanic structures tate 
shape in the Dnited States, the iitpact of the transformation 
ncw underway may make itself felt with grawing farcefülnéss 
throughout the world capitalist systfem, being transnittéd 
along all the channélsof internatichal econanic relatiaris and 
the coinmerclíal, mónetary, fihancial and technological channéls 
in particular. 
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3. An attemot to evalúate the effects on Latin America 
of economic trenas in the United States 
a) Dif ferences between countries and áreas of Latin America 
anta the Carjbbean 
Bilateral trade with the United States is still of 
considerable impórtanos :.n the intemational economic 
relations of the countries of Latin America, which shows the 
potential of this means of transmitting the positive and 
negative impulses generated by the North American econcray. In 
1983, 39% of all the exports frpm the 19 latin American 
countries as a vínole were directed towards the United States, 
and 36% of the imports of the same group carne frcm that 
country.4_6/ 
However, these aggregates conceal the considerable 
dif ferences which exist between the countries of the región in 
terms of what the United Status martet means to their trade. 
These dif ferences were accentuated in the period 1983-1984, 
when the trend towards greater geographic diversif ication of 
Latin American exports was reversed and sote countries 
recorded a pronounced increase in the share of their exports 
destined for the United States. 
Among the of AIADI countries, Brazil and México saw their 
exports grow during this period, almost solely because of the 
role played by the United States market; Colombia and Ecuador 
managed to compénsate fully for the sudden fall in their 
exports to the rest of the world by means of their increased 
sales to the United States; and Chile, Perú, Uruguay and 
Venezuela to a large extent had the same experience. Only 
Argentina and Paraguay kept to the same degree of export 
diversification (see table 19). 
Outside of AIADI, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Panamá and the Dcminican Republic also showed a marked in-
crease in the share of exports destined for the United States, 
while Haiti and Honduras kept their share high. A case apart 
is Nicaragua, whose exports to the United States fell from 
38.6% of their total exports in 1980 to 14.3% in 1984. 
Although the growth of the sales to the United States 
enabled a number of Latin American countries to obtain the 
additional foreign exchange earnings they so badly need in 
order to service their external debt, some of those countries 
were still highly vulnerable to the possibility of change in 
the economic situation in the United States or in the economic 
policy of the present Administration. 
Statistics show that Latin American exports to the United 
States have provided an important means of transmitting the 
impact of economic trends in that country to Latin American 
economies, and this at very high levéis of potential risk in 




LATÍN AMERICA: EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR SHARE IN THE TOTAL EXPORTS OF EACH COUNTRY 
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If the cost of servicing the external debt is high, 
export earnings provide an absolutely indispensable flow of 
foreign exchange; this explains the vulnerability of countries 
\Aiich depend too ituch on a single market for their exporte. On 
the other hand, if a large share of an economy's importe carne 
frcm a single country, this resulte in relatively less 
vulnerability provided that in case of need it is f easible to 
replace that country by other suppliers, táúch is 
ccnparatively less difficult to do because at present 
catpetition among exporters is stronger than among importers. 
Ihe majority of Latin American countries have an importe 
structure Which is geographically more diversif ied than their 
exporte structure. However, the importe of México, Haiti and 
Venezuela are highly oriented towards the United States, which 
puts them in a potentially dependent and more or less 
vulnerable situation (see table 20). 
Table 20 
LATÍN AMERICA: SHARE OF EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES AND IMPORTS 



















































































Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. Yearboole 1985. 
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In spite of the appreciable increase in exports frcm 
Latin America to the United States and a marted decrease in 
the región's iitports fran that cxjuntry, in 1984 trade with the 
United States was still operating at a déficit for seven of 
the 19 Latin American countries considered (see table 21). 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras had small 
surpluses, while Chile, Uruguay, Perú and the Dominican 
Republic recorded surpluses of between US$ 200 million and 
US$ 500 million. As for Brazil, Ecuador, México and Venezuela, 
they showed positive balances of over US$ 1 billion in their 
trade with the United States. 
The international financial relations of the countries of 
Latin America include a whole spectrum of credit, investment, 
payments, flight of capital and other flows. The capacity for 
transmissian of the effects of the massive capital movements 
is difficult to measure accurately. What is clear, however, is 
that nearly all the countries of the región are seriously 
affected by these financial movements, which involve enormous 
volumes of money by comparison with the monetary flows of 
Latin America, which tend to be restricted. 
In 1984, the 19 countries of Latin America had to 
disburse US$ 36 billion in net payments of profits and 
interest, and the prelüninary estímate for 1985 is for US$ 35 
billion. 47/ The balaTK»^f-pavffiants statistics for 1983 
recorded the following outflows for profits, interest and 
amortization payments and transfers of capital: México, 
US$ 22.6 billion; Brazil, US$ 21.2 billion; Argentina, 
US$ 12.8 billion; Venezuela, US$ 9.2 billion; Chile, ÚS$ 3.7 
billion; Ecuador, US$ 3.4 billion; Perú, US$ 3.2 billion; 
Colombia, US$ 2.3 billion; Uruguay, US$ 1.3 billion; Solivia, 
US$ 900 million; Costa Rica, US$ 500 million, and Paraguay, 
US$ 250 million.48/ 
These capital outflows are a constant cause of concern 
A(*ien sufficient resources are not available to make the 
payments required. Although the Latin American countries nave 
succeeded in offsetting these flows abroad with capital loans 
to them, the need to get deeper into debt in order to be able 
to meet the obligations incurred sets up a vicious circle, 
frcm which no "normal" escape rate comes to mind. 
The sums guoted refer to total outflows from each Latin 
American country regardless of destinatian, and no data are 
available as to exactly what share of the capital leaving and 
entering goes to or cernes from the United States. It is, 
however, possible to mate some rough estimates since the 
amount of the debt of certain Latin American countries with 
the United States banks is known (see table 22). 
Between 1981 and 1983, the debts of the Latin American 
countries referred to in table 22 with United States banks 
soared, rising by 52.7%. In addition, in 1983 the debts of 
the following countries of the región with American banks 
represented a sizeable share of their total external debt: 
México, 38.7%; Colombia, 36.0%; Chile, 34.8%; Ecuador, 34.5%; 
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Table 21 
LATIM AMERICA - UNITED STATES: MERCHANDISE TRADE, 1982-1984 
(MiUions of US dollars) 































































































































































































































•i-Venezuela 73.6% 73.8X 74.4% 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. Yearbook 1985. 
Venezuela,. 33.7%; Argentina, 25.8%; Brazil, 25.6%; Uruguay, 
21.3% and Perú, 20.4%.42/ 
As they nave realized how much danger is represented by 
their swollen Latin American portfolio, privata banks in the 
Itoited States have begun to take measures to reduce it 
gradually. Thus, a number of banks has been refusirg to grant 
new credits to many countries in the región and are 
participating in the renegotiations of the débts «folie at the 
same time selling their latin American portfolio at a 
discount. This desire to reduce or at least not to increase 
their exposure to the risks of Latin American bankruptcy has 
resultad in the decline in Latin American débts with these 
banks, as reflected in the figures available up to mid-1985 
(see table 22). 
Table 22 
BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES: CLAIHS ON SELECTED LATÍN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 















































































Source: Board of Goverrors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bul le t in . 
October and Decerttoer 1985. 
Bank débts represent only part (the larger part, to be 
sure) of all débts with the United States, and if débts with 
non-banking institutions were also taken into acoount, the 
figures would be samewhat higher. When consideratlon is also 
given to the fact that the capital which leaked out of latin 
America in the period 1983-1985 was transferred primarily to 
the United States and to the tremendous role played by North 
American corporations in the transfer of profits, it may be 
concluded that monetary flows to the United States in the case 
of the various latin American countries can be estimated as 
canprising anywhere frcm a third to oansiderably more than 
half of total capital movements towards the exterior. 
Another iaportant phenomenon which was reoorded in the 
period 1982-1984 within the system of financial relations 
operating between the United States and Latin America was a 
marked reduction in the flow of privaba direct investments 
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frcm the United States towards the región. One indication of 
this is the fact that in those three years the repatriation of 
capital amcunted to US$ 10.5 bilí ion more than the total valué 
of the investments made in Latin America.50/ 
Consideration of total monetary flows in both directions 
shows that México is the Latin American country with the 
most intense financial relations with the United States, 
both in absolute terms and in terms of their relative impor*-
tance for the national economy. For this reason, México is 
very vulnerable to any impulse generated by the current finan-
cial situation in the United States, such as fluctuations in 
the exchange and interest rates and variation in financial 
flows. 
Panana, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela roaks up a 
group of countries whose financial links with the United 
States nave formad a large share of their external econamic 
relations, which has also made them very sensitive to the type 
of direct impact which is transmitted through monetary flows. 
In the case of Argentina and Brazil, the large voluntes of 
capital moved to and frcm the United States represent a more 
modérate share of their total international financial 
relations, and those two countries, like Perú and Uruguay, are 
therefore relatively less exposed to the monetary effects 
generated by the economy of the United States. 
The direct impact transmitted via the commercial and 
financial flows between the United States and Latin America 
is, however, only one of the effects generated by the econamic 
policy and trends of that country. Other effects are 
transmitted through econamic relations with other áreas in the 
world's economy, and the extent of their repercussion depends 
on the ways in which the Latin American countries take part in 
the international economy, with all that means in terms of 
bilateral and multilateral flows of goods, services, foreign 
exchange and technology. 
While the role played by Brazil in the international 
economy is, when quantified in absolute terms, very great, and 
substantial, commercial and financial external flows may 
transmit enormously intensive effects, the relative weight 
carried by the external sector in the national economy is less 
substantial, so the country has a greater capacity to absorb 
these effects with only modérate changes in its productive 
sector. In addition, the broad geographical and structural 
diversif ication of its external sector gives the country more 
roam in which to opérate. 
México maintains extensive relations with the United 
States in the fields of commerce, finance, co-operation and 
productive integration, and its external sector is 
pre-eminently oriented towards that country, which, in 
relative terms, weighs more heavily in México's economies and 
in that of Brazil. Therefore, in spite of México's special 
relationship with the United States, the Mexican economy tends 
to be more vulnerable than that of Brazil to the effect of the 
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current cycle of the econony of the United States and the 
proqess of structural trausfonnation urrier way in that 
country» A cyclical crisis in the United States would nave a 
sericus iirpact both on the extemal sector of México and en 
that portion of México's production which is integrated with 
United States firms. 
Althouofr the valué of the ccranercial and f inancial flows 
of other latín American oountries is not so high in absolute 
tenas, the share of the external sector in their eoonomies is, 
in general higher, which metes them more vulnerable in 
relative terms. ene example of a country in the región with a 
high degree of external openness is Panana, and the valúes of 
its external trade in both directions are comparable with its 
groas nafcLonal product, whiie its financial flows involve 
valúes many times greater than the product.51/ 
Ihe external vulnerabilrty of Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Honduras and Venezuela is high, in relative terms, and 
ccrranerjcial and financiar flows carry great weight in their 
econoraies. Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Perú and 
Uruguay are those countries within the región whose econetnies 
display a médium level of external openness, their commercial 
and financial flows representing approximately 60% of their 
gross domestic product. Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, 
Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, on the other hand, show 
modérate external openness in that their comercial and 
financial flows amount to about 40% of their gross domestic 
product. 
Another characteristic which increases an economy's 
vulnerability is the predominance of raw materials in its 
exports, especially if those exports involve a single 
comtnodity or a very limitad group of commodities, as is the 
case of petroleum for Ecuador, México and Venezuela; copper 
for Chile; coffee for Colombia, Guatemala and Haiti; sugar for 
the Dcminican Republic and natural gas for Bolivia. Structural 
diversification of exports and a high degree of manufactures 
in them diminish a country's vulnerability in spite of the 
fact that in recent years they nave been responsible for the 
rise in the protectionism practised by the industrializad 
countries. 
b) Effects on the Latin American countries 
of the economic policy and performance of 
the economv of the United States 
Because of the relatively great weight it carries in the 
international economy and its tremendous influence on that 
economy, the United States has transmitted the effects of its 
structural adjustment to other countries and has exported, 
through different channels of its external economic relations, 
those processes in which the adjustment consists. Ihe 
exportation of the recessive phenomenon produced an almost 
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immediate and very prolonged iirpact on the other economies. 
lhe Latin American countries were among the first to reoeive 
the impact of the 1980-1982 recession in the United States, an 
impact which was later increased by the effects of the same 
recession in other developed countries and was 
disproportionately magnified by the need to service the 
external debt. 
The impulse genérate! by the economic expansión of 
1983-1985 had rnany favourable effeets on varicus countries of 
Latin America, which managed to increase their exports to the 
United States significantly. In general, however, this impulse 
was not re-transmitted to the rest of the productive sector of 
those countries because all the trade surpluses obtained were 
needed to service the debt, so that imports were restricted, 
which affected their growth. 
Meanwhile the current deceleration of the economy of the 
United States is an indication that the expansión phase of the 
eyele has nearly run its course; there could be a recession as 
early as 1987, which would again transmit depressive effeets 
to Latin America. 
Another process which is part of the structural 
adjustment and was transmitted from the United States to other 
market economy countries is that of radical change in the 
production and enployment structure. 
Same industrialized countries are reaching a level of 
development which allows them to maintaín a large services 
sector along with a caiparatively small goods producing sector 
and even permits the existence, in socially acceptable 
conditions, of an enormous nuitiber of unemployed persons *4úch 
not long ago was considerad to be characteristic only of the 
eyelieal phases of crisis and depression. 
At this high level of development and capital density, 
the kind of economic and social structure described is 
possible, although it by no means guarantees a situation free 
of considerable social conflict. Ihe developing countries, 
however, are not in a position to offer their unemployed 
pcpulation socially acceptable living standards or to maintain 
an economic and social structure corresponding to a higher 
stage of developed capitalism. 
Latin America has already experienced what it is to graft 
extensive capitalism on an econamy with abundant human 
resources and limited technological and financial resources. 
Ihe current disproportionate external debt represents only the 
monetary aspect of this phenomenon, while its social aspeets 
are reflected in the impossibility of using a sizeable 
percentage of a rapidly growing labour forcé within this 
model. However impressive and solid the development achieved 
through this model may be, a capital-intensive sector is only 
a small enclave within a national economy. 
Another notable feature of the structural adjustment of 
the United States which is now affecting the developing 
countries is the relative, and in same cases even absolute, 
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decxease in the ccnsunption of various aramodities. 
Technological iimovations have been redueing the consurtption 
of various traditional products, the needs for whieh used to 
be met partially through iiports. Beripheral econcmies 
organized to supply such comodities need time to turñ to the 
production of cther canmodities, parimarily manufactures. 
So drastic a restructuring of production, consumption and 
employment is neoessarily acccopanied by much social 
sacrifioe, which in the ühited States, as in Western Europe, 
causes the social groups affected to bring heavy pressure to 
bear in f avour of the application of protective «easures v*iidh 
would enable them to aveid the inpact of various prccesses 
which are part and parcel of the adjustmsnt. Insistence is 
laid cilmoet universally on the need for means of defence 
against foreign oorapetition, whether it be "loyal" or 
"disloyal", together with the adoption of measures which are 
dcmestic in soope. 
In view of the growing foros of protectionist pressures 
at the present time, the possibility that the process of 
intense internationalization of the narket econamies may in 
the future osase to opérate for sane time cannot be Siscarded, 
and this would have serious consecpenoes for world trade. 
Even if protectionism does not rsach the point where that 
could h^jpen, trade between Latin America and the United 
States may well be affected by this factor in vAiat remains of 
the present decade, in spite of the free narket position of 
the present Administration in the United States. 
The effort now being made by the United States to bring 
the dollar down vis-á-vis the other major convertible 
currencies has borne significant results, vihich may have soné 
positive consequences for the Latin American countries, 
especially the non-oil-exporting countries, if they seize the 
opportunity provided by a higher real exchange rate to step up 
their exports to narkets other than that of the United States. 
As for the depreciation of the dollar, its inpact on the 
external debts of Latin America depends on the percentage of 
the debt contracted in dollars in each country of the región, 
sinos, víiile that part of the debt is devalued, the valué of 
loans contracted iñ other currencies is rising as the dollar 
falls. 
On the basis of the present correlation between those 
factors vhich determine the rise and fall of interest rates, 
it may be concluded that even if the preferential rate should 
fall in 1986, it would be neither a substantial ñor a 
prolonged drop and would have few positive effects on the 
servicing of the Latin American debt. Interest rates are more 
apt to rise, owing to the growing needs of the United States 
economy for dcmestic and foreign financing. In addition, a 
recession would diminish earnings and increase the fiscal 
expenditure of the United States, so that the Administration 
would have to seek more financial resources; this wculd stir 
up greater oompetition between the Treasury and the" prívate 
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banks, which would have to have recourse to an increase in the 
interest rates on deposite and, eventually, in those on loans. 
Should the rate at which foreign capital is entering the 
United States remain firm, Latin America's difficulties in 
obtaining financing would increase owing both to the 
ccnpetition which would result and to the continuing flight of 
capital fren Latin America to the United States. 
In view of the uncertain performance of the United States 
economy, with a recession in the offing, the Latin American 
oountries are disadvantaged by the fact that, with few 
exceptions those industries which use raw materials or 
traditional semí-mnufactures are in the rear guard of the 
expansión and henee will probably not be able to increase 
their imports over their 1984 level. In addition, those 
industries of the centres which compete with Latin American 
goods are in highly difficult straits and are energetically 
pressing for the application of protectionist measures, which 
may be introduced, if only partially. 
Meanwhile, the high technology industries which are 
experiencing expansión in the centres make very little use of 
traditional produets, and opportunities for latin American 
countries to particípate adequately in this expansión with 
their exportable produets are fairly limited. Then too it may 
be expected that the high technology secters preducing both 
goods and services will make an aggressive attempt to 
penétrate Latin American markets and apply pressure, through 
the United States Government, against latin American 
protection in these áreas. 
Although the maoroecorcanác policy of the. present United 
States Administration has been on the whole favourable to the 
structural adjustment and has created more propitious 
conditions for technological, financial and labour 
readjustment, because of its ccmplexity this process has not 
run its full course during the latest economic eyele. For this 
reason, in the course of the decades to come the United States 
economy will experience, although with varied intensity, a 
continuous restructuring and will transmit the impaets of that 
restructuring to the rest of the world. Iforeover, because of 
the unevenness in the levéis of development of the 
industrialized countries themselves, latin America will go on 
receiving these inpaets for many years. 
There is no way for the latin American countries to mset 
this challenge of a radical structural adjustment with such 
extensive effeets but to accept it. In practice, it is 
impossible to live in isolation froni the process of profound 
structural transformation of the world capitalist system 
withcut ceasing to be an integral part of this system, closing 
one's gates and cutting foreign trade and financial flows down 
to a itiinimum. 
It would, however, be traumatic for Latin American 
society to accept the adjustment on the scale and at the rate 
imposed by the centres since the latin American countries are 
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not in a poeition to briiig about the transfonnation of their 
eoononic structure while keeping social sacrifice down to an 
acoeptable Briiújanti. 
Insucft oircpnsfeances, the only reasonable eoluticn is to 
negotiate urgently the scale and rate of the structural 
adjustraesrt with the developed countries which ara now well 
into this porooess and are transmitting its effects to the 
developing economies. At present, the most neaningful 
bargaining tool in the hands of the latín American oountries 
is their external debt, which may be used to apply pressure. 
If a oonmon negotiating platform veré organizad and introduced 
in the North-South dialogue, the Latin Amerioans could agree 
upon a inore acoeptable rate of structural adjustment and on 
ways of iaplementing it more in acoordance with the real 
situación in their countries. 
It is true, however, that it takes time and effort to 
build up an awareness of the real dimensions and future 
iaplications of the problem. In this respect, it should be 
borne in mind that the time factor oparates in favour of the 
developed countries, which are now undergoing an intense 
reetructuring of their economies. Moreover, the transfonnation 
of the industrial structure and the decline in the consuraption 
of ccnracdities is having a markedly depressive effect On the 
prices of comnodities supplied by the developing countries, 
and the intensificación of the procesa --notwithstanding 
sporadic upturns in the consumption and prices of sane raw 
materials-- will worsen the eoonomic situation and the 
bargaining power of the latin American countries. 
4. Summarv and conclusions 
Ihe behaviour of the dómesele components and the external 
sector of the ecdnomy of the United States have different 
effects o£ varying intensity, which sometimes opérate at cross 
purposas and, «ten transmitted to the many channels along 
which internacional economic relatians are oonducted, have 
increasingly powerful consequences for the economies of Latín 
America. :i 
In recent years the greatest inpact in Latin America 
has been caused by the recession in the United States, 
the effects of which were very intense in the perlod 
1980-1982, and by the cyclical phase of expansión in the 
perlod 1983-1985, the effects of which were strongly 
reactivist. 
Ihe severity and length of the cyclical crisis of 
1980-1982 and the fact that the expansión of 1983-1985 vas 
parcial and incomplete, in spite of the high growch races to 
which it gave rise, are attributable basically to the 
translación of the economy of the United States from an 
eoonomic cycle of long duración to another long cycle which 
derives its Ímpetus from a new stage of the scientific and 
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technological revolution, which has cañe to be known as the 
"third industrial revolution". 
In the recent experience of the United States, what 
probably happened is that an adjustment of the sort that 
usually occurs as a result of a "normal" cyclical crisis was 
combined with the kind of structural adjustment which takes 
place in the trough of an economic wave of long duration. The 
purpose served by the structural adjustment, in addition to 
eliaiinating áreas of inefficiency and disequilibria which 
mount up during this kind of economic wave and are not 
corrected by the adjustments made in respect of ordinary 
cyclical crises, is to effect changes in the various 
activities which roake up the economic structure, thereby 
bringing it more closely into line with a new stage of 
developiment. 
The structural adjustment is a dual process in which, on 
the one hand, more roon is given for the develcpment of the 
productive forces and, an the other, these forces are provided 
with a new organic structure where the production of goods and 
services, employment and consumption are concerned. This makes 
it easier to introduce new technological prccesses, to use new 
materials and to sell new products. In the end, the structural 
adjustment now under way is such that flexibility and the 
capacity to adapt to changing conditions are the most salient 
features of this new stage in the evolution of capitalism. 
The special characteristics of the transformation of the 
economic structure include a decrease in the relative 
importance of the goods-producing sector, and especially of 
industry, in the economy as a whole and also the fact that in 
both relative and absolute terms, less use is made of various 
basic inputs, including petroleum, iron ore, ferrous and 
non-ferrous metáis and natural rubber, whose use, up until a 
few years ago, was increasing steadily. Changes in the social 
structure include a rapid relative growth of employment in the 
services sector and also a notable increase in the rate of 
unemployment in both the crisis and the expansión phase, by 
oomparison with what happened in the different phases of 
previous cycles. 
The scale and complexity of the structural adjustment are 
grounds for believing that this process will survive, with 
varying intensity, a number of ordinary economic cycles or, 
perhaps, the entire life of the recently initiated 
long-duration wave. 
The exact duration of the economic cycle now under way in 
the United States cannot be predicted; however, during its 
present phase of escansión and as early as 1985, it has shown 
signs of weakening, which gives cause to fear the advent of a 
new recession. Various factors, chiefly the Federal Reserve 
monetary policy, may prolong the phase of expansión for same 
months, in which modérate growth rates will be maintained, but 
a recessive crisis in 1987 is within the realm of 
probabilities. 
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Basically, during the period 1986-1987, the Latin 
American countries will possibly be affected by the following 
mostly unfavcurable, trerds in the evolution of the econamy of 
the United States: 
i) with sene instances of upturn, continuation of the 
relative decline in industrial eansumption of various 
basic oaanodities, including oannodities importad fren 
Latín America; 
ii) cxmtinued depression of international priaes of raw 
materials due to the declining consumption of basic 
inputsf 
iii) stagnation or reduction of imports, including imports 
of manufactures, due, respectively, to minimal growth 
or a recession; 
iv) strong protectionist pressure difficult for the 
Government in office in the United States to resist 
caused by the grave situation in which a number of 
traditional industries, affected by the structural 
adjustment and foreign competition, find themselves 
and to high unemployment in relative and absolute 
terms and a record, trade déficit; 
v) continued high real interest rates due to the enormous 
fiscal déficit and doroestic debt of the United States 
and to the nature of its tax system; 
vi) maintenance by the United States of its reputation as 
a safe haven, in spite of the likelihood of 
fluctuations, and continued attraction by it of 
massive foreign investment and other inflaws of 
capital, including that involved in flights of capital 
from the región; 
vii) increased demand for capital by the United States in 
the international credit market, accentuating the role 
of the United States as a cempetitor of the Latin 
American countries; 
viii) more aggressive attempts on the part of the expanding 
high-technology sector, in both goods and services, to 
penétrate the Latin American market; 
ix) continuation of the situation whereby the flow of 
capital repatriated from Latin America to the United 
States exceeds the inflow in Latin America of private 
direct investment from the United States; 
x) attempts by private bariks in the United States to 
reduce, or at least to restrict the growth of, their 
Latin American loan portfolio, by refusing in so far 
as possible to give new credit to Latin American 
countries regarded as high loan risks. 
However, the structural adjustment taking place in the 
United States should, owing to its immensity and to the 
growing internationalization of the market economy, produce a 
more profound and long-term impact in Latin America. Ihe 
complex procese of transforming the econemie and social 
structure now taking place in the developed economies (the 
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United States, Japan and Western Europe) may be expected to 
extend gradually to the developing oountries, beginning with 
those which play a larger role in the world economy and then 
reaching the rest. 
The Latín American countries seem to differ in their 
vulnerability to the effects of the current economic situation 
in the United States and its structural adjustment process. 
The most vulnerable seem to be México, Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Panamá, Costa Rica and Honduras; an intermediate 
group is formed by Chile, Perú, Uruguay, El Salvador and 
Haiti, while Argentina, Brazil, Colcaiibia, Paraguay, Guatemala 
and the Dominican Republic are less vulnerable. 
In spite of differences in their level of development and 
their vulnerability to the external situation, nearly all the 
countries of the región may well have problems in absorbing 
the impact produced by the evolution of the United States 
economy, in that for sane of them it may bring large losses of 
foreign exchange in absolute terms, while for others modérate 
absolute valúes may represent a heavy burden in view of the 
size of their economies. 
There is only a very remote possibility that the Latin 
American countries may succeed in somehow influencing the 
behaviour of the United States economy in order to prevent at 
least scme of the adverse consequences which may arise. In 
this connection, neither its economic potential ñor its still 
untenable situation as regards servicing of the external debt 
make it at all likely that Latin America can substantially 
increase its imports f rom the United States in order to help 
demand and production in that country to grow and thereby 
postpone a possible recession. 
Ñor can the Latin American countries bring about a 
reversal in those trends which are unfavourable to their 
interests by negotiating with the United States because, among 
other reasons, the economic policy of that country 's 
government is opposed to State intervention in the operation 
of the free market economy mechanism. In addition, with few 
exceptions, there is something objective, real and 
non-negotiable about these trends, and this means that they 
will in all probability gradually come into forcé in spite of 
any agreements which may oppose them. 
Ncvcrtheless, same elements of the North American 
economic policy can be negotiated if the authorities in the 
United States can be convinced that the worsening of the 
economic situation in Latin America would also be harmful to 
the United States. A negotiation's agenda might include the 
following items for consideration: 
i) need for caution in the sale of strategic reserves of 
the United States in order to avoid even greater drops 
in prices of basic commodities exported by the Latin 
American countries; 
ii) advisability of participation by the United States in 
agreements on stabilization of commodity prices; 
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iii) awnteapxxiuctive effeets of the grcwing pxtectignia» 
practised in the Uhited States; 
iv) urgenqy; of rsducing the fi«jal and twde déficit» of 
the United States, which hatve had widaspread adverse 
effecjts at infcernational level; 
v) gradual natura of the penetration of North American 
hághrtechnology sectors., including servioes in latin 
America. , 
Another problem of great concern for Latin America which 
should be negotiated to the United States and other developed 
countries relates to the transf er of the prooess of structural 
adjustment at a rate and sc3ale —whether foroed or 
spontanepus— which may constitute an excessive bujpden on the 
Latin American econpmies, many of which are already in a 
critical situatLon. It is absolutely necessary for the 
transformation of the eoonomic and social structure in Latin 
American countries to be controlled and regulated to a greater 
dsgree by the countries themselves. 
Paradoxically, Latin America's bargaining power depende 
largely on the tremendous size of its external debt. its 
present dimensions and the dimensions it may assume threaten 
to destabüize the international financial system, which 
already has problems in maintaining its delicate balance. 
Disproportionate servicing of the external debt, in addition 
to quenching Latin America's economic growth, is causing a 
marted decline in Latin American imports fren the United 
States and other developed countries, and this has 
unfavourable effeets on their productive sectors. Thus, Latín 
America's external debt has become a factor which depresses 
the growth of both debtor and creditor countries, as well as 
that of all the other participante in worid trade. In these 
circumstances the Latin American countries might well 
particípate in a dialogue of negotiation with the United 
States and other developed countries provided a comían 
position were drawn up and introduced. 
In any case, the prospeets for negotiation would be much 
more promising if the countries of Latin America managed to 
work with all the other developing countries in forraulating a 
coraran position aimed basically at reaching agreement among 
the developed countries concerning both a political solution 
to the problem of external debt and regulation of the progress 
made by the structural adjustment prooess. 
C. ECQNCMIC KELKTIONS BEIWEEI LATÍN AMERICA AND THE 
EUKDPEAN EOONOMIC COMWJNTIY (EEC) 
1. General bactorcund information 
Of all the developed countries, the EEC countries are those 
which have been the most sensitive to the effeets of the 
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present international economic crisis. In general, the 
Comraunity's economy has shown a growth rate of the gross 
domestic product lcwer than that of the United States and 
Japan. Since 1982, the EEC countries have been recovering, 
but at a slower rate than the other OECD countries; this 
recovery is aocompanied by steadily rising unemploy- ment, 
which in 1985 affected over 11% of the labour forcé 
(by ccnparison with 7% in the United States and 2.5% in 
Japan). 
Frcra a more long-term perspective, however, it is notable 
how the existence and operation of the European Coranon Market 
has, in spite of apparent limitations and operational 
difficulties, resulted in growing integration among the 
economies of the Community. In addition, as the original group 
of six countries with which EEC began were later joined by 
another four countries and still later, in 1986, by two more 
(Spain and Portugal), there is now a group of 12 countries 
which comes very cióse to covering nearly all the economic and 
productive potential of Western Europe. 
In connection with the above, attention should be drawn 
to a factor relating to the Community's foreign trade: the 
fact that the área constitutes the major presence in world 
trade, having such a high degree of openness that trade 
accounts for an average of over 25% of the gross domestic 
product of the EEC countries as a whole. Nevertheless, these 
countries concéntrate their commercial trade on developed 
countries — 7 5 % of their trade is with OECD and cióse to 51% 
takes place within the Cdmmmity. 
In the case of EEC, economic relations with Iatin America 
have not been given priority in that different treatment has 
been accorded to the developing countries of África, the 
Caribbean and the Pacif ic signatories of the Lomé Convention 
(the ACP countries), on the one hand, and the Iatin American 
countries, on the other. In any case, this does not mean that 
in all productive sectors Latin America is at a disadvantage. 
In the área of manufactures, the ACP countries are still not 
very highly developed, and their lag behind the Iatin American 
countries in technology, applicability, quality and design 
is still significant. However, the decided support given 
by EEC to the ACP countries (including the provisión of 
intermedíate technologies, access to competitive markets 
and other aids) might change the situation in the 
future. 
In addition, in the field of industrial raw materials, 
some ACP countries may compete with certain Iatin American 
countries (for example, in leather, skins and sawn woods). 
Moreover, some of these cammodities are included in the EEC 
Generalized System of Preferences but are subject to 
restrictive guotas, while the ACP countries enjoy a wider 
margin of preferences. As regards basic cammodities, 
discrimination against Iatin America would seem to be better 
defined. A large number of ACP countries have a production 
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structure similar to that of roany Latín American countries and 
nave been favoured by the Lomé Oonvention with preferential 
treatment regarding access to their carmodities to EEC. 
2. Evaluation of economic relations 
a) Trade between Latín America and EEC 
EEC is now in second place among the region's purchasers 
and purveyors, after the United States. In spite of the 
importare» of this tuade for Latin i America, the loss of 
reciprocity experienced in recent years is crystal-clear. The 
participation of Latin American exports in EEC imports from 
outside the Coniminity has dropped from 11.1% in 1958 to 6.2% 
in 1984. On the EEC side, the Latin American countries have 
come to hold a still smaller share in its trade in goods. 
Thus, in 1984 Latin America purchased a bare 3.7% of EEC 
exports outside the Cammunity, or just over one third of the 
percentage recorded in 1958 (see table 23). 
From the point of view of Latin America, in 1970 EEC was 
the recipient of 26% of its total exports, a figure which fell 
to less than 20% at the end of the 1970s and has not recovered 
in the 1980s. 
The main problem encountered by Latin American exports 
is the increase in protectionist policies in European markets. 
These include notably the Cammunity's Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), in which a complex system of pricing and 
intervention guarantees high selling prices for the 
Community's farmers and livestock breeders, regardless of 
whether their production can actually be absorbed in domestic 
and international markets at those prices. 
In the industrial field, the protection afforded by the 
community takes a complex variety of forms, including 
agreements on voluntary restrictions of exports, the 
establishment of floors on import prices and the granting of 
special advantages and subsidies to certain national 
industries. 
Another characteristic of the trade which operates 
between Latin America and the EEC is that the trade balance 
has traditianally been negative for the latter. In 1982, as a 
consequence of the crisis experienced by the región and the 
drastic restrictions on imports associated with the adjustment 
policy followed by Latin America, this negative balance 
increased appreciably. Thus, in 1984 it amounted to a record 
US$ 8 640 million, as opposed to only US$ 2 023 million in 
1981 (see table 23). 
However, there has always been great asymmetry in the 
kind of goods traded between the two regions, and even more so 
after 1980 because of the greater share —cióse to 80%— of 
the raw materials category in Latin American exports. This was 
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Table 23 
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Source: EUROSTAT, Honthly External Trade BuHetin. luxembourg, special issue 1958-1982 and No. 5 / 1 9 8 5 . 
due primarily to the increase in the relative share of fuels 
in those exporta (frcni 7.6% in 1979 to 26.3% in 1983) (see 
table 24). 
In oontrast with the ccmpositian of Latin American 
exporte, nearly 90% of the goods wjiich the región importe from 
EEC consiste in a large yariety of industrial conmodities, 
especially machinery and transport eguipment. 
One of the main factors in the process of deterioration 
of the trade relations between Latin America and EEC may be 
the scarcity of Latin American manufactures on the European 
market, in spite of the degree of conpetitiveness achieved on 
intemational markete by a large number of the región's 
industries. EEC absorbed 16% of Latin America's total exporte 
of manufactures in 1970, a figure which fell at the begirming 
of the 1980S to 14.5%.52/ 
b) Financial relations between Latin América and EEC 
It is difficult to determine the origin of funds prdvided 
by European banks participating in the Eurodollar market (a 
substantial source of financing for Latin America), since not 
all the furris traded in this market come from Europe; these 
banks channel resources from a number of developed couhtries 
as well as frcni oil-exporting countries with financial 
surpluses. Then too, intemational banks arrange and 
particípate jointly in the same loans, agreeing among 
themselves as to their tente. 
It is estimated that in recent years the Latin American 
external debt with European banks has represented cióse to one 
third of the región*s total debt with banks. In this respect, 
Europe helps to reduce Latin America's dependence on the 
United States somewhat, but the banks of European countries do 
not nave the same degree of co-ordination among each other as 
those of the United States, and in negotiations of the 
external debt, they normally subordínate their policies to 
what the banks of the United States decide. This has limited 
the possibility for greater concertation between Europe and 
Latin America. 
It may also be noted that the structure of 
financing derived from the developed countries has been 
changed as privatization of financial sources has 
increásed. 
In the field of official development assistance received 
by Latin America from the EEC máriber pountries, the low share 
received by the región is notable in that it represented only 
5.2% of such assistance in 1981 and 4.8% in 1982 (see 
table 25) ¿ Off icial develppmént assÜKtance is also marginal 
by ccnparison with total financial flows channelled 
towards latin America, since it represented no more 
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Table 24 (concl.) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Exports bv the Comwjnitv 
Section 0: Food 
Section 1: Beverages and tobáceo 
Section 2: Crude materials, 
except fuels 
Section 3: Fuels and lubricants 
Section 4 : Oi ls , f a t s , etc. 
Section S: Chemicals 
Section 6: Manufactured goods 
Section 7: ttachinery and 
transport equipment 
Section 8: Miscellaneous 
manufactured ar t ic les 
Section 9 : Conmodities and 
transactions not 
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a/ In tha source publication the Standard International Trade Classification (SITO was used. 
Table 25 
OFFICIAL DEvELOPPF.NT ASSISTANCE FROM EEC TO LATÍN AMERICA 
(In millions of dollars) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Total COA from EEC 
to Latin America 221 369 438 535 660 580 
Total COA from EEC to 
developing countries 5 134 6 909 8 898 9 835 12 702 12 187 
Latin America's share 
in total 
(in percentages) 4.3 4.3 5.3 4.9 5.2 4.8 
Source: SELA, Evaluación de las relaciones entre América Latina v la Comunidad Económica 
Europea. 1983-1984. Caracas, 1985. 
m direct foreign investment, the most active countries 
in the Ccmnunity nave been the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. IXiring the 
period 1979-1981, Latin America received 39% of the net flows 
from France, 59% of those from the Federal Republic of Germany 
and 36% of those frcsn the United Kingdom. From the point of 
view of the accumulated investment in Latin America, at the 
beginning of the 1980s, the United States still accounted for 
60% of the total investment in the región, followed by Europe, 
with 30% and Japan, with 10%.53/ 
In the field of direct investment, it appears advisable 
to promote new formulas for the participatíon of European 
investment in Latin America, which would permit an increase in 
the Latin American capacity for adaptation and creation of 
technology, which would be compatible with the development of 
public and private enterprise in each country (for which 
purpose association with local capital might prove useful) and 
would facilítate the expansión of Latin American exports 
outside the región. 
c) Technoloav links 
Ttechnological co-operation between the Community and 
Latin America is one of the priorities for joint action in 
research and development as well as in transfer and simulation 
of the technical progress made in industry. 
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It is notewcrth/ that European fcechnolagy pradcninates 
in certain industrial branches in Latin America. Franoe, 
fpr ejsample, plays an oufcstanding role in the área of 
data prooessing and teleoonrrunications; the United Kingdom, 
in oannection with machinery and heavy equipmant for 
the processing industry, and the Federal Repufolic of 
Gerroany, in the Chemicals and pharnaceutical industry. 
Alttoough the United States is the supplier oountry with the 
gxeatest number of technological sales contracts, EEC also 
plays an inportant role in latin America's technological 
wealth. 
In the 1960s, the Ccranunity established technological 
oo-operation agreements with Argentina and Brazil in the 
nuclear field (EURATCM), which lost sene of their 
applicability in Argentina when gas was disoovered and in 
Brazil beoause of the abundanoe of hydroelectricity. Since 
then, meare specific, although more modest, initiatives nave 
been espoused, such as the financing of research operations in 
Latin America, primarily in agriculture and energy, a chapter 
on co-operation in the field of scienoe and research was 
included in econamic oo-operation and trade agreements enterad 
into with the Andean Pact and Brazil.54/ 
If it is desired to place more decisive scientific 
and technological co-operation between the two regions 
on a firmar footing, it will probably be necessary to 
work more systematically with all the countries of Latin 
America. 
d) Bilateral and subreaional agreements between 
E E C and Latin America 
EEC now has trade agreements with three Latin American 
countries —Uruguay (since 1983), Brazil (1974 and 1980) and 
México (1975). Between 1971 and 1980 an agreement was in forcé 
with Argentina, and there are plana to renew it oh a broader 
base. In adetition, at the end of 1983 a co-operation agreement 
was signed between EEC and the Andean Group, while another was 
entered into between EEC and Central America at the end of 
1985. 
Co-operation agreements signed with Brazil and México 
have related primarily to matters of mutual concern, such as 
industries (bringing enterprises together), energy and scienoe 
(agriculture and tropical medicine). 
The standard co-operation agreement with the Andean Group 
provides for teehnical and financial aid for projeets designad 
for rural sector», food aid, assistance in trade premoción and 
support for regional integration under integration 
arxangements. .  • , • 
As for tiie trade agreement between EEC and Uruguay, it is 
operating somewhat sluggishly and is in the prooess of being 
reactivated. 
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3. Prospects for relations between Latin America and EEC 
In spite of the fact that at the economic level relations 
between Europe and Latin America are relatively stagnant, it 
should be noted that at the political level there have begun 
to be signs that the European position with respect to Latin 
America will soon undergo a real change. Ihis is supported by 
a number of events which have taken place over the past two 
years: 
i) the adoption by the Barliament of Europe in October 
1983 of a resolution on Latin America; 
ii) the holding of negotiations aimed at a co-operation 
agreement between EEC and the Andean Group, which was 
signed in December 1983; 
iii) the opening of negotiations in October 1985 concerning 
the signing of an economic co-operation agreement with 
the countries of the Central American Isthmus (Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panamá), which was signed on 12 November 1985. 
The broadening and deepening of economic relations 
between Latin America and EEC must, however, go iruch 
further than gocd intentions and general statements. What is 
reguired in the last analysis, both in Europe and in Latin 
America, is the taking of a long-term political view which 
will give rise to agreements and determine instruments for 
acción, and the rejection of the idea that the present 
economic situación will in and of icself give rise to betcer 
relations. 
If Latin America is to make a positive contribution to 
the recovery of the econony of the Ccrnmunity and of the world, 
it will have to act within the framework of efforts to expand, 
rather than to reduce, internacional crade. Ths región's 
objectives do not, moreover, conflict with the intereses of 
the EEC countries. Any growth in Latin America would 
eventually increase its pcwer to purchase goods and 
technology from the developed countries and f rom the 
Ooununity in particular, which would in turn help to solve the 
problems of employment and stagnation now confronting chose 
economies. 
On the ocher hand, it is obviously of incerest for EEC, 
as an important supplier of capital goods and advanced 
technological services to the región, to increase its exports 
to Latin America. Ihis, however, will be possible only if the 
Cammunity first liberalizes its import crade efficiencly, 
thereby making it possible for Latin American goods to gain 
access to European markets, which would genérate enough 
additional foreign curreney to sustain the level of imports of 
European origin. Secondly, EEC will be able to finance its 
shipmencs to the región out of export credics, which, if 
various loans of co-financing were used, could, in the case of 
capital goods, make a notable contribution to che economic 
growth of Latin America. 
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4. Poeslble effacts of thé entrv of Spain 
and Portucial into EEC 
The M u r e oourse of the «minie relaticm between Europe and 
Latín America will aleo depend largely oh vihat repercussions 
the recent Inccrporaticn of Spain and Portugal into EEC may 
have on Latin America. There IB a certain sJMlarity in sene 
of the studies carried out en this roatter in recent years 
in that they draw attentian to sane net negative effeets 
which their adhesión may have on latin American exporte to 
EEC.55/ 
The adhesión of Portugal seems to be of léss concern than 
that of Spain sinos Portugal is a relatively smaller trading 
partner of latin America, whose trade with it has amounted to 
less than ene tenth that carried out with Spain. The debate 
has therefore beén concentrated on Spain's adhesión, which, it 
is felt, will have important oonseguences for merchándise 
trade with the región. 
The present structure of latin American exporte to Spain 
and Portugal has been characterized by high concentration on 
foodstuffs, raw materials and petroleum. In 1984 the valué of 
these sales was ÜS$ 3 billion in the case of Spain and 
US$ 300 million in that of Portugal. On the other hand, 95% of 
Spain's total exporte to latin America has been concentrated 
en machinery, transport eguipment and other manufactures; 
after reaching US$ 2 billion in 1982, the valué of these sales 
fell by 40% in 1984, owing primarily to the econetnic 
adjustment policy carried out by the latin American countries. 
As for Portugal's exporte, they have centred around 
foodstuffs and raw materials, and their valué in 1982 was 
ÜS$ 68 million. 
As a conseguence of their entry into EEC, Spain and 
Portugal will have to adopt amendmente to their trade policy, 
which will have oomplex effeets, both positive and negative, 
for latín America. 
It is worth drawing attention to the fbllowing changes of 
a commercial nature which will emerge as a result of thé entry 
of Spain and Portugal in the OoHttunity: 
i) the elimiñation of tariffs in the case of trade 
between Spain and Portugal and the other countries of 
the CCKRunity. This will be disadvantageous for goods 
importad from outside the Conmunity, including those 
frora latin America, owing to the reroutlng of the 
demand to the EEC market; 
ii) the adoption by Spain and Portugal of the Common 
Gustdms Tariff and the Ccranwnity's foreign trade 
policy, under which they must abids by the obligations 
incurred by EEC with respect to importa from 
developing countries withln the fraroework of the GATT 
Multifibre Agreement and the generalizad system of 
tariff preferences; 
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iii) the adopción by both countries of the principies and 
mechanisms of the EEC Common Agricultural Folicy, 
including its whole sáneme of price guarantees and 
production support mechanisms and accxanmodation to the 
trade barriers which EEC has established in respect of 
farm importa frcm third-party countries; 
iv) need for Spain and Portugal to respect the agreements 
already signad by EEC with the ACP countries, the 
Mediterranean basin countries and the southeast 
Asían nations (ASEAN). Ihe two new manber 
countries could act independently to extend their 
credit agreements with third-party countries frcm 
the time of their adhesión on. After their adhesión, 
EEC could authorize them to extend same of those 
treaties but not permit them to enter into nev 
agreements. 
These changes, which will result frcm the incorporation 
of Spain and Portugal into EEC, may have sigráficant 
repercussions for Latin America in various aspects of its 
trade relations. 
Thus, for exanple, there could be a deterioration, in 
relative terms, of the ccrrpetitive position of Latin American 
goods on the EEC market in respect of goods from countries 
recently incorporated in the Comttunity as a result of 
the suppression of customs duties applied to the latter 
countries. 
Frcm the study carrled out by Alonso and Donoso, it may 
be seen that 7.2% of latin American exports on the EEC market 
would experience competition from Spain;56/ however, this 
consequence would be attenuated by the application of the 
EEC generalized system of preferences to latin American 
countries; it is calculated that the net negative effect 
would then be cióse to 3% of the región's present exports to 
EEC. 
In the same study it is noted that latin American exports 
to Spain would also be affected. In the first place, the 
application of the EEC common customs tariff by Spain would 
result in higher tariffs for 25% of Latin American exports and 
tariff reductions for 11% of them. Second, the four commercial 
régimes in forcé in Spain —the liberalized régime, the 
globalized régime, the bilateral régime and the State régime— 
will have to be cxníbined in the free trade régime in effect in 
the Community. Ihird, Spain will begin to use the variable 
protectian systems applied by EEC. Fourth, Latin America will 
encounter still greater competition in Spain from the EEC, the 
ACP countries and the Mediterranean countries. Finally, the 
EEC generalized system of preferences will benefit 4% of Latin 
American exports to Spain. 
When what has happened in respect of all access 
conditions is weighed up, the figures reached with regard to 
the trade which is likely to be affected are relatively low in 
that it is estimated that only 13.4% of Latin American exports 
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to Spain vill be harmed ard that 1.8% of that trade will 
benefit. 
It may be ccncluded then that the nost negative ef f ect of 
Spain's accession to EEC will probably be experienoed by Latín 
American exports to the market of Spain. Mthough the valué of 
this trade is less than the losses estimated in the Connunity 
market, the iapact is felt more intensively. «hile latín 
American goods are indirectly affectetl in the narket of EEC, 
in the Spanish narieet the impact is direct and at times 
ctomüative, 
It should, however, be borne in mind that the study 
referred to is based priaarily on a statistical analysis of 
the trade which can be affected and that no atteopt is nade to 
consider the changes and repercussions which will acconpany 
the entry of Spain in EEC in order to estímate the ataount of 
trade which will actually be altered. 
She enlargement of EEC will, vdthin the framework of the 
Oommunity, intensify the crisis experienaed in same productive 
sectors and the saturation of the internal market by certain 
goods. This will tend to strengthen the protectionist policies 
of the enlarged Community» above ali in the case of goods of 
which Iatin America possesses a potentially high supply. 
Owing to the enlargement, import margins will shrink, 
particularly in the case of agricultural and industrial 
oomnodities from developing couñtries. This will nave a 
significant effect on latín America because of the regional 
preferences policy now applied by EEC sinos Iatin America has 
low priority In the geographical hierarchy which the aommunity 
in practice respects in the conduct of its external economic 
relations. 
Nevertheless, from a more generic point of view, consi-
deration must also be given to the fact that both Spain and 
Portugal will, as a result of the relations they maintain with 
the Iatin American couñtries, make the Community particularly 
sensitive ooncenüng issues relating to Iatin America. In 
this oonnectian, there can be no doubt that these tuo 
couñtries carmot escape responslbility for the plans fdr 
political and economic rapprochement between EEC and Iatin 
America. 
Another matter which must be taken into consideration in 
measuring the scope of and prospecte for any effort to 
strengthen the links between the Ccewunity and iatin America 
relates to the possibility that reciproca! relations will be 
determined by the dominant trends at world level. The 
betutviour of certain variables, suoh as, for example, East/ 
West tensión, natlonal recovery strategies relatiisg to the 
international economic crisis, destabilizing impact of the 
external debt of the Iatin American couñtries and what happens 
with ¡regará to the relativa valué bf the doliar, to mentían 
only a few, will nave an importsant effect oñ the future of 
relations between the tuo regians. 
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5. Suonestians for strenqthenina co-operatlon between 
Latín America and EEC 
a) The global context 
The existence of important obstacles in the ecancnic 
relatlcns between EEC and Latín America suggests the 
advisability of seeking new formulas of co-operatlon which may 
be more frultful and stave off a growlng deterioration in 
those relatlcns. 
In this effort various reguiranents will have to be met. 
In the first place, there is need to co-ordinate the positions 
held by Latin America and to hamonize its external policies 
to mate it possible to adopt a joint policy towards EEC and in 
so doing, to increase Latín America's bargaining power. This 
also presupposes the incorporaticn into the process of Latin 
American econcmic sectors vínose activities are liriked vith 
European agents by creating structures for negotiation which 
channel the needs of those sectors in order to facilítate 
their convergence with their European counterparts. 
Secondly, economic co-operatlon between Latín America and 
the Community must opérate an the basis of complementarlty of 
efforts and resources and must always opérate in both 
directions so that the actions of one región will f ind their 
counterpart in those of the other. In this connectian, the 
basic task is to identify and mobilize the specific sectors in 
which co-operatlon based on the principie of the mutuality of 
oonverging interests can be developed. 
In the third place, Latín America will be well advlsed to 
undertake comprehensive negotlatlcns with the Communlty which 
would cover trade and matters relatlng to flnance, production 
and technolcgy at one and the same time rather than being 
limitad entirely to reaching an understanding Ítem by Ítem 
because this has so far nade things difficult for Latin 
America's process of co-ordination and joint action and made 
its bargaining power less forceful than it mlght be. 
b) Sane more specific auldelines 
Measures which mlght help to strengthen co-operatlon with 
the enlarged Communlty of the twelve mlght well include those 
suggested below: 
i) It will be necessary to improve the channels of 
communlcation between Latin America and the Communlty if the 
guest for opportunlties of mutual co-operatlon is to be 
carried out more systematically. This was the purpose of the 
recent creation of the Institute of European-Latin American 
Relatlcns (IREIA), located in Spain, which will answer 
guestions from Latin America and make it easier for Latin 
American publlc bodies and prívate Instltutlons interested in 
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relations with the CJcraunity to aapire krowledge cxanoeming 
EEC regulations. I t might also be useful for this Institute to 
issue invitatims to ministerial meetúigs en a regular basis; 
ii) Sime the incorporaticn of the Iberian countries vill 
raise the level of agricultural eelf-sufficiencY in the 
Oannunity, and this will have negativa effeets on trade with 
Latín America, it wculd sean that of all the sector» it is the 
industrial sector which has the best prospeets for fruitful 
collaboration with EEC. To realize these prospeets, it will be 
neoessary to analyse the European markets for non-traditional 
goods exportad from Latin America and to examJj» the problems 
which must be solved in order to make such exports feasible. 
In carrying out this analysis, account must be tafeen not only 
of present oontütions but aleo of trends in the producción and 
tedhnology of European countries inasmuch as they can alter 
the región's conparative advantages. latin America will need 
to keep cióse track of European industrial policy in order to 
evalúate its iapact on the región. Two aspeets of this policy 
are especially relevant to links with EEC. On the one hand, an 
attempt is being nade in the Ooraraunity to modemize and 
renovate the textile industry, the iron and steel industry, 
and machine-tool industry, the Chemicals industry, the 
ship-building industry and the wood derivativas industry, 
which are considered to be in decline. This means that this 
policy will come into conflict with the growth tendencies of 
non-traditional latin American exports. On the other hand, 
since 1980 Europe has been intensively fostering the 
developraent of joint scientific and technological research in 
the face of the domination exercised by the United States and 
Japan in the spearhead technologies, and in particular in data 
prooessing, telecxxnmunications and bictechnology, áreas in 
which Latin America is still far behind; 
iii) it would be advisable for the Ocranunity to eliminate 
discrininatory trade practices and to iaprove its generalizad 
system of preferences in such a was as to increase the 
products oovered, broaden the prefarential margine and make 
the rules of origin more flexible; in addition, it should 
adopt measures to prevent its enlargement fren resulting in a 
deviación of trade which would be prejudicial to Latin 
American exports, including in its generalized system of 
preferences goods which have traditionally been traded between 
the Iberian countries and Latin America; 
iv) as a matter of importance and urgeney, a greatar flow 
of direct foreign investments from EEC towards Latin America 
should be promoted. In those categories in which Latin 
American import substitution will be combinad with increased 
exports (for example, in capital goods, agro-industrial 
products and Chemicals), formulas should be promoted which 
would permit association with local capital and the provisión 
of technologies adaptable to regional conditions. This should 
preferably involve the promotion of direct foreign investments 
in exports, and the valué of those exports should exceed the 
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valué of importad licenses and inputs. Moreover, in view of 
the fact that a considerable proportion of European 
investments in latín America nave come from large 
transnational corporations, it would be a good idea to carry 
out prcmotion exercises so that medium-sized and small firms 
could play a inore important role since sene tradition attaches 
to EEC in this field and its capabilities in this oonnection 
adapt well to the econoraic structure of the latín American 
countries; 
v) it would be worthwhile giving ímpetus to 
suboontracting activities between Latín America and the 
Iberian countries. In this effort, an attempt muid be made to 
intégrate parts manufacturad in both áreas in the production 
of finished goods. In an unpublished study prepared by the 
ECLAC Secretariat, various items suitable for this kínd of 
industrial co-operaticn between Spain and latín America were 
identified, including the following: parts for internal 
caobustion enginss, including piston-driven engines; parts for 
loaos and knitting machines; parts for sewing machines and 
typewriters and parts and accessories for adding machines and 
cash registers; 
vi) it would be advisable to organize meetings between EEC 
and latin American entrepreneurs to identify and promote áreas 
and mechanisms appropriate for co-operation; 
vii) It should also be noted that both EEC and the latin 
American countries nave shown an inclinatipn to favour 
co-operation programmes in sectors such as the mining and 
energy in view of the vast mineral resources to be found in 
latín America, the growing regional market and the ampie 
capacity to export goods produced by those sectors if they 
were processed to a greater degree. New the EEC countries face 
the possibility of a shortage of mineral and energy produets, 
there may be considerable scope for conplementarity in the 
processing and manufacturing phases as well as in 
technological, cammercial and financial co-operation through 
projeets or joint ventures of mutual interest. 
In order not to raise false hopes, however, it ittust be 
borne in mind that European investroent flows are to a great 
extent determined by the economic policy of the United States, 
which attracts European investment to that country. What 
happens between the United States and Europe will determine 
the balance left over for Iatin America and other developing 
regions. 
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III. EXPORTS OF GOODS FROM IAHN AMERICA AND 
THE CAKEBBEAN: RECENT TKENDS, 
PROSPECIS AND POLICIES 
A. CCMMODITIES 
1. International market trends 
One of the itain features of the international economy today is 
the very depressed level of commodity prices. This critical 
situation differs frcm anything known in the past in that the 
experience of this decade has been longer and more severe. All 
sectors have been affected —frcm petroleum, ores and metáis 
and farm oommodities to virtually every variety of food and 
beverage. 
The marked drop in prices is easily observable in the 
UNCEAD commodity price Índex. 57/ The Índex for 1985 is (with 
petroleum excluded) 32% lower than the annual average for 
1980. It is ímportant to note also that the lew figure 
recordad in 1985 is even smaller than the annual average for 
1982, which had been regarded as the worst year for 
canenodities. The recovery shown during 1983 and 1984 was very 
modérate, the prices recorded being 25% lower than the average 
for 1980. In addition, even though price movements in 
currencies other than the dollar have not been very 
proncunced, the recent substantial strengthening of those 
currencies has not resulted in a significant improvement in 
the majority of commodity prices quoted in dollars. In SDR 
tenns, the UNCIAD Índex for 1985 also shows, for example, that 
in the f irst three quarters of 1985 prices were 10% lower than 
the average for 1980 (see table 26). 
The real price of cammodities, deflated by the Índex of 
the unit valué of exports of manufactures, fell considerably 
in 1981 and 1982 because the decline in commodity prices was 
higher than the drop in the unit valué of exports of 
manufactures. This decline in real prices was largely reversed 
in 1983 and 1984 when commodity prices recovered slightly 
wnile the prices of exports of manufactures continued to drop. 
Nevertheless, in 1985 the real prices of primary goods fell 
significantly in spite of the reduction in the unit valué of 
exports of manufactures. Real commodity prices, if petroleum 
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is excluded, were approximately 15% lower in the period 
1981-1985 than their 1980 level and 20% lower than the average 
for the period 1975-1980. 
Table 26 
WORLD MARKET: INDEX OF PRICES OF C0HMODITY EXPORTS 
OF DEVEL0P1NG COUNTRIES 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 a/ 
Food and tropical 
beverages 160 81 67 71 73 63 
Vegetable oíl seeds 
andoils 100 96 75 92 126 86 
Agricultural raw 
materials 100 87 75 81 79 72 
Hiñerais, ores and 
metáis 100 86 77 77 72 72 
Total (based on 
dollar valúes) 100 85 72 75 77 68 
Total (based on 
SDR valúes) 100 93 85 92 98 89 
Source: UNCTAD, Honthlv comnoditv Drice bulletin. various issues. 
a/ Through the month of November only. 
Commodity exports and the earnings f rom them constitute 
the backbone of the economic life of the peripheral countries. 
In 1983 world trade amounted to US$ 1.8 trillion and cióse to 
19% of that figure (US$ 337 billion, with petroleum excluded) 
was brought in by primary goods. Of the latter figure, 
US$ 95 billion corresponded to cornmodity exports from 
developing countries. The share of primary products in the 
total trade of these countries (excluding the leading 
oil-exporting countries) dropped to 35% in 1982 from the 67% 
share recorded in 1970. In the case of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, ccmmodity exports, including petroleum exports, 
recorded in 1982 were valued at US$ 73 billion, or 82% of the 
total valué of merchandise exports. If petroleum is excluded, 
the valué of commodity exports in 1982 was US$ 34 million, or 
38% of the total valué of the exports of Latin America. As may 
be seen, exports of primary products and the prices obtained 
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for than are of great significarle and have a considerable 
jjpact on the eoorónies of the región. 
The reducticn of conmodity prices observed since 1980 has 
very adversely affected the export earnings of the majority of 
developing countries. It has been estimated that during the 
period 1980-1983, the aocunulated loss of export earnings due 
to the drop in prices amounted to cióse to US$ 40 billion.58/ 
This drop was offset primarily by rlses in the volume of 
exports. 
Ihe drop in price of primary products is directly relatad 
to the incapacity shown by many developing countries to pay 
their esternal obligations. Consideration iray be given to what 
happened in 1985, as an illustration of this. In accordance 
with the Institute of International Finance (HF), between the 
end of 1984 and the end of 1985, the amount of debt pending of 
the most indebted developing countries rose by US$ 30 billion, 
coming cióse to a total of US$ 680 billion. It caiinot be 
denied that the decline in conroodity prices vías an important 
factor in the growth of this financial borden. 
2. Main factors behind the drop in prices 
One of the most important causes of the present depression in 
the prices of primary goods is the slow growth in the economic 
activity of the main industrialized countries. In the 1980s, a 
nurriber of variables in the level of activity of those 
econamies had decelerated by comparisan with the preceding 
decade. Ihe real average growth of the gross natianal product 
of the seven leading industrial countries in the period 
1980-1985 was only 2.3% a year, as opposed to an average of 
3.5% in the preceding decade. The growth of industrial 
production in the same countries stood, on average, at 1.8% in 
the I980s, as carpared with 3.4% in the I970s. The increase in 
gross doraestic investment, which is an important factor in the 
demand for certain metáis and agricultural raw materials, 
amounted to 2.4% a year in the same countries for the period 
1980-1985, and to 3.5% in the preceding decade. It must, 
however, be borne in mind that the economic recovery recorded 
after the recession of 1981-1982, which was ane of the most 
marked recessions in the postwar period, was not reflected in 
a sizeable increase in the demand for commodities. It may 
therefore be suggested that not only has the demand for 
commodities decelerated but even that there may now no longer 
be a definitively positive ratio between the level of economic 
activity and the demand for commodities. 
Another factor which has contributed greatly to the drop 
in the prices of primary goods is the great increase in their 
production in the 1980s. Thus, the production recorded in 
1980, which was 5.9% higher than that shown the preceding 
year, marks the highest point reached during the period 
1969-1985 and drove prices down at the same time as the dollar 
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was being revalued. There has been a pronounced surplus supply 
in, for example, grains and soya beans, follcwing excellent 
harvests for two consecutive periods. In non-ferrous metáis, 
the reductlon in production in the leading industrialized 
countries, and in particular, in the United States, has not 
resulted in better prices since it has been more than offset 
by the growth of production in the developing countries. At 
the same time, adjustment measures imposed primarily as part 
of the IMF austerity prograinmes, have forced many third world 
countries to export greater voluntes in response to the drop in 
prices. 
In addition, the re«trictian on international liquidity 
noted since 1981 has causad a decrease in the demand for a 
large number of commodities which used to be purchased as 
buffer stocks, that demand having now been diverted towards 
more liquid assets. For several years, when the short-term 
interest rate vas highar than the lang-term rate, large 
volumes of capital flowed towards assets such as naney-market 
acccunts. However, at the end of 1982 the reverse began to 
occur —more capital was channelled towards stock markets? the 
financial attractiveness of these markets kept the movement of 
speculative capital from turning towards commodities. Another 
pertinent financial consideration was the abnormally high real 
interest rate maintained in the industrialized countries since 
1980, which has greatly increased the cost of keeping 
inventories of primary goods and has therefore been 
responsable for substantial reductions in them. 
The drop or stagnation in the demand for commodities can 
also be explained by the reduction in the amount of materials 
used per production unit as a result of technological advances 
and the curtailment of the demand for natural raw materials as 
it is replaced by synthetics. In recent decades, a large 
number of agricultura! commodities lost same of their export 
markets owing to competition from synthetics. During the 
1970s, for example, the volume of exports of hard fibres, jute 
and wool fell notably, both at world level and in third world 
countries. In the case of cotton, exports from developing 
countries also declined significantly. 
Another factor behind the drop in ccmmodity prices is 
related to the decline in demand caused by the growing 
protection which the industrialized countries provide for 
their domestic agriculture. The main primary goods, and in 
particular those of the greatest importance for the developing 
countries (sugar, meat, seed-oils and grain-oils) are being 
seriously affected by protectionism and other related 
measures. It is calculated that cióse to one third of the 
agricultural exports made by the developing countries to the 
industrialized countries are subject to non-tariff 
restrictions. 
The extensive effects of protectionism on the Latin 
American commodities sector 59/ are illustrated by the fact 
that import barriers erected by the developed countries caused 
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developing ccuntries to lose nearly US$ 7.5 blllion in export 
earnings an sugar in 1983 and that the potential valué of the 
región's sugar exporte is estimated at US$ 3.5 billian per 
year. Meanwhile, EEC spends 64.7% of its sugar earnings to 
support its own sugar prcducers.^Q/ 
In short, a rapld examination of the internatlonal 
catattodities markst seems to confina that the sharp fall in 
ccraocdity prices In recent years cannot be explained by 
cyclical factors since long-term causes are notably in 
evidence. These include the slow development of eoonomic 
activity in the industriallzed ccuntries; the less direct 
relationship between the level of the economic activity of 
those ccuntries and the demand for primary conmodities; the 
monetary and fiscal pollcies of the industriallzed ccuntries 
which affect international liquidity and the demand for 
ccanmodities; the increase in protectionist measures in the 
North and the impact of technological change en the demand for 
censnodities. 
3. The price situation in Latín America and the Caribbean 
The repercussions had in the región by the drop in commodity 
prices may be explained in the light of the price Índex for 
Latin America's main primary commodities for export. 
On this index,61/ food and beverage prices experienced a 
drop of 37% between 1980 and September 1985. The tropical 
produets subgrcup (which includes sugar, bananas, coffee and 
cocea) showed a price drop of nearly 40%, and the températe 
produets subgrcup (wheat, maize, meat, etc.) showed a drop of 
20%. The price índex for agricultural raw mataríais, which 
covers commodities such as cotton, wool, leathers and skins, 
soya-bean oil and fish meal, fell by 23%. As for the prices of 
ores, minarais and metáis, they experienced a reduction of 
30%. The Índex in respect of 24 commodities shows a decline of 
22% between 1980 and 1985; uhen petroleum and petroleum 
produets are included, there is a decline of 23% during the 
same peried. The recovery recordad by the índex of 24 
commodities in 1983 and 1984 was modest by comparison with the 
situation in 1982. The level of prices for 1983/1984 was 26% 
lower than that achieved in 1980. The índex of 26 commodities 
shows a steady drop in prices during the f ive years in 
question. 
It is notable that focds and beverages, which are of 
fundamental importanoe for the ccuntries of the región, 
experienced the most marked decrease, although the drop in 
prices was severe and touched nearly every sector. The level 
of prices in 1985 was higher than the annual average for 1980 
in the case of only a limited number of commodities (bananas, 
soya-bean oil, shrimp, tobáceo and zinc). 
The sharp drop in ceramedity prices has resulted in a 
considerable reduction in export earnings in many Latin 
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American countries. In same cases the drcp in earnings was due 
not anly to lew International prices but also to a reduction 
in the volume exported. In other cases, the exportation of a 
larger volume of goods campensated only partially for the 
lower prices. This situation has considerably weakened the 
región's capacity for coping with the burden of servicing its 
external debt and has adversely affected investments in this 
sector, which is bound to have significant lang-term Impacts 
on both producer and consuitier countries. 
Although all the figures for the countries of the región 
for 1985 are not available, the following examples illustrate 
the effects had by the drop in international prices on the 
export earnings of sane of those countries .62/ 
The valué of Argentíne meat exports fell by cióse to 60% 
between 1980 and 1984, and their volume, by approximately 40%. 
If the unit valué of exports for the period 1981-1984 had been 
the same as in 1980, export earnings for those four years 
would have risen by over US$ 1 billion. In the case of 
Argentine wheat and maize, the expansión in the volume of 
exports was not enough to offset the price drop. If the unit 
valué of exports in 1980 is maintained over the following four 
years, the loss in export earnings will amount to US$ 700 
million in the case of wheat and to US$ 400 million, in the 
case of maize. 
Earnings fram tin exports fram Bolivia have been 
declining markedly since the end of the 1970s, and in 1984 
they were 34% lower than the earnings realizad in 1980. This 
was due in particular to the low price of tin on the 
international market. As for the unit valué of Bolivian tin 
exports, it decreased by 27% in the same period. Had the unit 
valué of exports in 1980 been maintained, total export 
earnings in the period 1981-1984 would have risen by 
US$ 300 million. 
In the case of Brazil, the valué of the country's coffee 
exports in 1984 was much higher than that recorded in 1980, 
thariks primarily to the increase in the volume exported. 
During 1984 and the first half of 1985, Brazil exported 30% 
more in volume terms. When the unit valué of exports in 1980 
is applied to the period between 1981 and the first half of 
1985, an increase in coffee earnings of over US$ 2.5 billion 
is observed. The prices and volumes exported of soya beans and 
soya-bean produets and iron ore performed much better than 
those of coffee. 
The export earnings fram coffee in Colombia were 33% 
lower in the period 1981-1984 than in 1980 as a result of 
declines in price and volume. The price drop caused the 
country to lose over US$ 1.9 billion in export earnings (by 
comparison with what would have been realizad in the period 
1981-1984 had the unit valué of exports remained the same as 
in 1980). 
Chile has experienced a marked drop in its export 
earnings from cqpper. Prices in 1984 were 37% lower than in 
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1980, and the increase in the volume exported has not been 
sufficient to offset that decrease. Had the unit valué of 
exporta remained the sane during the period 1981-1985 
(including only the first half of 1985) as in 1980, export 
earnings would nave increased by over ÜS$ 3.4 billion. As for 
Peruvian copper, it showed a drop in the volume exported and 
its unit valué, the drop in volume being much more marked than 
that in unit valué. The accumulated loss in export earnings in 
this case (here again calculated on the basis of the 
maintenance of the 1980 price throughcut the period 1981-1984) 
would probably be on the order of US$ 900 million. 
The petroleum sector has also been severely affected by 
the reduction in its prices. In Ecuador the unit valué of 
crude oil exports in 1984 was 25% lower than that recordad in 
1980 (and 30% lower in the first half of 1985), while the 
volume exported increased by at least 50% to 60%. Had the 1980 
price been maintained during the period 1981-1985 (only the 
first half of 1985), export earnings from crude oil would nave 
risen by same US$ 1.7 billion. As for México, the valué of its 
crude oil exports in 1983 and 1984 was 60% higher, in dollar 
terms, than that recorded in 1980. This was basically due to 
the marked increase in the volume exported, which was 80% 
higher than in 1980. 
The examples chosen give a clear idea of the effects of 
the crisis on the región's econamies. Given the vital 
importance of cammodities for Iatin America and the Caribbean, 
it is dif f icult to imagine how the present situation can be 
surmounted unless this sector shows substantial recovery. The 
countries of the región should therefore co-ordinate their 
measures to enhance the role played by their cammodities in 
the international market, to defend their prices and to 
organize and exercise their purchasing power in negotiations 
with consumer countries. The problems now affecting the 
cammodities sector are undoubtedly complex, but their solution 
is urgently needed in order to pramote the economic and social 
growth of the región. 
4. Possible action in the field of cammodities 
In view of the considerable importance of non-cyclical factors 
in the search for effective solutions to the problems facing 
the cammodities sector, the international negotiating 
structure known as the Integrated Programme for Cammodities 
(IPC), defined by resolution 93 (IV) of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (Nairobi, 1976), should 
receive fresh attention in order to, as soon as possible, take 
concrete steps within its framework. 
Prior to the adoption of the IPC, and even following its 
adoption, negotiations in this field were restricted to the 
theme of price stabilization. Other major features remained 
excluded, including those concerning the nature and control of 
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markets; the participation of developing countries in the 
processes of marketing, distribution and transport; 
competition from synthetic products; the importance of local 
processing of primary products in countries in the Third 
World; access to markets and the liberalization of trade; 
transparency in markets; the role of commodity exchanges and 
their influence in setting international prices; 
diversification; scientific and technological research and 
protectionism in developed countries together with its 
repercussion on the developing nations. Although it is 
recognized that a more integrated approach is required to 
cansolidate IPC, the international ccminunity as a whole has so 
far anly met with limited success in this, and has begun to 
question the validity of many features of the Programme. 
In view of this situation, it is both necessary and 
useful to re-examine the policies and positions vhich the 
countries of the región could adopt at a global and regional 
level. Experience has shown that oo-operation and 
oo-ordination between producéis is essential in order to 
achieve a fairer and more equitable relationship between 
producers and consumers; consequently, regional co-operation 
and co-ordination in respect of commodities can be directed 
along the two channels mentioned above, reinforcing one 
another. 
a) Action at the global level 
At the global level, the main vehicles for attaining the 
aims defined in IPC nave been restricted to the International 
Commodity Agreements (ICA) the so-called Common Fund and to 
compensatory financing agreements. 
With regard to ICA's, following almost ten years of 
negotiatians, three agreements, relating to rubber, jute and 
tropical timber, were added to those which already existed on 
sugar, cocoa, coffee and tin. Within this process, economic 
provisions were only made in the agreement on natural rubber. 
The agreements on jute and tropical timber merely set aims 
without any concrete economic clauses. Of the existing 
agreements, those on cocoa, tin and coffee have been 
renegotiated, the agreement on coffee being renegotiated 
outside UNCIAD. Efforts at renegotiating the sugar agreements 
failed, and the present convention on this product is merely 
of an administrative nature. As far as the agreement on tin is 
concerned, it is at present facing the deepest crisis in its 
history. 
So far, these agreements have had far more limited 
success than was originally expected. The restrictions 
affecting IPC include: a) insufficient development of the aims 
adopted and measures taken with respect to the various 
agreements (the aim generally agreed upon is price 
stabilization); b) limited coverage of products; c) unegual 
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distributian between consumer and producer countries of the 
coste involved in price stabilization; d) nan-participation of 
mjor producer and consumer countries in soné agreanents, and 
e) the non-cxjnpulsory nature of the agreements, which enables 
members to disregard the provisions laid down therein. 
All in all, despite the fact that by means of the ICA's, 
IPC has aimed to increase the income eazned from «xmmodities 
and to maintain their prices, it does not seem possible to 
achieve these aims süoply by means of measures designad to 
stabilize markets, and which merely smooth out violent 
fluctuations and prevent excessive speculation. Moreover, it 
should be retnembered that ICA was not designad to be a 
mechanism for maintaining prices over the long tena under 
conditions involving structural surpluses. 
During negotiations on IPC, the industrialized countries 
maintained that the ccsranodity crisis was not structural but 
cyclical, and that there was conseguently no need to 
reorganize the sector. At several meetings on canmodities, 
they also cast doubt on the validity of a number of features 
contained in resolution 93 (IV) of UNCIAD and its application 
to specific products, and requested a large nuniber of studies 
into the agreements and the viábility of international 
mechanisms. 
As tune went by, negotiations on canmodities were 
gradually separated frcm parallel negotiations on the 
establishment of a Garañón Fund.63/ Thus, matters relating to 
primary products began to increasingly veer away frcm the 
original objectives of IPC as discussions slipped back towards 
a product-by-product approach. 
Opposition frcm the industrialized countries to ICA's and 
the Ccmmon Fund, partly reflects the view that temporary 
financing operates more effectively for producer countries. An 
example of this is the system of low-interest loans to cover 
slight falls in export income, which are provided by the IMF 
through compensatory financing arrangements. However, from the 
point of view of the develqping countries, these agreements 
are subject to a number of serious restrictians; mainly: 
i) limited coverage should export income decline, based on the 
allocation of quotas (10% of the quota of the member 
countries); ii) the concept of decline in net external income, 
which does not specifically concern the canmodities sector, 64/ 
and iii) too short a period of grace. If the swollen level of 
the external debt of Latin America and the Caribbean is taken 
into account, it does not seem desirable to solve the 
structural problems existing in the international commodity 
trade essentially by means of formulas which involve a higher 
level of indebtedness. 
The litelihood óf bringing about stabilization and 
adopting an effective global agreement, whi<±i would involve 
both produoers and consumers over a long period of time is not 
particularly strong, particularly in the case of those 
products whose production is not concentrated among a small 
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number of countries, and even less so unen production is 
extremely scattered. The fact that agreements nave been 
reached only in the case of those goods a high proportion of 
which origínate in developing countries (cocea, coffee, 
ruhber, tin and sugar), partly reflects the recegnition by the 
developed countries of the fact that they benefit from such 
agreements, as they thereby obtain the opportunity to 
influence prices. 
The failure to opérate the Common Fund largely explains 
the weakness (or the inexistence) of ICA. Without the support 
which the Fund is capable of providing, many developing 
countries would be unable to finance large buffer stocks and 
to apply other allied measures. The present agreement on the 
Ccmmon Fund, reached in June 1980, represents a considerably 
simplified versión in comparison with the original aims agreed 
upan, in principie, in 1977. Even so, the Ccmmon Fund 
canstitutes a major innovation in international economic 
relations, and provides a series of worthwhile initiatives, 
which are dearly beneficial for developing countries. 
First of all, the Common Fund differs from other 
international financial institutions, in that it responds to 
the behaviour of commodities rather than to falls in export 
income at the national level. It also establishes the 
principie of mutual responslbility between producers and 
consumers for financing international measures within the 
framework of the agreements. A further innovative feature Is 
the fact that, as distinct from the financial institutions 
established at Bretton Woods, it offers the developing 
countries a major role in contributing funds and in 
administering the decision-making process. Mbreover, the 
sepárate account (the "second window") designed to bring about 
long-term aims and to stimulate productivity, marketing, 
diversification and scientific and technological research, 
oould prove to be a major source of international funding for 
measures and projeets aimed at the commodities sector in the 
developing countries. 
In spite of their present difficulties, financial 
institutions specialized in commodities possess considerable 
potential for gradually becoming a vehicle for achieving the 
aims of IPC. 
By January 1986, the number of countries which had 
ratified the Common Fund had reached the reguired number of 
90, but this number only provides 57.87% of the agreed 
capital, leaving 8.80% still unprovided. The present United 
States government, which is responsible for 15.7% of this 
capital, has clearly stated that it will not ratify. Three 
other OECD countries (Portugal, Turkey and Ioeland) have taken 
no action. As far as the Eastern European countries with 
centrally-planned econamies are concerned, none of them have 
ratified or signed. 
Of the developing countries, 23 have signed, but not 
ratified the agreement: six in África, two in Asia and twelve 
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in latín América and the Caribbean. Thls latter group includes 
Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Granada, 
Guyana, Honduras, Perú, the Dominican Republic, St. lucia and 
Suriname. Nine cther countries in the región (Bahamas, 
Bolivia, Chile, Dominica, Panamá, Paraguay, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay) nave so far 
taken no action over the agreement. 
It is of course imperative that the Cctnmon Fund be 
ratified as quickly as possible so that it roay begin to 
opérate in the near future. 
b) Regional co-operation in the cammodities trade 
If the limited success of co-operation between producers 
and consumers in the case of ICA's is taken into account, the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are faced with 
the alternative of taking a number of measures at the regional 
level. These should include examination of the possibility of 
redirecting the commodities trade towards the región itself; 
the execution of joint action to ensure a higher degree of 
processing, and the search for greater participation in the 
marketing and distribution of these goods. 
i) Redirection of trade. The structure of the 
intemational cxanmodity trade in the countries of the región 
is highly dependent upon markets in the developed economies. 
Despite the fact that, with a number of exceptions, the región 
has reached a level at which it is potentially self-sufficient 
in the production of a large number of these goods, 
intra-regional trade in such goods is slack, even though there 
are áreas or subregions which possess considerable surpluses 
and others a marked déficit. 
In 1982, the valué of intra-regional trade in commodities 
represented merely 12% of the total valué of trade, whereas 
more than 65% of the región's exports went to markets in 
developed economies. Markets in the other developing countries 
and the countries with centrally-planned economies have so far 
been less important. As far as imports are concerned, 
intra-regional trade in these products only represented 30%, 
while trade with «otlier developing countries played a 
significant role, supplying more than 30% of the región's 
reguirements in primary products. 
At a more disaggregated level, the group made up of 
petroleum and petroleum by-products reveáis that regional 
imports in 1982 represented US$ 18 billion, but that only 31% 
of these carne from the región itself. If the potential 
self-sufficiency of Latin America with respect to this group 
of products is taken into account (in 1982 the región exported 
almost US$ 40 billion worth of petroleum and petroleum 
by-products to the rest of the world) there is without doubt 
considerable potential for redirecting trade towards the 
región itself. 
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As far as food and agricultural raw materials are 
concerned, although in 1982 total imports rose by US$ 11 
billion, less than 30% of these originated in the región, 
which in turn exportad more than US$ 25 billion worth of such 
goods. Within this group, the potential for redirecting trade 
towards the región is particularly rich with regard to 
products such as maize, wheat, sugar, soya beans and soya bean 
by-products, and other oilseeds and oils. 
With respect to minerals and non-ferrous metáis, a 
similar situation prevails: although in 1982 extra-regional 
exports and imports were higher than US$ 7.5 and US$ 1.3 
billion, respectively, intra-regional trade remained between 
US$ 700 and US$ 800 million. The same survey indicates that 
within this group of products, the most salient items are 
aluminium, iron, steel and copper products, and that 
intra-regional trade could also be oonsiderably expanded, and 
concludes that efforts to redirect trade in 40 products 
towards the región itself (representing five SITC diglts), 
could increase regional trade in commodities by more than 
US$ 15 billion. 
Regional co-operation in this direction should be 
emphasized, when, as is now the case, the región's comnodity 
exports are facing growing protectionism, as the growth of 
regional trade is a viable alternative for improving export 
income and saving the región's meagre external resources, 
ensuring in addition regional food security. 
ii) Manufacture in the región. Examination of the 
structure of the commodities trade in Latin America reveáis 
that exporting goods in a primary state and importing the same 
once they nave undergone a manufacturing process is a further 
characteristic of its peripheral status. In 1982 the región 
exported approximately 60% of its 20 most important 
commodities towards the OECD countries, whereas 70% of 
regional imports of the same imported goods were in 
manufactured form. These figures confirm that it is yet 
possible to oonsiderably increase export income, by augmenting 
the valué added by manufacture. 
One of the major hurdles facing countries in the región 
if they are to expand their manufacturing capacity, 
particularly in the field of minerals, is the huge scale of 
the investment necessary to set up and economically run the 
manufacturing units. The various projections concerning the 
capital investment requirements in the mining sector in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, drawn up by organizations such as 
the World Bank and the IDB, range frcm US$ 3 to US$ 7 billion 
dollars per year for the next five to ten years. These 
estimates are based on the projects which it is planned to 
bring into operation. In order to satisfy forecast 
requirements, non-regional sources would need to provide 
approximately 60% of this capital. 
In present financial circumstances, and particularly in 
view of the restrictive conditions which nowadays affect 
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official and conroercial loans, it is not olear whether it will 
be possible to satisfy such huge reguizements. 3hus, in arder 
to provida produoer countries with tbe possibility of 
daveloping manufaoturing activities outside the traditional 
transnatdónal channels, or with lesser participaticn by the 
lattar, it would be vital to increase the credit aade 
available through international and regional financial bodies. 
Süaaltaneously, the ocuntries in the región oould decide to 
give priority to a number of sectors (for example, a number of 
agricultural projects, which do not require as rauch capital as 
those in the mining sector). 
Co-oparation at the regional level may taha a number of 
fonos. Por example, the Latan American and Caribbean countries 
oould perhaps save capital by rationalizing goods 
manufachiringactivities, or by one or several countries 
oentralizing or specializing in specific activities for 
certain goods. Specialization at the regional level oould be 
achieved through joint enterprises or on contractual bases, 
which would mato it possible to achieve eoonomies of scale, 
mato better use of installed capacity and more eoonomic use of 
inputs and tachnology. 
m recent years, joint enterprises (binational or 
multinational) have been set up in the región as a means of 
attaining objectives of eoonomic integration and co-operation. 
Thus, the joint enterprise Empresa siderúrgica Integrada de 
Acero (ACEPAR) was set up by Brazil and Paraguay; HELITOBCA, 
by Perú and Venezuela, for the manufacture of steel tubas in 
Venezuela; the Compañía Andina de Maderas (timber), by 
Venezuela and Oolombia, and the joint Ctiilean-Ecuadorean 
ANEEC, which produces ircn and steel products in Ecuador. 
Although joint enterprises of a multinational kind are rarely 
the case, one example is the Olancho project in Honduras, for 
the production of sawn wood, pulp and paper. Argentina, 
Ecuador and Venezuela also particípate in this project. 
Ibis type of joint arrangement not only tends to decrease 
competition between producers in the región, but also 
stioulates increased intra-regional trade in goods, which, as 
was pointed out above, is at an extremely low level. Moreover, 
a company operating on a large scale, and which is of a 
regional nature, has greater opportunities for successfully 
using its strong bargaining power on the international aarket. 
Iast, but by no means least, a oo-ordinated and 
Consolidated, regional approach (or one defended jointly with 
otí.er producers in the inird World) will be vital in 
inceasing the level of manufacture of regional expcact 
prod'jcts. Success in this task will also depend to a certain 
extent upon the: effort which the developing countries mato to 
elimínate the subsidies granted by developed countries to 
their ana manufacturing industries. 
It would be desirable for the Latín American and 
Caribbean countries to endeavour to negotiate jointly at 
international forums in order to obtain the fbllowing: 
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agreements for the manufacture of their products by countries 
in the Third World; agreements to increase the transparency of 
policy measures which affect prospecta for the manufacture of 
export goods; plans to collectively acquire technology; 
technlcal assistance in the field of market information and 
prometían of manufactured commodities; systematization of 
International standards of guality, packing and sanltary 
regulations; and finally, a common front seeking to gradually 
reduce and progressively elimínate trade barriers (tariffs, 
non-tariff and other restrictive measures), which affect 
manufactured goods. 
iil) tfarketlncr of export oommodities. A majar hurdle to 
exports of cennodities by the developing countries is the 
dlíf iculty in increasing the extremely small percentage which 
they represent in the final price paid by consumers. lhis lew 
return partly reflects the incapacity of exporter countries to 
control the various stages of the marketing and distribution 
chain through which these products are purchased and sold. 
Ihere is no doubt that the significant natlonalizatlon of the 
manufacture of basic products recordad in past decades has not 
lowered dependence on foreign finos for marketing and 
distribution. 
A study at present being carried out by the Secretarlat 
of ECLAC examines statistlcs relating to trade between 
"related parties" in United States importa in 1981 (it is 
assumad that trade between related parties exista when 5% or 
more of the shares of a f ira are owned by the other party with 
which it trades). lhis research reveáis that almost half of 
them fell into this category. However, if the examinatlon is 
restricted to the sector of oommodities from latín America, a 
low level of trade between related parties is observed. 
The same study indicates that the degree of intra-f irm 
trade seems to increase in acoordance with the level of 
manufacture of the goods. This discovery is in keeping with 
the finding that transnatlonal industries practise more 
effectlve market control over the chain of activities in 
manufacturing industries in which the valué added is high. 
However, in the case of many products most world trade is 
carried out by a relatlvely small number of transnational 
enterprises or trading companies, which act as intermediarles 
between the producers and the consumers. 
lhis f inding concerning the control exerclsed by trading 
ocmpanles in the commoditles sector clearly implies that the 
markets for these goods are far from offering conditions of 
open competltlon. The price-setting mechanism invoked by 
economic theory for a free and open market does not in general 
seem to apply to the «xnmoditles trade, in which a group of 
oligopsonistic purchasers faces a large number of suppliers, 
as is the case with many agrlcultural products. Neither does a 
situation exist in which oligopsonistic purchasers face a 
«an*n number of oligopollstic sellers, as is the case with a 
number of mineral exports from developing countries. 
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In such asymmetrical circumstanoes, prioes are not only 
set by the prevailing oonditions on tha narket, but alao by 
the relativa bargaining power of the parties. Such a 
disequilibrium in bargaining capacity also applias to thoae 
cases in which a pcwerful trade conglomérate represents a 
group of producers or manufacturing companies as exclusive 
agent, either on the purchasing or sales side. Transnational 
oarporations and trading companies are in general in an 
exoellent position to influence market prioes in view of the 
considerable voluntes they purchase, their enornous financial 
power and their excellent netwarks of trade información. 
Sales agents in the developing ocuntries seek to expand 
their existing markets and to discover new markets, thereby 
facing harsh cetnpetition fren the pcwerful trading companies 
in the developed countries. Nevertheless, if it ís borne in 
mind that the relativa bargaining power of purchasers and 
saliera plays a determining role in setting prioes, trading 
companies may prevé to be a means of organizing narkets which 
it would be advisable for Iatin American countries to develop. 
Such trading cempanies possess numerous advantages; to 
ñame but a few, the bread range of produces and narkets seems 
to lessen and share out the risks v*vich exist in the 
cemnedities trade, spreading them out ovar a larga number of 
different transactions, and lowering and off setting 
fluctuations in income. In additicn, these finos face lower 
risks of exchange fluctuations, as they are able to nake use 
of the varices cenpensatory agreements *Aiich exist at the 
national and regional level, and, in contrast with those viiich 
se.ll a single preduet, they are able, for example, to inport 
nanufactured goods in exchange for exporting canmodities, or 
vice versa. 
Given that the Eurcpeans and Japanese rely on this type 
of enterprise, and that the United States are rapidly neving 
towards the expansión of similar units and adopting their type 
of corporate structure, the región oould set up enterprises of 
this type or strengthen same of those v*iich already exist 
(UBEC, GEFLACEA, MüLTIFERT, among others), as a means of 
avoiding an intensification of the influence of external 
trading agents. 
Recently, there has been an increase of conoentration in 
both horizontal and vertical trade, thrcugh mergers between 
oanglcinerates and takecvers of cempanies, naking it aven more 
difficult for trading agents from developing countries to 
penétrate markets. 
The establishroent of direct trade links with consuners in 
the developed countries is also rendered difficult by the 
practices adopted by established firms with regard to prioes, 
the traditional relationships which exist between them, the 
economies of scale from which they benefit and the need for 
major capital resources and heavy expenditure on advertising 
for a variety of produces. A regional marketing strategy oould 
give an Ímpetus to acción programmes to particípate directly 
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en markets in the developed countries, for example, by seeking 
to set up joint representative, sales and promotlon agencies. 
ühls wculd facilítate a inore dlrect relatlonshlp between the 
reglón and the retall distribution networks, and wculd help to 
foster a better knowledge of consumer pref erences in the 
developed countries. 
Oonsideration should also be given to the pcssibility of 
increasing the participation of the countries of Latín America 
and the Caribbean in the price-setting nechanlsms on the 
cenmodity exchanges, situated in the developed countries. 
Dlrect participation in these institutions and a knowledge of 
the way in which they opérate wculd allow the región to 
produce its aun forecasts of the economic forces influencing 
the future prices of cemrodities. A trade delegatlon for a 
single preduet could not be justified in a cost-benefit 
analysis, but representatian of a large number of goods and 
countries (for exanple, a body representing regional interests 
in London, Chicago and New York) could have a major ispact, 
reaching into trade in all produets. 
To sum up, the above analysis indicates that even though 
a large number of the solutians to the problems which the 
región is f acing in its cemmodities trade are of a structural 
nature and need to be dealt with withln the framework of the 
IPC agreements, regional co-operatlon in the field of 
coinnodltles may take the form of activitles to redirect trade, 
to manufacture and market. It is advisable to apply policies 
which facilítate intra-regional trade, consolldating existing 
patterns and establishing new enes to promote local 
manufacture and increase the share of latín America and the 
Caribbean in International trade. Ihis could genérate viable 
options withln the framework of traditional agreements between 
producéis and consumers. 
B. IATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE 
FACE OF EKOTECriONISM 
1. The world settincr 
a) Recent tr^rris in world trade 
m recent years International economic relations have 
undergone deep changes brought about by structural 
transformatlons whlch have affected both the economles of 
industrialized countries and those of the developing 
countries, involving a substantlal modification of the pattern 
of supply and demand in International trade. 
In the case of the developed nations, increased use of 
new technologles has significantly decreased the demand for 
raw materials, prlncipally those importad from developing 
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regions. Simultaneously, dlfficulties of structural origin, 
sucil as the high cost of wages in central cxxmtries, have led 
to sane of their traditional industries losing intemational 
conpetitivity, with a censequent drop in exports and a marked 
increase in the share of imports in these cxxmtries' donastic 
cansunption. As a cxjunterpart, the services sector has taten 
first place among the most dynamic s e c t a , particularly in 
the United States, and has proved the majar sauroe of 
enplopent so far in the 1980s. 
Canplementary to this, agricultural protectionism in the 
central oountries, together with their dcmestic policies of 
subsidies for production, have boosted the world supply for 
agricultural products, sharpening the decline in canroodity 
prices. As was pointed out above, this situation was worsened 
by the increased supply f rom developing cxxmtries af f ected by 
heavy débts. 
In tuxn, the relatively advanced developing oountries 
have managed to export manufacturad goods towards the 
industrializad countries on increasingly oompetitive terms, 
taking advantage of lower labour costs and, in general, of the 
camparative advantages they possess or nave acquired. 
Moreover, traditional manufacturing sectors in the 
developed countries have suffered the oonseguences of the lack 
of new investment, of the obsolescence of their industrial 
equipment, the high cost of labour, and in the case of the 
United States, the overvaluation of the dollar. Thus, for 
example, in rather less than five years exports cornered 75% 
of the market for leather shoes in the United States. 
The tight link between financial and commercial factors 
to sane extent accounts for the performance of exports of 
nanufactured goods from the developing countries. Faced with a 
balance-of-payments crisis, they endeavoured to offset the 
fall in the prices of their commodity exports by a significant 
increase in their exports of manufacturad goods. 
Finally, the growing share of developed countries in 
commodity exports (in association with heavy subsidies and 
protection of national markets), together with the decline in 
the competitiveness of obsolete industries in these very same 
centres, are the two factors which have most oontriiiuted to 
the rise of managed trade and the growing protectionism vAiich 
nowadays harms the interests of developing countries, and 
those of Latin America and the Caribbean in particular. 
b) Protectionism and manaaed trade 
Although the sectors of their economies which have been 
particularly affected are the least dynamic manufacturing 
activities, the industrialized countries have shown themselves 
to be preoccupied by the growing share of iaports in their 
dcmestic consumption of these sectors' products. This concern 
(which according to traditional econcmic theory is unfounded, 
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since such theory assumes that the most inefficient sectors 
are eliminated) is justified by pragmatic considerations 
founded caí the persistence of relatively high levéis of 
unenploynent, and the cxantinuing importance of such activities 
as employers of labour. 
Consequently, in recent years the developed countries 
have increasingly resorted to protectionist measures of a 
non-tariff natura, adopted to check the fall in these sectors1 
output, in spite of their clear obeolescence. 
Such interference with free trade is contrary to the 
ideas defended by GATT, since it limits the extensión of 
most-favoured nation treaboent to all the signatory countries, 
by discriminating against specific countries and, what is even 
inore serious, against develcping countries. 
The grcwth of protectionián is not a recent phenomenon, 
although its upsurge is. In recent years, the trend towards 
managed trade, meaning the use of domestic administrative 
measures, of a tariff or non-tariff nature, to control the 
entry of products en to the national territory has been 
spreading throughout the world. Ibis process essentially 
involves a decline in multilateralism in international 
relations, restrictive bilateral agreements, countertrade and 
trade reprisals. (Moreover, in a broader sense, the expressicsi 
"managed trade" could cover countertrade as practised by the 
major transnational trading ccrapanies.) 
Consequently, there is an urgent need for an acceptable 
formula to check the weakening of the multilateral trade 
system and the increasingly frequent use of protectionist 
measures adopted outside or contrary to the nonos of GATT. 
However, the present position of the developed countries 
would seem to suggest that the options which will be put 
forward at the next multilateral trade negotiations will not 
be particularly favourable towards develcping countries, as 
the rights they have acquired under GATT will not be taken 
into aooount ñor will gains nade at the Ttokyo round of 
negotiations, several of which have not been incorporated into 
concrete agreements. 
c) Some recent steos in the field of protectionism and 
manaaed trade 
The most recent declarations by the industrialized 
countries, following the sutnmit meetings between Heads 
of State, have included the undertaking to check and 
even reverse the vise of protectionism in their trade 
relations. However, the reality underlying this rhetoric has 
been quite different. Both in the case of the United States 
and the EEC, the two major trading partners of latin America 
and the Caribbean, protectionist measures and management of 
trade have become increasingly commonplace in their trade 
relations. 
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Exporta fron Latin America and the Caribbean nave been 
subject to a bread range of non-tariff restrictions. Despite 
having earned a considerable trade surplus with the United 
States in 1983-1984, the región is nowadays facing 
considerable and growing hurdles to the continuad expansión of 
its exporte thereto, m response to pressure Í M flgKÜC 
loÜléS the United States has carríed out a large runfoer of 
iiwestigations liriked to the introductian of oompensatory 
tariffs and "anti-dunping" investigations, táose main a k is 
to lessen the ccapetitiveness of mary imported products which 
nave obtained an increasingly large share of the United States 
market. 
The critical situation facing a number of its own 
productive sectors has led the United States Government to 
establish a sort of quota on imports of products which are of 
great iitportance to the región, principally steel, sugar and 
textiles. 
•Uve United States general system of preferences, which 
was renewed at the end of 1984, introduced major changes, and 
extended the possibilities for graduation affecting both the 
products covered by it and the countries benefitting from it. 
In addition, the new 1984 Trade Law increased the powers of 
the United States Presldent to exert pressure on his country's 
trading partners, in arder to afotain a greater liberalization 
of their markets for exports of goods and services from the 
United States. 
As has been noted, the EEC pursues a particularly 
restrictive trade policy in the case of agricultural products. 
In September 1984 the Caranunity adopted a new trade instrument 
(Regulation 2641/84) allowing it to respond rapidly and 
efficiently to any illicit practice, with the aim of 
eliminating the conseguent prejudice and ensuring "full 
exercise of the rights of the European Canraunity". Following 
the example set by section 301 of the United States 1974 Trade 
law, this new regulation allows for a solution to trade 
confliets to be sought bilaterally, or within the framework of 
article XXIII of GATT. Should an amicable solution not be 
found, the regulation authorizes the Council to take 
retaliatory measures which could involve suspensión or 
withdrawal of concessions, an increase in tariffs or the 
establishment of quetas. 
Finally, as far as exports of manufactures taken 
separately are concerned, it has been estimated that in 1980 
approximately 45% of such exports were affected by a system of 
managed trade.65/ 
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2. The manaqeroent of the trade policy of the roain tradina 
partners of Iatin America and the Caribbeaii 
a) Ihe principal features of their trade policies 
United States trade policy encourages public hearing, 
debate and the free interplay of pressure exerted by sectoral 
lobbies. While on the one hand this fosters greater 
participation by all sectors of society in defining trade 
policy, on the other hand it prevente greater plarming of the 
external sector, whenever the circumstances prevailing at a 
given mcment lead to decisions vAiich are incompatible with 
long-term objectives. In fact, United States trade policy 
rarely contains elemente of export planning or industrial 
policy, except when it includes prograinmes such as those 
designed to protect agricultural prices or retrain labour, 
which anly nave a seoondary iitpact on the external sector. 
In the case of the EEC, although trade policy is the 
responsibility of the Community, it has taken into account the 
atoas put forward by the meniber States in their natianal 
industrial redeplcyment programes. Such a preocopition on 
the part of the Q u i t o is easy to i i tóanl , sinoe the 
meniber States exert direct influenoe over trade policy through 
their participation in the Oouncil. 
Generally speaking, application of the Conmunity's trade 
policy has been marked by vigorous market protection and a 
proverbial lack of transparency in the nechanisms adopted. 
While the modalities and procedure involved in United States 
trade policy are open to the influenoe of domestic sectors and 
interests, and to a certain degree, even external ones, in the 
case of the EEC the system involving decisions taken by 
consensus among the xnember States exeludes the actual economic 
actors from the measures taken, in which they play only a 
third-party role. 
b) Institutions which formúlate trade tx>licv in 
the United States and the EEC 
The differences between the trade policies of the United 
States and the EEC are also reflected in the institutions 
which formúlate them. 
In the United States, trade policy is the outeome of a 
triangular interplay of influence between administration, 
congress and lobbies. 
The Administration, headed by the President, is 
respansible for executing trade legislation, and to a certain 
extent for integrating trade policy with economic policy in 
general; in setting down the rules for trade policy, it must 
also take into account the intemational repercussions —of a 
political and economic nature— of the measures adopted, a 
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factor vftách occasionally exerts a moderating influence. At 
the present time, the Administration's major preoccupation is 
with reducing the trade déficit, promoting the opening up of 
new markets to United States exporta of goods and services, 
and attempting to chedc protectionist measures introduoed by 
Oongress and the lobbies. 
Congress's roain concern in this field is the domestic 
situation and the repercussions of international circuinstances 
in the domestic sphere. In recent years Oongress has shown a 
dearly protectionist leaning, as a result of the serious 
problems facing a nvmtoer of sectors of the United States 
econcny, above all as a result of the overvaluation of the 
dollar and of increased external ccnpetitiveness. Ihe majority 
of the productive sectors concerned malee intensive use of 
labour, táiich is vthy there are at present approximately 300 
bilis of a dearly protectionist nature under dlscussion. On 
the other hand, and in oontrast to the above, those domestic 
sectors vAiich are adversely affected by protectionist measures 
adoptad by the Government also attempt to exert influence over 
Oongress. These interest groups may cali on the services of 
lobbyists, a perfectly legal practice in the United States, to 
increase the efficieney of their influence over the 
Administration or Oongress. 
As far as the European Economic Comnunity is concerned, 
the principal institutions v*iich formúlate its trade policy 
are the member States, the Coranission and the Council. The 
essential f©ature of the mode in which the system operates is 
the need to obtain a certain degree of consensus iñ order to 
take decisions. The member States play a direct role on the 
Oouncil and elect the commissioners, i.e., the members of the 
Commission. The commissioners are responsible for proposing 
measures or regulations, while the Council bears 
responsibility for adopting them. Neither of these bodies is 
fully independent, and vhen the Conmissión puts a proposal 
befare the Council, it has generally already sounded out the 
points of view of the member States. 
The economic actors —entrepreneurial and trade-unian 
interest groups, etc.— only take part in the initial stage of 
the procedure, expressing their opinión on the regulation or 
measure to be considerad by the Commission to their respective 
member State. 
c) The principal instruments of trade regulations 
An extensive range of instruments is at present used by 
developed countries to control trade flows. 
Although the Tbkyo round of negotiations brought about 
reductions in the nominal levéis of tariff barriers, the 
existence of pregressive tariffs has acted as a deterrent to 
increased processing of the raw materials available in 
countries in the Tnird World. 
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A certain number of signs suggests that the tariff 
reductions applied since the Tokyo round of negotlations 
worsened the prdblem of progressive tariffs. By way of 
exanple, since these negotlations, the average tariff on 
processed fruits has been almost four times higher than that 
on fresh fruit, and the same is the case with wood. 
Nevertheless, non-tariff barriers are those which do most 
damage to exports from the developing world, and their. 
adoptian is driving trade between the latter and the central 
countries towards a situation of managed trade. A schenatic 
examination of non-tariff barriers affecting trade should 
hlghlight úiport quotas, variable surcharges, hedging clauses, 
agreenents involving voluntary restraints, discriminatory 
practices, catpensatory taxes, technical requirements and 
production and export subsidies. 
The situation would seem to be quite severe in so far as 
the región's agricultural exports are concerned. In 1982, 50% 
of such exports were affected by some form of quota restraint 
in the EEC countries.66/ 
Similarly, exports of manufactured goods also sean to 
face a battery of non-tariff barriers including among others, 
agreements involving voluntary restraints, anti-dumping and 
catpensatory tax investigations, technical barriers and 
quotas. 
The list of non-tariff barriers affecting trade drawn up 
by UNCIAD is an essential starting point for a systematic 
examination of the difficulties which developing countries 
face with regard to their exports to industrialized countries. 
At the next round of multilateral trade negotiations it would 
be desirable to take this list into account as a point of 
reference in the debates aimed at liberalizing trade flows. 
In addition, the use made at present of legislative 
measures to control trade should not be underestimated. In the 
United States, responsible for inore than 50% of the growth of 
world trade in 1984, Congress is at present discussing a 
number of bilis designad to restrict importa of a broad range 
of products of vital importance to the developing countries, 
including textiles, clothing and footwear. Moreover, should 
the bilí on trade emergencies and export promotion be 
approved, a 25% tariff surtax would affect importa from 
countries which nave a high trade surplus with the United 
States. 
3. Protectionism. Latin America and the Caribbean 
a) The discriminatory nature of protectionism aaalnst the 
recrion's exports 
The región is clearly the victim of discrimination in so 
far as its exports to a number of industrialized countries are 
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concerned. If weighted averages are considered, it encounters 
the highest tariff levéis in Japan and in the EEC, while in 
the United States they are midway between those affecting Asia 
and the rather lcwer ones which affect África. This represents 
a first type of discarindnaticjn. 
The second form of discriinination concerns non-tariff 
protectionism. Both in so far as Japan and the EEC are 
concerned, Iatin America is, of developing regions, that which 
faces the highest levéis of this form of protectionism. In the 
United States it faces modérate levéis of protectionism 
(midway between the high levéis f acing Asian countries and the 
lew levéis which affect African exports) (see table 27). 
Discriinination against the región' s exports focuses en 
quotas. The percentage of the región's produets affected by 
these (10%) is double that of the total imports concerned by 
these restrictions. This may be explained by the fact that the 
región's exports to industrializad countries contain a high 
prqportion of agricultural produets, which are the target of 
loost of the quotas in the central countries. Hhilé regional 
exports of manufactured goods are less affected by such 
restrictions, they bear a diverse range of protectionist 
Hieasures, such as voluntary restraints, of a clearly 
discrindnatory nature (6.7%), supervisory systems (4.2%) and 
other price-control measures (2.3%). 
With regard to a certain number of specific produets of 
relatively greater importance for Iatin America and the 
Caribbean, such discrimination represents a far higher real 
cost. A far greater percentage of these produets are in fact 
affected by non-tariff measures. Such is the case of meat 
exports which are restricted by tariff contingents and other 
quotas, or of sugar limited by various quantitative 
restrictions and variable surcharges. Copper is also to a 
large extent affected by supervisory systems. A high 
percentage of iron and steel exports from the región are 
subject both to supervisory systems and voluntary restraints 
as well as to other price control measures. Exports of 
leather, in turn, are concerned by anti-dumping measures. 
It should be stressed that even in those cases where 
there appears to be no significant discrimination against 
Iatin America and the Caribbean (as is the case of sugar, for 
example), the harm caused to Iatin American countries is 
relatively higher as a result of the product's high share of 
their total exports. 
The United States applies tariffs which are, en average 
below 5% in so far as the exports of Iatin America and the 
Caribbean are concerned, with the exception of exports from 
Barbados, Haiti and Uruguay. However, a number of countries in 
the región are more deeply affected by non-tariff restraints. 
Such is the case of the Dominican Republic, 44.5% of whose 
exports to the United States are subject to some of these 
measures. Barbados (39.0%), Guyana (30.2%) and Panamá (24%) 
are also significantly concerned by non-tariff barriers of one 
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Table 27 
TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFFECTING IMPORTS ON THE MARKETS 
OF THE MAIN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
(Valué of trade in miUions of doUars) 
"~—_^__^ Importer 
Exporter "•-•««^^ 


















































































































































a/ Average, ueighted on the basis of the volume of trade, and of most-favoured-nation 
status preferential tariff rates. 
b/ Estimates are based on: 1) information for 1983, by tariff bracket, relating to given 
non-tariff barriers (for example, "voluntary" export restrictions, total and 
conditional bans, quotas, discretionary import authorizations, automatic licenses, 
multi-fibre agreement, tariff quotas, variable surcharges, anti-dumping and 
ccmpensatory tax investigations, minimun price systems and inport surveillance); and 
2) data on tariff brackets for 1980 inports. !n the case of the EEC, sepárate 
estimates were made for each of the member States, taking into account the measures 
adopted both by the Caimunity and at the national level. 
form or another on their total exports to the United States. 
In comparison the largest countries seem to be less affected, 
especially if the greater volumes and higher valúes involved 
are taken into aocount. For example, 15.4% of Argentina's 
exports to the United States are subject to same form of 
non-tariff ineasure. Data for Brazil reveal that 17.2% of its 
exports are concerned. In tum, only 5.1% of Mexico's exports 
are affected by such measures (see table 28). 
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Table 28 
TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFFECTING IHPORTS FROM LATÍN AMERICAN AND CARIB8EAN COUNTRIES I N 
THE MARKETS OF THE MAIN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Vsxs>>^ Importer Valué of imports in 1980, in nrillions of do l l a rs a / 
^
V > >«^ 1 ^ Austria EEC Japan Norway Sweden S u i t z e r l a n d U n i t e d 
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Table 28 (concl.) 
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8 . 8 
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Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Source: UNCTAO data base on trade neasures. 
9/ Zero indicates less than half a miIIion dollars. 
y See the notes to table 27, Nhich give the relevant explanations. 
Average tariffs In the European Eoonomic Ocranunlty- are 
higher than in the United States. Nevertheless, oountries in 
the English-speaking Caribbean enjoy dear tariff preferenoe, 
with zero tariffs for the Bananas, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Surinaae and Trinidad and Tobago. In oontrast, high 
proportians of exports to the EEC from a nuniber of countries 
in the región are subject to non-tariff barriere. Such is the 
case of Colombia (73.3%), Uruguay (37.5%), Argentina (34%), 
Brazil (27.7%) and Jamaica (22%). As far as the EBC is 
concerned, an initial conclusión suggests that it 
discriminates against the medium-sized and large countries in 
the región, possibly because of the greater share of températe 
climate agricultural products or of industrial products in 
their exports, and favours small countries in the región, and 
particularly those in the English-speaking Caribbean. 
As far as Japan is concerned it seeras to prefer the 
adoption of non-tariff measures, as average tariffs are 
relatively lew, except in the cases of Cuba, Ecuador and 
México. Itoreover, not only is the percentage of inports 
subject to non-tariff barriere higher in cenparison with the 
United States or the EEC, but so is their frequeney. Those 
countries most affected are Honduras (91.2%), Haiti (82.7%), 
Jamaica (81.8%), Costa Rica (63.1%) and Colombia (60.5%). 
The position of Cuba deserves special mention, as it has 
no trade recorded with the United States, and bears the 
heaviest percentages of tariff and non-tariff protectionism 
both with regard to the Cornmunity and Japan. 
b) The overall quantitative effeets of protectionism: 
an illustrative estímate 
At the very best, attempts to estímate the impact of 
non-tariff protectionism are imprecise. A more exact estímate 
of the overall levéis of protectionism is still being 
perfected.67/ 
Table 29, which was prepared for ECXAC by UNCEAD, 
cansiders data relating to tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriera af fecting sene of the main export products of the 
two largest countries in the región: Argentina and Brazil.*/ 
Tais table reveáis that the "levéis of protection affecting 
these key export products are generally extremely high 
and well in excess of 100%. Argentine wheat exporta, 
which were worth more than US$ 800 million in 1980, are 
subject to levéis of protection which vary between 120% and 
*/ Table 29 includes representative products whose 
exporte reached a miníiaum of US$ 100 million in 1980, and 
indicates the type of non-tariff barriere affecting them on 
the industrial markets, as well as the published calculations 
of the ad valoran equivalente of such restrictions (including 
the inpact of tariffs). 
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Table 29 
AVERAGE LEVELS OF PROTEaiONISM AFFECTING THE PRINCIPAL EXPORT PRODUCTS 
OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 
Exporter Product a/ 
Valué of 
exports in 1980 
(n i l l i ons of 
dol lars) 
Non-tar i f f berr iers applie 
i n industr ia l lzed countrie 
EEC 
Estimated l e v é i s o f a a c t u a l 
p r o t e c t i o n í s i » £ / 
Japan United 
States 
Argentina Rau meat (011) 
Uheat (041) 
Maize (044) 
Fruit and nuts (051) 
Fresh vegetables (054) 
Sugar and honey (061) 
Oilseeds (221) 
Textile fibres (26) 
Leather (611) 
Iron and steel (67) 
Clothing (84) 
Brazil Fresh meat (011) 
Meat preparations (013) 
Fish preparations (03) 
















1 . 2. 3, 4, 5. 6 
2 . 3 . 4 , 6, 7 
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Table 29 (concl.) 
Exporter Product a/ 
Valué of 
exports in 1980 
(millions of 
dollars) 
N o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r a a p p l i e d 
in i n d u s t r i a l i z e d count r ies b / 



















Sugar and honey (061) 374.4 
Coffee and nanufactures thereof (071) 2 773.1 
Cocoa and manufactures thereof (072) 696.6 
Tobacco and manufactures thereof (12) 295.3 
Textile yam (65) 654.3 
Iron and steel (67) 881.5 
Footwear (851) 387.9 
2 , 3 , 6 , 4 




17, 15. 19. 
12, 20, A 









a/ Standard International Trade Classification references (SITC) are given i n b r a c k e t s . The 1980 comnercial valúes of these products uere taken 
from the UMCTAD publ i catión "Yearbook of International Trade Stat ist ics", V o l . I , New York, 1982. 
b/ This colum gives the type of non-tariff restrictions affecting export products í n t h e European Economic Conmunity, Japan and the United States. 
The key adopted for the various forms of non-tariff barriers is as fol lows: 1 : t a r i f f quota ; 2 : permit f o r m a l i t i e s ; 3: variable surcharge; 4: 
general quota; 5: ainimuna price; 6: health and hygiene regulations; 7: S t a t e monopoly; 8 : re fe rente p r i c e ; 9 : seasonal t a r i f f increase; 10: 
discretionary granting of inport l¡censes; 11: ban; 12: controlled a u t h o r í z a t i c o ; 13: m u l t i - f i b r e agreement; 14: nonas; 15: anti-dumping 
investigation; 16: basic price; 17: "voluntary" export restrictions; 18: v a r i a b l e component; 19: ant i -dunping t a x ; 20: cempensatory tax. 
c/ The estimated levéis of protection given in this colum refer to t a r i f f and n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r s . The informat ion was obtained from the following 
sources: International Monetary Fund, "Effects of increased market access e n s e l e c t e d developing count r i es ' export earnings: An i l lus t ra t i ve 
exercise", Washington, D.C., 3 May 1984; UMCTAD, "Protectionism and s t r u c t u r a l ad jus tment" , TD/B/940, Geneva, 2 February 1983; and A. J . Yeats, 
"Trade barriers facing developing countries", London, MacNillan Press, 1979. I t a l s o has t o be acknowledged that the levéis of protectionism 
affecting agricultural products «ay change sharply as a result of the roture o f t h e t rade r e s t r i c t i o n s a p p l i e d . 
145% in the EEC and Japan; Argentina and Brazilian meat 
exports face even higher trade barriers (the respective level 
of protection is estimated to be inore than 300% in Japan). In 
addition, in the case of textile and clothing exports, the 
levéis of protection fluctuate between 59% and 79% in the 
European Econonic Ocmmunity and the United States. The table 
also indicates that the systems of protection af f ecting these 
key export products are extremely cccplex, and that oertain 
Ítems such as neat, preparad fruit, iron and steel are 
affected by up to seven different types of non-tariff 
restrictions" .fiB/ 
To sum up, detailed analysis of all the faceta of 
protectionisni reveáis relatively clearly the h a n done to the 
oountries of latín Anterica and the Caribbean, as well as the 
other developing oountries. In this context the oonsidsration 
of specif ic indicators leading to the drawing up of special 
discriminatory treatment against the región's exports seems 
even more sericus. 
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TV. IATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE FACE OF 
THE INTERNATICNAL DEBATE OVER SERVICES 
A. BACKGROÜND 
Teleocnnunicatlons, banking, data prooessing, cinema and 
televisión, insurance, advertising and auditing, education and 
health services, transport, in short the whole of that set of 
econonic activities which are not included in the goods-
producing sectors are today the suibject of growing and 
unprecedented interest in a number of centres of the globe. 
Academics and governments, sociologists, political scientists, 
international and legislative bodies, executives in major 
corporations as well as the specialized press and other 
written media, in various countries, are devoting increasing 
time and resources to studying and gaining deeper knowledge of 
the econonic, social and political role of this hitherto 
ignored sector. 
This new approach would seem to be the result of the 
convergence of various factors, which may be helping to 
stinulate the international concern with services. 
A sudden and perhaps belated realization is taking place 
of the vast econonic, social and technological dimensions 
which the tertiary sector has aoguired, both in developed and 
developing economies. Services contribute more than half world 
valué added and enploy approximately 60% of the world's 
available labour. 
In turn, striking technological progress is 
revolutianizing a whole range of service activities, such as 
across-the-frontier data transinission, banking, insurance, 
transport and others. These changes are taking place with such 
speed that they often make it impossible to clearly perceive 
what impact they may have on the processes of economic and 
social development, as well as on the economic and political 
relations between countries, particularly between the 
developing and the industrializad countries. 
The modern world is deeply frustrated and confused by the 
persistence of serious social and economic problems in the 
majority of countries, particularly in view of the inability 
of conventional development mcdels to solve the serious 
problems affecting a large part of the world's population. 
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This sltuation requires that nev develcpnent options basad on 
a more complete kncwledge of hitherto disregarded sectors, 
such as services, be sought out. 
An intense and as yet unresolved debate is going on both 
in the developed itiarket econamy countries and in the 
developing countries as to the real role played by services in 
economic and social development. In the view of same, untoward 
eacpansion of the tertiary sector of the econamy is a sign of 
weakening, distortion and declining productivity in the 
economic apparatus, while for others, the existence of modern, 
efficient and cheap services in activities such as transport, 
banking, insurance, data processing and others is a 
fundamental requirement for development and for iinprcved 
integration of countries into the international eccnomy. 
It is consequently not surprising that the industrialized 
countries, headed by the United States, are promoting the 
adcption of a series of multilateral ccmmitments designed to 
facilítate the expansión of their service activities through 
the internationalization of their large service enterprises, 
whose expansión requires a vast and unencumbered geographical 
área to develop. In order to achieve this, for same years the 
United States have been pursuing extremely concrete aims at 
the bilateral (by mearas of the 1984 Trade and Tariff Law), 
regional (as part of commitments to the other industrialized 
OECD countries), and multilateral (by promoting inclusión of 
services within GATT) levéis. 
Awareness of the fact that services may hold one of the 
master keys to development and to economic relations between 
countries, together with the realization that increasing 
external dependence is associated with the supply of new 
strategic services, such as those linked to the international 
data networks, has led to the developing countries viewing 
with increasing and well-founded mistrust the reoent 
international initiatives taken with regard to these services. 
It is increasingly realized that béhind such initiatives lie 
more complex and far-reaching issues than mere business. Ñor 
do developing countries perceive the advantages they could 
obtain fram the application of the measures proposed; 
countries seem far more inclined to expect a gradual weakening 
of their position in the world economy. Finally, neither do 
these countries find the proposed forum attractive, in view of 
the long history of frustration and restrictions which has 
been their lot in their dealings with developed countries 
under GATT. 
At the multilateral level, this attitude has been 
mirrored in the almost unanianous rejection by the developing 
countries of attempts to bring the issue of services befare a 
forum such as GATT. In turn, these countries have shown 
considerable interest in broadening the international debate 
so as to give due attention to the impact on their development 
which would be associated with national and international 
policies on services. Consequently, in March 1985, the Trade 
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and Development Board of UNCIM) adopted a programe of 
wark £9/ which devoted additional funds to iicproving knowledge 
of the role of services in the trade and development of 
countries, and to exaraining mechanisms for international co-
operation capable of raaximizing this sector's contrihuticn to 
the developing countries. 
At the regional level, a joint UNCIAD/ECIAC/UNDP project 
aims to prcvide Latin American and Caribbean countries with 
support in the search for regional co-operation mechanisms in 
the services sector, and in preparing studies to assist in 
defining a framework for international services which fully 
satisfies their interests. 
Finally, within the framework of SELA, in 1983 the Latin 
American Council adopted Decisión 153 which, among other 
things, expresses the desire of the countries in the región to 
act in a co-ordinated and barmonious f ashion with regard to 
the international debate over services, and to pursue all 
necessary efforts to improve knowledge of the role which 
services can play in development, as the best means of 
identifying the real interests of the región in this field. 
B. IOTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES 
WITH REGARD TO THE SERVICES TRADE 
The leading role played by the United States in the 
development of bilateral, regional and multilateral 
initiatives in the field of services is well known. It is 
oonsequently useful to briefly set out the core of these 
initiatives before attempting to interpret them. 
1. The 1984 United States Trade and Tariff Act 
On 30 Cctober 1984, President Reagan signed and brcught into 
effect the new United States Trade and Tariff Act.70/ Title 
III, of this Act, and in particular section 302, sets out the 
general purposes which the United States Administration has 
sought to achieve in this field. 
These are: 
a) to foster the economic growth of, and full employment 
in, the United States by expanding competitive United States 
exports through the achievement of commercial opportunities in 
foreign roarkets substantially equivalent to those accorded by 
the United States; 
b) to improve the ability of the President: i) to 
identify and to analyse barriers to (and restrictions on) 
United States Trade and investment; and ii) to achieve the 
eliffiination of such barriers and restrictions; 
c) to encourage the expansión of i) international trade 
in services through the negotiation of agreements (both 
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bilateral and multilateral) which reduce or elimínate barriera 
to international trade in services; and ii) United States 
servioe industries in foreign commerce; 
d) to enhance the free flew of foreign direct investment 
through the negotiation of agreements (both bilateral and 
multilateral) which reduce or elimínate the trade distortive 
effeets of certain investarient-related measures. 
The statement of purposes reveáis three major elements. 
The first of these is the inclusión of a new cenoept of 
reciprecity in commercial opportunities substantially 
equivalent to those accorded by the United States. The second 
is the improvement of the President's ability to take 
retaliatory action in the absence of reciprecity harming the 
interests of United States cranpanies in other countries. 
Finally, it places barriers affecting trade in gcods and 
services. and direct foreign investment on the same level, and 
provides for the adoption of interchangeable and 
counter-roeasures of reprisal in each of these three fields. 
Further on the Act establishes the negotiatlng objectives 
with respect to trade in services: 
a) to reduce or to elimínate barriers to, or other 
distortions of, international trade in services (particularly 
the United States service sector trade in foreign markets), 
including barriers that deny national treatment and 
restrictions on the establishment and operation in such 
markets; 
b) to develop internationally agreed rules, including 
dispute-settlement procedures, which: i) are consistent with 
the commercial policies of the United States, ii) will reduce 
or elimínate such barriers or distortions and help ensure open 
international trade in services. 
The Act also empowers the Executive to specifically 
pursue the following negotiating objectives with respect to 
services, investment and technology: 
a) to reduce or to elimínate barriers to, or other 
distortions of, international trade in services and to develop 
internationally agreed rules including dispute-settlement 
procedures, which will reduce or elimínate such barriers; 
b) i) to reduce or to elimínate artificial or trade-
distorting barriers to trade, and to establish norms, 
including dispute-settlement procedures, which will help 
ensure a free flow of foreign direct investment, and reduce or 
elimínate the trade distortive effeets of certain investment 
related measures; ii) to obtain the elimination or reduction 
of, or compensation for, the pressures exerted by other 
countries to increase their exports to the United States, to 
which end the Trade Rspresentative may impose import 
restrictions, and even ban the products of firms from 
countries which exert such pressure; 
c) i) to obtain and preserve the máximum openness with 
respect to international trade and investment in high 
technology products and related services, and to obtain the 
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elimination or reduction of, or ccmpensation for, the 
signlficantly distorting effects of foreign governroent 
iittervention affecting United States exports of high 
technology products; and ii) to obtain the reduction or 
elimination of all tariffs on, and other barriers to, 
United States exports of high-technology products, and 
to obtain coraraitments to foster national treatment 
and to provide effective mínimum safeguards for the 
acquisition and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. 
The Act frequently uses the words "unreasonable", 
'^justifiable" and "discriminatory", to describe the 
obstacles or distortions mentioned above. In Title III, these 
adjectives are defined as follows: 
The tena "unreasonable" means any act, policy or practice 
which, while not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent 
with the international legal rights of the United States, is 
othervise deemed to be unfair and inequitable. The tena 
includes, but is not limited to, any act, policy or practice 
which denies fair and equitable: i) martet opportunities, ii) 
opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise, or iii) 
provisión of adeguate and effective protection of intellectual 
property rights. 
The term "unjustifiable" means any act, policy, or 
practica which is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the 
international legal rights of the United States. The tena 
"unjustifiable" includes, but is not limited to, any act, 
policy or practice which denies national or most-favoured-
nation treatment, the right of establishment, or protection of 
intellectual property rights. 
The term "discriminatory" includes, where appropriate, 
any act, policy or practice which denies national or most-
favoured-nation treatment to United States gcods, services, or 
investment. 
Finally, in an unequivocal enlargement of the various 
arguments which could be invoked in order to open up the world 
services market, and which is of particular interest for the 
developing countries, Title V of the Act, in sections 501 to 
508 (Generalized System of Preferenoes Renewal Act of 1984), 
requires the developing countries to act so as to ensure the 
United States of their intention to elimínate or reduce 
barriers to trade in services. This consideration serves for 
the designation of beneficiary countries, regulations relating 
to articles which may be designated as eligible articles, 
limitations on preferential treatment and termination of duty-
free treatment for imports and exports in application of the 
system of preferenoes. 
A precedent would seem to have been recently established 
in this respect with the adoption of a free trade agreement 
between the United States and Israel, under which extended 
benefits within the system of preferenoes were granted in 
exchange for concessions with regard to services. 
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2. The proposition for necrotiations over the 
services trade as part of GATT 
As the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act and its iramediate 
predecessor, the 1974 Trade Act (in particular the 1979 
amendtnent to this Act) state, the Executive Authority of the 
United States, acting through the Special Trade 
Representative, is empowered to foster the adoption of a set 
of multilaterally agreed nontis, with a view to opening up 
trade in services. 
In view of their greater geographical and trade 
influence, as well as the legal nature of their canmitments, 
the most important United States initiatives are closely 
linked to the proposal roade by the United States to extend a 
nuihber of the principies and norms of GATT, which nowadays 
apply almost exclusively to trade in goods, to the 
international services trade. 
The United States propose that a new round of 
multilateral negctiations be held, to include, among other 
items, a contractual agreement on international trade and 
foreign investroent in services, under the auspices of the 
secretariat of GATT, and with the support of the 
administrative apparatus of the institution.7i/ To this end, 
and together with other industrialized countries, the 
United States has fostered an exchange of infonnation 
between the contracting parties relating to the 
principal conclusions of a number of national 
investigations into the services sector.72/ It is worth 
pointing out that this exchange only took place 
between developed countries.73/ No developing country 
has so far presented either a national study or 
any Information on the services sector in the framework of 
GATT. 
In the view of the United States, this exchange of 
information and future discussions will allow for a more 
complete understanding of the conceptual and statistical 
problems, as well as of the definitions and approaches 
involved in the services sector in different countries. 
Whilst the sectors which would be examined form part of 
the negotiating agenda, the United States has expressed 
interest in including activities such as banking, insuranoe, 
telecomraunications, data processing, maritime transport, air 
transport, and construction and engineering. 
Although the United States have specifically indicated 
that the agreement would exelude all those financial flows 
deriving fram payments to factors of production (transfers of 
profits and workers' income), and would süiply concern the 
commercial aspeets of services, the proposals so far set out 
continué to adopt an ambiguous language which in no way 
exeludes the future inclusión of items which fall within the 
sphere of direct foreign investment and, moreover, of 
international movements of highly skilled labour. 
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In an esposé nade by the GATT Group of 18, the United 
States representative specified a nuniber of aims of a new 
round of trade negotiations which would include services. 
lhe overall aim would be the establishment of a legal 
framework of rules and procedures in order to: i) render the 
services trade as open as possMe, through greater 
transparency in practices, and by solving problerns through 
consultation, and ii) negotiate sectoral or functional 
cxsíanitments in relation to specific problerns of given service 
industries. 
The legal fraitiework should contain the following 
elements: transparency; the principie of national treatmant; 
the establishment of open reglementary procedure; agreement on 
public monopolies; procedure for settling disputes, and the 
principie of market access. 
With regard to the reduction of trade barriers, the 
Uhited States delegation proposed that procedure be 
established for both sectoral and functional negotiations. 
As far as sectoral negotiations are concerned, the United 
States planned a set of understandings or agreements relating 
to the specific problerns affecting trade in given services. In 
this respect, the United States suggested that priority be 
given to the achievement of an understanding in the área of 
international data flows, in view of their huge iitpact on 
almost all service industries. 
As far as functional negotiations are concerned, the 
United States put forward a proposal to apply the fundamental 
concepts and principies used in the various codes on non-
tarif f barriers which had been the outcome of the Tokyo round 
of negotiations. The United States specifically mentioned the 
cbdes relating to technical norms and to government purchases. 
They also suggested that elements of the future agreement on 
intellectual property suitable for application to services be 
adopted. 
Finally, with regard to investments, the United States 
delegation stated that a number of service enterprises were 
experiencing serious problerns in pursuing their operations in 
foreign countries, as they did not possess access to ownership 
of the property necessary for local production of the 
services. In order to improve the trade opportunities of these 
enterprises, the United States put forward a proposal to 
establish a similar context to that suggested for the services 
trade, and urged the contracting parties to initiate an 
examination of the investment problems involved in services, 
as part of an eventual framework for investments in services. 
In any case, the delegation emphasized that any understanding 
on the international services trade would have to include 
activities facilitating the right of representation of foreign 
services enterprises, in order to facilítate iuportation of 
the service in question into the receiver country. 
Other developed countries have expressed their intention 
to co-operate with these initiatives and have put forward 
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relatively similar proposals in order to provide international 
trade in services with a legal framework under GATT. France is 
the only developed country which has manifested any reticence 
in this respect, as it subjects any new round of trade 
negotiations to the progress achieved in reform of the 
international monetary and financial system. 
C. SCME MAIN FEATURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
EOONOMY AND OF SERVICES 
In a previous report,74/ the Secretariat provided an initial 
analysis of the ccmplex repercussions of a nuiriber of 
initiatives linked to possible international negotiations on 
services. This report underlined the need to clearly sepárate 
strictly cammercial aspects from other issues under debate, 
such as that of foreign direct investment, examination of 
which, in conjunction with the issue of the services trade 
would appear to be arbitrary (as it siraultaneously exeludes 
the flows originating in other international movements of 
production factors, such as labour) and exceeded the 
possibilities for concrete action in a forum hitherto designed 
only to regúlate international trade in goods. 
The previous section provided a synthesis of tara 
important elements which nave appeared relatively recently and 
which may help in clarifying the debate: the United States 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, and the formal presentation of 
the United States proposal for a new round of trade 
negotiations under GATT, put forward in July 1985 to the Group 
of 18. 
Simultaneously, since that date, the international debate 
on the subject, both at the political and academic levéis has 
considerably broadened and deepened. Consequently it new seems 
opportune to provide a certain amount of further background 
information which may further highlight the potential effeets 
of and the real issues behind the initiatives set out above. 
1. The structure of the international services trade 
a) World output of services and international trade 
The difficulties involved in "storing" and "transporting" 
a large number of services mean that, despite the considerable 
dimensions which the sector has attained, in almost all 
economies that proportion of services which are 
internaticnally tradeable averages barely 8% of the world 
product of services, compared with 45% for agricultura and 55% 
for mining and industry. It is possible that this extremely 
low tradeable proportion of services is also a reflection of 
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the inadequacies of traditional systems for recording 
invisible goods in the balance of payments. 
b) Flows in the services trade 
In 1980, world trade in services attained US$ 436 
billion. Between 1970 and 1980 this trade grew at an average 
annual rate of 18.8%, samewhat lower than the rate for goods, 
which was 20.8%. Ihe developed countries are the main 
exporters (86.5%) and importers (82.5%) of services, and 
throughout the 1970s showed a continuous growth in the 
surpluses on their trade in services. In the case of the 
United States, in 1980 the surplus on services (US$ 6.6 
billion) covered one quarter of the déficit of the trade in 
goods (US$ 27.4 billion). Ihe Ítem "other services" has been 
the industrialized countries1 major source of surpluses. 
As far as the developing countries are concerned, they 
consume a minor share of the world trade in services (13.5% of 
exports and 17.5% of inports) and have recorded considerable 
and increasing déficits in this trade, in which transport is 
the most significant item. 
It should be pointed out that a number of developed 
countries are also in serious déficit in their trade in 
services (for example, the Federal Republic of Germany as a 
result of the balances in the "travel" account), and that a 
nuniber of developing countries possess considerable surpluses 
(for example, México, thanks to tourism).75/ 
c) Incoroe from foreicm investment and the 
internationalization of services 
Although the volume of world trade in services attains 
considerable proportions, it is of relatively little economic 
signif icance in relation with the other movements resulting 
from the internationalized services sector. Tne difficulties 
described above in selling services internationally led to the 
aajor service companies developing and improving new forms of 
management and international control. This fact, based on the 
technological progress in information science, has meant that 
once these enterprises have successfully set up an 
international network of data transmission they are able to 
considerably expand the frontiers of their markets and 
internationalize their operations even a very long way from 
their headquarters. 
This phenomenon has led to the development of far more 
important financial flows than those associated with exports 
and imports of services in the strict sense of the word. 
Although insufficient analysis has been made of the overall 
data in this área, it is useful to mentían the case of the 
United States. In 1980 this country earned a surplus in the 
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región of US$ 31.5 billion on flows frcnt its interests in 
service enterprises operating abroad. The figure vas almost 
five times higher than the surplus on its services trade that 
year (US$ 6.6 billion) and aLnost us$ 11 billion higher than 
the déficit on the trade in goods (US$ 27.4 billion). 
The income received by a nuihber of United States firma as 
a result of their overseas operations itay be of vital 
iitportance for many of them and, on the basis of partial 
indicators, the significance of such operations as a source of 
income is rapidly growing. For example, it has been calculated 
that United States advertising firms receive 37% of their 
gross income from their overseas operations. The equivalent 
percentage for auditing firms is 25% and for consultancy and 
engineering firms 43%.76/ 
d) Latín America and services 
Ihe services sector in Latín America also attains 
considerable iitportance in the econcmic, social and 
technological spheres. On average, it contributes rather more 
than 55% of total valué added in the región and employs at 
least 60% of its labour forcé. Its impact on employment may be 
even greater if the labour-intensive nature and the weight of 
service activities in the extensive informal sector of these 
economies is taken into account. 
With regard to international trade in services, the 
región has a similar share to its share of world trade in 
goods (approximately 5%). However, flows in the services trade 
reflect a continuing and ever-increasing imbalance throughout 
the 1970s, reaching a déficit of US$ 10 billion in 1980. The 
greatest déficits were in "transport" and "other services". 
Unfortunately the regional balance of payments dees not 
provide satisfactory estimates of the portion of remittances 
of profits which correspond to the operations of service firms 
established outside the región. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that the figures which correspond to these flows are quite 
considerable, if the share of total supply constituted by 
transnational enterprises in activities such as auditing and 
advertising, banking and insurance, data processing, hotels 
and other sectprs in which foreign interest are praminent is 
taken into account.77/ 
2. New technolocries and the production of and 
trade in services 
In recent years extremely signif icarit changes have been noted 
in the composition and characteristics of the tertiary sector, 
both in so far as its output and its insertion within the 
world economy are concerned. Among other things, these changes 
are linked to the following factors. 
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a) Ihe special role of data processing and telematics 
Nowadays Information constitutes a fundamental resource 
in the production of a wide range of goods and services. It 
may be defined as an inexhaustible resource requiring 
relatively little input in order for it to be updated. In 
turn, Information generally flows in two directions: from the 
supplier to the user, and from the user to the supplier (this 
latter flcw generally costs the supplier nothing). 
Moreover, the growing role of data processing in econcmic 
activities is bringing about considerable changes in the 
quantity, quality and type of services available to the 
economic infrastructure, both domestically and 
internationally. The merging of informatics, i.e., of the 
activities of data collection, processing, storage and 
distribution with the national and international 
teleccromunications network makes it posslble to supply an 
ever-increasing nuníber of service activities in a constantly 
growing nuníber of locations throughout the world with 
information resources. 
If the evolution of the most dynamic service activities 
is observad, it is possible to perceive a similar process to 
that which was recordad at the beginning of this century 
following the introduction of electricity and the effect it 
had in réinforcing the industrial base of countries. A process 
with similar repercussions would seem to be taking place as a 
result of the introduction of data processing and the 
development of service activities, both within national 
economies and at the international level. 
Hbwever, in view of the degree of concentration of 
financial and technological resources achieved by a number of 
conglomerates, and the increasingly widespread nature of 
interconnected data bases, information is only available 
within captive circuits to which only a limited number of 
users have acoess. 
b) Ihe increase in the "tradeabilitv" of services 
Ihere is no doubt that the introduction and applicatian 
of new technologies, such as the development of data 
processing, are having far-reaching economic effects whose 
impact is not yet fully apparent. ihe most obvious signs 
appear to be the following: i) the quality, quantity and 
dlversity of services offered is undergoing a radical change; 
ii) international competition in the goods and services trade 
is being deeply marked by the supply of a certain number of 
key services; and iii) in view of the increasing 
data-prccessing element in many services and the enlarged 
possibilities for "transporting" this resource across 
frontiers, the number of activities concemed by such an 
international trade is growing considerably. 
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This conseguence is particularly apparent in the 
internationalization of a range of professional services, such 
as architecture, engineering and management consultancy, vising 
cxamputerized design and management techniques. 
Increased geographical coverage, together with the degree 
of technical perfection of international teleccmnomications 
networks provides a free flowing web of "freeways" for 
supplying an increasing range of services across frontiers, 
bringing about a similar change to that caused to the goods 
trade by the imprcvement of conventional means of transport. 
In turn, the increased "tradeability" of certain 
services, as well as the inccrporation of new technologies 
also influenoes the dynamism of certain goods. A significant 
growth of the services element incorporated into their valué 
added may be observed in the production of goods; information 
represents an increasingly important share of this increase in 
valué produced by services. This is particularly true of high-
technology goods, which are moreover those which prove most 
dynamic in international trade. 
c) Chames in comparative advantages; towards 
the end of cheap labour? 
As was outlined above, the introduction of new 
technologies such as data processing and robotics is causing 
deep changes in the processes of production of goods and 
services. It is likely that these changes are also having a 
marked inpact on the traditional productive relationship 
between capital and labour, in bcth the field of goods and of 
services. 
Thanks to the use of robots and camputers, Japan has 
succeeded in making considerable savings in its labour 
costs in the clothing industry. In the United States 
computer prograinmes nave been written for designing and 
cutting clothing, making it possible to copy patterns, 
autcmatically alter them to different sizes and introduce 
additional accessories, while at the same time minimizing the 
amount of material used; all of these factors exert a crucial 
influence over the international competitivity of these 
industries. 
In the transport sector, container technology, together 
with the integration of different modes of transport in large-
scale operations is also displacing the antiquated fleets of 
many developing countries.78/ 
So far, the low cost of labour in these countries has 
made it to some extent possible to offset the higher 
productivity of capital and labour in a number of advanced 
countries. Ihe above technological changes however, are 
allowing these countries to restore comparative advantages in 
traditional sectors which were assumed to have been 
definitively transferred to developing countries. 
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3. Transnational corporations and the production 
of and trade in services 
A (ktermining factor on the international economic scene is 
the grcwing iinportance acquired by transnational corporations 
in the supply of services. The transnational development of 
many service enterprises has in part represented the logical 
continuation of the similar process which took place with 
great intensity among goods-producing firms in the 1960s and 
1970s. It is only possible to satisfy the natural market thus 
created beyond national frontiers by establishing subsidiaries 
and branches in other countries. Ihis accounts for the 
transnationalization of the major banking and insurance 
conglomerates, those involved in advertising and auditing, as 
well as a wide range of service activities which do rot 
possess ready potential for international trade and which, 
however, are an essential logistical support for the 
internationalization of the economy of the central countries. 
a) Chandes in patterns of manacrement and control 
As was mentióned above, the process of inter-
nationalization of goods-producing activities which has taken 
place in the last decade or so is being followed by the 
internationalization of a broad range of service activities. 
This phenomenon ccmplements international trade through the 
establishment of extensive networks of subsidiaries, branches 
or other organic units, which it is easier to manage and 
control internationally thanks to relatively recent 
administrative procedures, such as the granting of licences, 
privileges or franchises, rentáis under specific conditions, 
and others. 
In this connection, it has been suggested that government 
policies which, perhaps inadvertently, affect the relative 
profitability of investment in one sector or another, together 
with the relative intensity of international competition, may 
also ocnstitute factors which account for the emergence of new 
service sectors and of new forms of organization in firms.79/ 
Not only nave these factors lengthened the list of 
services offered, but they have also sparked off a series of 
mergers between firms which would have been unthinkable barely 
a few years ago. Obviously, the reason lies in the fact that 
mergers diversify risks, help with the acguisition of new 
tecinical knowledge and facilítate access to finance.80/ 
b) The dvnamism of transnational corporations 
The dominant position of transnational corporations in 
the worldwide trade and supply of services also reveáis the 
very particular dynamism which has characterized these firms' 
activity in recent years. 
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Among the factors which explain such dynamism is the low 
level of international "tradeability" of services and, 
consequently, the attractiveness of foreign inarkets to these 
firms, as a stimulus to the expansión of the volurre of their 
operations. 
A major part of the capital of transnational services 
corporations is composed of their accumulated technical 
kncwledge, as well as the reputation they have acquired and 
the goodwill inspired by their trade mark. Escansión of the 
frontiers within which the conglomérate is able to opérate is 
oonsequently vital in order to take fuller advantage of 
economies of scale and to m a x M z e overall profits. 
Moreover, keener competition has forced finos to lengthen 
the list of services offered, by entering into mergers. This 
is the reason for integration between a nurriber of industries, 
not only in the services sector, but also between 
manufacturing fintis, so as to achieve greater penetration into 
foreign markets and to extend their operations therein. 
One of the raost widely guoted examples of this type of 
dynamc conglomérate is the case of what are kncwn as the 
"sogo-shosha" in Japan. The internationalization of these 
major trading companies has transformad them into the 
organizers and co-ordinators of projects capable of supplying 
a great variety of support services, ranging fram project 
financing and supervisión, purchase of equipment for plants 
and construction of infrastructure works (such as ports and 
motorways), to the sale of mineral resources and provisión of 
consultancy services. These enterprises also take part in the 
construction of airports, tourism installations and housing 
ccmplexes in developing countries.81/ 
c) internatj'-'nai information networks; the diversification 
and extensión of qeographical coveraqe in the supplv 
of services 
Within a large number of service activities (particularly 
banking, insurance, transport and others), the processes of 
internationalization of production, control and management of 
activities on a world scale are gathering speed and being 
improved and diversified thanks to the development of the 
global teleccmmunications infrastructure and to the simplicity 
and rapidity with which it is possible to transfer large 
voluntes of information across national frontiers using media 
such as, telematics. 
Whilst the cost of setting up an international data 
network is extremely high, the marginal costs associated with 
the transmission of new data, or information hitherto not 
transmitted by these means, are quite insignificant. 
Consequently, the cost of expanding and diversifying the 
number of services offered is also extremely low, when these 
services are directly dependent on the supply of information. 
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In turn, when a central data base is available together 
with suitable connections with termináis in public 
teleocranunications networks, and fran there to the data base 
at the head office, the marginal investment necessary to 
extend the geographical coverage of operations is also quite 
lew. Ihe direct investment in the establishment of 
subsidiarias of banks, Insurance campanies and other servioe 
enterprises involves little more than expenditure on 
advertising, fumishing offices and parchase of termináis, an 
investment which in a number of cases is almost completely 
financed with local funds. 
d) The need for an unrestricted space in order 
to maximize nrof its 
For the reasons briefly set out above, it is quite clear 
that the majar service enterprises will endeavour to exparri as 
far as possible an área free from hindrances and heterogeneous 
regulations making it difficult for them to be present on the 
nost diverse markets. Ihe high marginal return associated with 
the establishment of subsidiarles in a predictable and 
relatively homogeneous environment conseguently constitutes a 
vital necessity for the survival and further development of 
these firms. 
In confirmation of this, one of the most active lobbies 
defending the interests of the major transnational service 
corporations (known as the "Ooalition of service industries") 
has identified the main obstacles to the expansión of its 
members' activities as being, among other things, restrictians 
an the right of enterprises to opérate on foreign markets and 
to be given the same treatment as national firms (i.e., the 
"right of establishment" and the right to "national 
treatment"); tariff discrimination; barriers to cross-frontier 
data transfer, and unfair competition which may arise fram 
State moncpolies.82/ 
4; A new interpretation of international trade 
and development in the makina 
The failure of a variety of approaches to the development 
processes in a large number of countries, together with the 
sharpening of econamic imbalances between the industrialized 
and the developing countries, has sparked off increasing re-
examination of conventional development theories, as well as 
of the principal factors which determine the international 
división of labour. 
The frustration and perplexity caused by traditional 
models of econamic and social development whose achievements 
have preved inadequate in a large number of countries, has led 
to a search for new development alternatives based on better 
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knowledge of the role which may be playea by eoonomic sectors, 
such as servioes, to which little attention has hitherto been 
paid. 
A number of authors suggest that the importance of 
sezvices is not the almost automatic outcome of a stage-by-
stage development (from agriculture to manufacturing and from 
there to servioes) but quite on the contrary, that services 
represent one of the central keys to the development and 
relativo wealth of nations. 
If such is the case, far from lessening the vitality and 
scundness of goods-producing sectors, the provisión of modern, 
dynamic and efficient services would appear to be fundamental 
in stimulating them. In other words, services would seem to be 
rather a prerequisite of the development process and not, as 
vas hitherto thought, a consequence thereof. The tight links 
between the various services and the rest of the economy mean 
that innovation and progress in key service activities are 
rapidly disseminated in the form of lower coste, increased 
productivity and an increase in the international 
competitiveness of all sectors of the economy. 
In this respect, it is important to bear in miirl that 
services may genérate considerable external savings and 
dissavings, depending en the concrete forms in which countries 
decide to provide them. 
Moreover, if it is borne in mind that services represent 
a majar and growing share of aggregate world preduet, the 
ownership and management of the supply of valué preduced by 
the internationalization of the sector has an undoubted impact 
on eoonomic relations between countries, as well as on their 
ability to tap the surplus generated by these activities. 
Oonsequently, there is no risk in assuming that after the 
tertiarization of the world economy and trade, similar 
phenomena to those which caused the structural deterioration 
in the developing countries1 terms of trade could again oceur 
and become more pronounced. As is well known, this 
deterioration has been linked with the profile of the 
periphery's external trade which is based on the export of 
ccracodities, whose relative prices systeroatically decline and 
on the import of roanufactured gcods and eguipment of high 
valué added, whose prices tend to rise. 
In so far as the central countries maintain a dominant 
position over the most dynamic service activities in the world 
economy, they will find it increasingly easy to capture a 
growing percentage of world income. Regressive distribution of 
such income would be brought about by international trade and 
movements of factors, favouring the economic revival of 
activities over which the developed countries possess 
worldwide control and ownership. 
Furthermore, there would seem to be no other limits to 
the internationalization of services than those set by the 
capacity to develop new techniques of management and control. 
It would thus be possible to cover almost all these 
176 
neterogeneous activities, provided the marginal managemsnt 
oosts were lower than the additional income generated. This 
wculd include not only banking and other financial and 
professional services, but also urban transport, Wholesale and 
retail trade and distribution, as well as a number of public 
services (mail, urban cleaning and maintenance, health and 
educatlon services, and others). 
D. LATÍN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THEIR INTERESTS AND 
THE INinATIVES TAKEN BY THE UNITED STAIES 
IN REIATION TO THE SERVICES TJRADE 
Developing countries in general and those of Latin America in 
particular nave shown understandable qualms over the 
possibility of the international debate on the services trade 
following the lines laid down by the United States. Brazil, 
Argentina, India and other countries in the developing world 
nave resolutely opposed the idea of dealing with the theme of 
the services trade within the same conceptual and 
institutional frameworks which have so far been used to deal 
with the multilateral aspects of the trade in goods. 
A number of arguments have been put forward to justify 
this refusal. There is no doubt that in the view of many 
developing countries, these propasáis seem to contain the real 
possibility that forms of economic expansionism and domination 
will be repeated, in a similar fashion to the colonial 
practices of the European countries from the last century 
until the middle of the present century. It is worth 
remembering that a fundamental strategic component of 
colonialism was based on the development and subseguent 
control of key service activities, both in the colonies and in 
the young Latin American nations. This control was 
concentrated on services such as railways, telephones and 
telegraphs, the Wholesale trade and warehousing, as well as on 
a number of basic services, mainly gas and electricity. 
1. The GRTT proposal: extrapolation of the United States 
Trade and Tariff Act into the multilateral área 
It is quite clear that both the organization and the 
conceptual backing for the United States proposal relating to 
the inclusión of the services trade within the framework of 
GATT closely follows the relevant form and content of the 1984 
Trade and Tariff Act. 
The relevant United States Act not only defines the 
overall principies which, from that country's viewpoint, are 
to direct the internationalization of the services trade, such 
as the right of United States firms to set up (right of 
establishment), to be given the same treatment as national 
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firitis (the right to national treatment) and to enjoy most 
favoured nation status, but also establishes a definitive link 
between the themes of services, investments and high 
tecnnology, while siitultaneously specifically advocating the 
liberalization of all cross-frontier movements of data and 
eliminating restrictions affecting the geographical 
localization of data banks. 
Mbreover, should the United States' effort to nave these 
national principies Consolidated within GATT succeed, many of 
the obstacles to the internationalization of services which 
the American Act defines as "unreasonable", would become 
"unjustifiable", i.e., the would constitute violations of the 
multilateral rights acquired by that oountry, as a result of 
which the financial and commercial reprisals adoptad would 
enjoy complete legal support frara the international axranunity 
which has signed these agreements. 
2. Implications of any aqreement within 
the framework of GATT 
Inclusión of the services trade within GATT, under the térras 
suggested by the United States and in keeping with the legal 
and contractual nature of this Agreement, would signify 
accepting that the very same principies which regúlate 
international trade in goods should govern the 
internationalization of service activities. Not only is the 
conceptual coherence of such proposals debatable, but, what is 
far more important, it would oblige countries to expose 
themselves to the adoption of a series of retaliatory measures 
affecting their exports of goods in possible reprisal against 
regulations or practices violating principies such as the 
right of establishment, non-restriction of data flows or 
others. 
Examples of this have been provided by the recent 
attitudes adopted by the United States Government towards 
Brazil, over its data-processing policy, and towards South 
Kbrea, over its practices in the field of insurance. With 
these precedents in mind, it is logical to wonder whether 
within the framework of GATT there would be cases in which 
those "contracting parties which refuse to extend national 
treatment to foreign banks risk retaliation in the form of the 
withdrawal of tariff concessions on bananas or orange 
juice".83/ 
3. Derequlation at the national and international levéis 
It is also obvious that the new United States Trade and Tariff 
Act reflects a particular ideological concept: the desire to 
restore the iuportance of "the free play of market forces" and 
to diminish regulations of every kind which are considered to 
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militate agatnst greater dynamism and conpetitiveness in 
econcmic activities. "Hiere are many service industries within 
the United States economy in which a prooess of deregulation 
has been introduced, involving among other things the 
suppression of price, exchange and wages controls, as well as 
of a large number of controls and regulations affecting such 
intportant sectors as energy, transport, teleooimnunications and 
financlal services. 
Qn January 1, 1985 the body regulating air transport 
(Civil Aeronautics Board) which had been in existence since 
1938 disappeared. In 1980 restrictions affecting loading 
rights and the practice of fixing agreed tariffs in road 
transport were eliminated. In 1982, the Federal Ccrranunications 
Ccmmission reached an agreement with ATT cver the división of 
its regulated nionopoly into seven large regional telephone 
carpanies and for the elimination of the exclusive supply of 
equipment and International telecommunications and data 
transmission services. Finally, in 1980, an Act deregulating 
financlal services eliminated the ceilings on interest on 
savings, as well as restrictions on the type of loans which 
intermediarles may offer. Paradoxically, considerable 
restrictions remain with regará to the geographical coverage 
of financial operations within the United States «84/ 
Uie theoretical basis for the United States GATO proposal 
would oonsequently seem to be the same as that which has 
prevailed in bringing about changes within its own econamy; in 
other words, liberalizing and opening up the world economy to 
the unhindered and unfettered expansión of the major service 
enterprises. 
Although the available Information is quite incamplete, 
the Latin American countries in general possess fairly 
"deregulated" service sectors, particularly in áreas such as 
data processing, cinema and televisión, auditing and 
advertising, as well as in far more critical áreas such as 
banking. This is in marked contrast to the protectionism and 
extensive control to which such activities are subject in the 
EEC countries and in Japan. Conseguently, in practice a GATT 
agreement on the services trade would be little more than a 
legal agreement to freeze this unregulated situation, an 
agreement which the countries of the región would adopt 
without obtaining any campensatory concessions from the 
industrialized countries. 
Furthermore, the presentation made by the United States 
in which the intemationalization of the services trade is 
linked to a hypothetical abundance of direct foreign 
investment would seem to be little else than a well-meaning 
declaration. In fact, the "right of establishment" and 
"national treatment" would allow the major transnational 
corporations to enter new markets with a minimum of additional 
investment; i.e., only that investment required in order for 
their subsidiarles and branches to connect their termináis to 
the international telecommunications networks, which in turn 
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would link them to the head office and thereby ensure 
that most of the valué added by this activity would be 
produced in the countries in which the firms have their 
headquarters. 
4. Towards a specialization of developed econamies 
in the export of services and of developina 
econamies in the export of qoods? 
The United States has put forward a hypothetical setting in 
which the developed countries would evolve towards a 
concentration of their external trade on the export of 
services, while the developing countries would specialize in 
exporting goods. The basis for this argument is the conviction 
that the developnent of services corresponds to a higher stage 
of the developnent process, and that consequently comparative 
advantages would seem to suggest countries will specialize as 
set out above, with the consequent benefit of an impreved 
standard of well-being for the international ccnraunity as a 
whole. 
Rather strangely the same sources which vaunt the 
merits of this scenario miss no opportunity to emphasize 
that the growth of the services sector does not weaken the 
vitality of the manufacturing sector, just as growth of the 
latter did not devitalize the growth of agriculture. In order 
to drive the point home, it is pointed out that in the 
United States, between 1910 and 1970, while agricultural 
employment fell from same 13.6 million to 4.5 million, real 
agricultural product tripled and it is added that the 
manufacturing sector, on a percentage basis, has shown the 
same trends.85/ 
This link between a modern and efficient services sector 
and the dynamism and strength of the primary and secondary 
sectors has been recognized by a number of authors. Same even 
refer to the "absolute advantages" which a higher stage of 
development may provide, and which would hold sway throughout 
every sector of the ecanomy.Sg/ The volume and dynamism of 
United States agricultural exports, together with the recovery 
of a certain degree of competitiveness in a number of textile 
activities in the most developed countries, would seem to 
provide confirmation of this phenomenon. 
Finally, if it is borne in mind that the majority of 
services will remain "non-tradeable" activities in the 
conventional sense of the word, the internationalization of 
services constitutes a partial and inadequate means for the 
industrialized econamies to maintain their leadership. In the 
absence of similar dynamism in agriculture and manufacturing, 
the internationalization of services will indeed be able to 
increase incame fram factor services in the balance of 
payments, but will not créate new source of employment within 
the industrialized econamies. 
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5. GATT: beyond services 
The deepening of the international eooncmic crisis, and in 
particular the surge of high and persistent rates of 
unemployment within the industrialized economies revealed the 
fragility of the institutional arrangements for international 
trade which were set up after the Second World War. 
The principies of non-discrimination and reduction of 
obstacles to free trade between countries nave been gradually 
replaced by a growing tendency to resort to what is described 
as managed trade. All manner of voluntary restraints on 
exports, non-tariff barriers of every kind, caapaigns and 
pressure exerted to influence the consumer habits of national 
citizens, subsidies and other unfair practices which affect 
the possibilities of trade have gradually created a parallel 
system of international trade within which the role of GATT as 
a regulating agreement for multilateral trade appears 
increasingly weakened. 
All of these practices have had particular impact on the 
developing countries in general, and on those of Iatin America 
and the Caribbean in particular. The weak bargaining position 
and scant economic power of the countries of this región have 
not only meant that they have been obliged to fully comply 
with their GATT commitments, but that discussion and solution 
of the problems which affect them most acutely have been 
systematically neglected. This is true of the trade in 
agricultural products, textile products and other goods in 
which arbitrary use of unfair practices on the part of the 
developed countries is in contravention of a number of GATT 
principies. 
In such circumstances, there is further reason for the 
countries of Iatin America and the Caribbean to observe with 
misgivings the use of this forum for discussion of an issue 
connected with activities whose development has barely started 
on their territory. In view of the apparent insignificance of 
the promise of improved access for their exports of goods, 
what can the región expect in exchange for concessions 
facilitating the internationalization of the industrialized 
countries' service enterprises? 
E. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
With the exception of a number of fragmentary disciplines 
which have addressed same specific service activities, 
particularly transport and certain financial services, the 
services sector has not received particular theoretical or 
practical attention in countries1 economic policies. The con-
vergence of a series of factors, such as those which have been 
briefly set out above, is bringing about a rapid change in 
this situation, above all within the industrialized countries. 
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1. The need for deeper knowledae of the role and potential 
of services in the región1s ecsnomies 
The desirability of acquiring iinproved knowledge of the 
contribution of the different service activities to the growth 
and development of economies is urideniable. In contrast with 
other economic phenomena, little is to be leamt from the 
experience of the industrialized countries, as they thenselves 
comprehend relatively little about the role of services. 
To a large extent, this task requires the development of 
specific methcdologies and approaches in order to determine 
which services are vital in order to inore fully achieve social 
and economic goals, and what particular forms of organization, 
ownership and management raust be adopted to ensure the supply 
of these services. 
In carrying out this task it m y prove extremely useful 
to perform a cióse examination of the oontribution nade by 
services to development, centering attention, as suggested by 
UNCIAD, on the reciprocal links between the production of a 
variety of services, and between these services and the 
production of goods, rather than attempting to measure the 
productivity of each service. 87/ It would also be desirable to 
further investigation of the historical and economic causes 
which determined the present structure of the national supply 
of services in the región's economies. Identification of the 
principal conflicts and contradictians which aróse from the 
participation of foreign capital and technology in the 
management of these activities may prove particularly 
illuminating. 
Improved knowledge of the role of services in development 
raust necessarily involve a definition of the true role of 
foreign trade and investment in the services sector, in order 
to determine whether these factors strengthen the links of 
economic and commercial dependence, or whether, on the 
contrary, they facilítate autonomous and self-sustained 
development in the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
2. Patterns of co-ooeration and inteqration of service 
activities at the subreaional and regional 
levéis, and between develooirer reerions 
The technological, financial and market capacity required for 
the efficient and dynamic development of many service activ-
ities no doubt constitutes a major barrier to the possibility 
of developing service activities restricted to the fragmented 
scenario offered by the región's piecemeal national economies. 
This will no doubt créate enarmous possitoilities for the 
appearance of new and imaginative forms of co-operation and 
iiíegratian between two or more countries depending on the 
specific characteristics of the activity in question. 
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Moreover, it is increasingly apparent that ecoroaic 
integration between countries requires a broad process also 
oovering the integration of a variety of basic service 
activities, without whose contributian attempts at integration 
do not seera viable. The raultinational expansión of the supply 
of services sucia as transport, insurance, banking, informatics 
and others appears to nave played a determining role in a 
rumbar of suooessful integration experiroents, such as the 
European Econamic Cararaunity. 
Once again, previous attempts at co-operation and 
integration nade by the countries of the región at different 
levéis nave systematically underestúnated the contribution 
which services can make, not only as an essential complement 
to co-operation and integration of productive activities and 
of the markets connected thereto, but also to their export 
potential towards markets outside the región, or in 
substituting imports therefrom. 
3. The role of services in the operation of 
the domestic econamic apparatus 
and in meetim trade and 
integration goals 
Ihere is increasingly widespread acknewledgement of the fact 
that the contribution of services to development reaches far 
beyond the simple amount of the valué added by them to 
national accounts. As has been indicated above, the existence 
of a complex network of interconnections between certain 
services and the rest of the econamic apparatus, together with 
the external savings generated by these services, indicates 
the need to develop strategies capable of establishing a 
hierarchy of services on the basis of their contribution to 
the performance of the national economy. 
Subsequently, on the basis of this hierarchy, it will be 
necessary to identify the most suitable instruments and 
convenient policies to bring about the modernization and 
galvanization of these activities. 
Furthermore, the present structure of world trade in 
services brings out the pressing need to improve the 
contribution made by services to the external sector of 
economías, and to take advantage of the potential of the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in this área, 
with a view to significantly raising their share of the 
International services trade, rendering them less dependent on 
the supply of services fram countries outside the región. It 
is easy to state these aims, but far fram simple to achieve 
them. The vital need for the timely, efficient and cheapest 
possible supply of a range of services which are essential for 
global econamic development cannot be forgotten. This obliges 
many countries in the región to resort to imports of specific 
services when the national economy proves incapable of 
183 
supplying them on the same terms. This explains the complex 
dilemna facing many countries in the región, involving the 
need to iraprove efficiency and remain technologically up to 
date and the possibilities of strengthening their autonomy and 
independence over national econamic management. 
4. The need for a pattern for international co-operation 
in service activities meetina the interests of 
Iatin America and the Caribbean 
Hiere is no doubt that services nave been the victims of 
unjustified neglect both within national development processes 
and with regard to their links with trade and international 
econcmic relations. The grcwing acknowledgement of the crucial 
role which they are capable of playing in the trade and 
developnent of the countries of the región makes it imperative 
to oonoeive new ways in which the international cctnmunity can 
support the efforts of countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean to modernize, galvanize and inprove the contribution 
nade by services to their own development. 
The international debate has so far been dominated by 
initiatives which appear completely divorced fram the reality 
and interests of the región. There is no likelihood of a 
dialogue founded on such bases prospering. Rigidly insisting 
on proposals so alien to the interests of the developing 
countries will merely exaspérate the parties involved and 
leave them at loggerheads. 
The countries in the región need to possess modern, 
efficient and low-cost services. In order to develop these it 
will be necessary to formúlate and carry out policies at the 
national and regional level to harmonize efforts and maximize 
resulta. 
The political, econamic, socio-cultural and strategic 
characteristics of many services open up a natural área for 
co-operation between countries which are not only 
geographically cióse, but cióse with regard to these 
characteristics. This is clearly the case of the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Mbreover, the physical and 
econamic conditions necessary for the supply of many services 
reguire demographic and econamic spaces far larger than those 
which exist in the countries of the región individually. 
Consequently, there is considerable potential for extensive 
development of service activities at the regional and 
subregional levéis, which must as soon as possible be explored 
in depth. 
In this context, regional and subregional co-operation 
and integration of a number of key services is particularly 
important. It seems unrealistic to hope to offer alternatives 
for extended international co-operation which are not in turn 
based on concrete experience within the región. If the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean were able to 
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protagonize successful pattems of integration of their 
service activities, this very fact would provide a solid 
foundation for any original proposal put before International 
forums. In turn, such experience would make it possible to 
more clearly define the canplementary support which 
international co-operation should provide for the developraent 
and modernization of regional services, and in particular, the 
role which the industrializad countries should assume in this 
task. 
Only within such a framework would it be possible to 
define a regional counterproposal which would not only enrich 
the international debate over services, but which would also 
put forward means and instruments for bringing about more 
equitable international co-operation in this field. 
One promising field for initiating study of a regional 
counterproposal is the sector of informatics and all 
activities linked to the collection, processing and 
distribution of data. 
Tlie nature of data as a "vital fuel" for the development 
of essential service activities would reguire an international 
agreement conceived in broader terms than those provided by a 
merely commercial framework. As is the case of international 
agreeraents over pharmaceuticals and Chemicals used in human 
health, which have been drawn up on the basis of a broad 
understanding of their social function, information would also 
reguire the international canmunity to adopt an agreement 
recognizing its highly specific nature, as well as the need to 
respect the rights and responsibilities of countries in the 
field. In such a case, it is hard to imagine that a framework 
such as GATT, drawn up in accordance with the restricted 
parameters of a trade agreement, could be capable of shedding 
light on suitable forms of international co-operation for a 




V. FINANCING AND EXTERNAL DEBT IN IATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN 
A. THE FINANCIAL SITUAnON OF IATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN: TRENOS AND FROSEECTS 
As frcm the middle of the 1970s the financial resources 
reaching the región rose considerably. From sums in the order 
of US$ 1 billion per year prior to 1973, the figure rose to 
approximately US$ 40 billion in 1981. 
These increases mostly reflected capital in the form of 
loans, rather than greater direct or portfolio investroents. 
Thus, the región* s external debt rose from approximately 
US$ 20 billion in 1970 to US$ 368 billion in 1985; i.e., it 
rose twenty times. Since 1982, the size of the debt has been 
more than three times that of annual exports. As a result of 
this, and of the continuing rise in interest rates, interest 
payments have come to constitute a growing current account 
burden, which in recent years has exceeded more than orne third 
of the total valué of exports. 
Since the middle of 1982, the flow of net external 
financing towards the región has fallen off sharply, and in 
1985 represented less than US$ 5 billion. On the eme hand, 
there was a considerable decline in groes capital inflow, and 
on the other, a vertiginous rise in interest payments as a 
result of the rises in intemational interest rates. The 
región suddenly bagan to suffer acute balance-of-payments 
problems, essentially caused by the overwhelming weight of the 
debt. 
Faced with the external bottleneck, the countries of the 
región have been obliged to readjust their economies, reducing 
domestic expenditure on investment and consumption, at the 
expense of a serious recession. Gross domestic product fell in 
1982 and 1983, and has remained extremely low since then; in 
per capita térras it fell by 9% between 1981 and 1985. Gross 
domestic investment fell sharply between 1981 and 1983, and 
since then has remained at such a low level that in 1985 it 
was 33% lower than in 1980. All of these factors brought about 
a severe shrinkage in Latin American imports, which were 40% 
lower in 1985 than in 1980. 
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Bearing in mind the decline in gross foreign capital 
inflows, this shrinkage in imports has constituted the main 
nechanlsm with which the región has tackled Its present 
balance-of-payments crisis, if gross capital inflow is 
subtracted from the amount of aitortization and interest 
payments on the external debt, it is clear that since 1982 
there has been a capital outflow from Latín America and the 
Caribbean whose scale in 1985 verged -upan the truly enormous 
sum of US$ 30 billion. 
The readjustroent to which the región's economies have 
been subjected has had extremely distressing consequences in 
terms of, among other things, unemployment, wage reductions, 
the increase of poverty, inflation and idle capital resources. 
In addition, the sharp fall in investment casts doubt on the 
possibility of restoring adequate and sound rates of economic 
growth within a reasonable period of time. In such 
circumstances, the social and political stability of the 
countries in the región, both at the present time and in the 
foreseeable future, is a sourse of considerable precccupation. 
In the face of the domestic economic situation of Latín 
America and the Caribbean it is necessary to rapidly find 
relief mechanisms, and speedily return to paths of acceptably 
rapid growth, for which it is essential to determine new ways 
of solving the problem of external debt. 
A number of economic projections have been made based on 
the hypothesis that the región would assume responsibility for 
100% of the external debt burden, as has for the most part 
been the case so far, and the size of external furris which 
would be required for the región to recover its growth, at, 
moreover, modérate rates, has been calculated. The overall 
conclusión of these studies is that the foreign furris neces-
sary to provide a path to solving the problem of the región's 
external debt are far more sizeable than those which interna-
tional sources have preved prepared to grant. Conseguently, it 
is necessary to deal with the debt problem in different terms. 
Projections have been drawn up to fit two different sets 
of circumstances. In case A, it has been assumed that the per 
capita gross domestic preduet will only return to its 1980 
level towards the end of the present decade (growing 1.8% 
annually); that it will continué to rise at an annual rate of 
3.5% uñtil 1995, and that exports at constant prices will 
increase by 4% per year between 1985 and 1990 and by 5% 
thereafter. In case B, which is more optimistic, it has been 
assumed that per capita gross domestic product will grow at 
the rate of 3% per year until 1990, and by 4.5% thereafter; 
that exports at constant prices will rise by 5% per year 
during the first five years and 6% in the second five years, 
and that the external debt will be rescheduled over a ten-year 
term, with five years' grace, which will be applied to the 
debt in abeyance and to the new debt. 
In both cases an annual rate of world inflation of 6% has 
been assumed and external interest rates have been set at 
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between 12 and 11.5% for prívate operations, and between 6.8 
and 8* for operations involving official institutions. The 
hypotheses for grcwth of product and exports in case B 
undoubtedly assune that the economy of industrializad 
oountries will perfora more dynamically. 
The resulte of the projections, both in so fax as the 
región's balance-of-payments current acoount and the e 'olution 
of the debt and financial services are concerned, are set out 
in tables 30 and 31. The principal conclusions ar i quite 
obvious. Net exbernal funding requirements in 19' '0 will 
fluctuate between US$ 25 and US$ 33 billion per year, and in 
1995 between US$ 55 and US$ 68 billion. As a resuLt, the 
external debt will nave to continué growing, and wil. attain 
almost US$ 800 billion in 1995 should economic growlh prove 
more rapid. Although the proportion of exports represt nted by 
the debt will gradually decline, it will remain e tremely 
high. In both cases there will be a trade surplis, and 
consequently the transfer of real resources abroid will 
continué. If interest and amortization payments on the 
external debt are examined, gross capital inflows of between 
US$ 80 and US$ 88 billion will be required in 1990 and between 
US$ 134 and US$ 145 billion in 1995. This would : lake it 
necessary to reverse the net capital flow in 1995, as « result 
of which the región would once again receive f: nancial 
resources worth between US$ 4 and US$ 11 billion per y< ar. 
These projections nave not taken into acoount tí e slump 
in the price of oil which occurred at the beginning cf 1986. 
Should the international price of this product in real terms 
remain at its present levéis, net financial requirements would 
be US$ 25 and US$ 33 billion in 1990, and would rise to over 
US$ 40 and US$ 50 billion, respectively. In 1995 these figures 
would be US$ 55 and US$ 68 billion, or would rise fren US$ 80 
to US$ 98 billion respectively. In this case, gross capital 
requirements would increase in proportion. 
These projections indícate that if the región is to 
reoover sustained yet modérate economic growth, and at the 
same time to bear the whole of its present external debt 
burden, it will require far greater external financing, well 
beyond the amounts at present forecast by prívate and official 
financial bodies. These results are certainly valid for the 
forecast hypotheses regarding international scenarios, both in 
so far as interest rates and the grcwth of trade are 
concerned, and there is every likelihood of these scenarios 
occjrring if the projections for the world economy made by 
mulVinational bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank prove 
coroct. 
This explains the urgent need to search for alternative 
solutions to the debt problem, adopting corrective measures 
which take into account all parties involved. The policies at 
present in forcé will need to be modified, and the inter-
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B. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT EKOBLEM 
Two types of factors contributed to the accumalation of the 
región's extemal debt. On the one hand rapid growth of the 
international financial markets took place in the 197Os. This 
was essentially brought about by the huge accumulation of 
liguidities on the part of the oil-exporting countries 
following the enormous increases in oil prices, and by the 
fact that this affluence of funds inundated a market which 
lacked suitable regulations, as was the case of the 
euro-currency market. In this way the international capital 
market expanded to a large extent outside the reach of any 
national or international monetary authority, and capital 
movements became increasingly more significant in coiantries' 
balance-of-payments results. 
Mbreover, the application of national policies 
stimulating the inflow of private funds helped to increase the 
región's extemal indebtedness, and also tended to produce 
excessive domestic expenditure by the public sector in same 
cases, and by the private sector in others. 
Whenever government expenditure is in excess of income, 
it seeks to finance the shortfall by extemal loans, thereby 
directly increasing the official debt, or by domestic loans, 
which causes an increase in money supply or rises in the 
interest rate. If there is an excess of money supply in the 
economy, overall demand for gocds and services grows 
inordinately, engendering disequilibria in the trade balance, 
as a result of which the country is affected by a shrinkage of 
its reserves and the government tends to resort to debt in 
order to cover the déficit; in this situation, which is the 
most frequent, the extemal public debt often increases. 
With regard to excessive expenditure by the private 
sector (which may lead to an increase in the extemal debt of 
countries whose public sector has managed to improve the 
balance of its accounts), the majority of analysts have 
assumed that it may be avoided as the government is able to 
control growth of domestic credit. Nevertheless, it has been 
observed that excessive private-sector spending targets can be 
met if alternative extemal sources of funds appear, and if 
the policy in forcé makes it easy to obtain access to them. 
In those cases in which excessive private expenditure 
predominates, it has been observed that the extemal debt of 
the private sector increases, while when the fiscal déficit is 
predominant, official indebtedness is of greater importance. 
Other national policies which contributed to increasing 
the región's extemal indebtedness were those which led to the 
maintenance of considerable differences between domestic and 
extemal interest rates. 
The available information indicates that differences 
between domestic and extemal interest rates in the región 
have been both pronounced and persistent, even if expected 
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fluctuations in the exchange rate are taken into account. In a 
number of countries in the región the domestic rates, 
expressed in foreign currency, nave veered sharply away frcm 
external rates. 
Administrative control over capital movements constitutes 
the traditional explanation for this divergence between 
domestic and external interest rates. However, recent 
experience has shown that even when such movements aré 
relatively free, the divergence may persist for a long time. 
Firstly, because the international capital market is segmented 
and local applicants for credit do not themselves have direct 
access thereto, but only a number of financial intermediaries. 
Secondly, because local financial assets do not constitute 
satisfactory substitutes for international ones, either 
because of the absence of the information necessary to assess 
risks or as a result of the excessive cost of obtaining such 
information. Finally, a number of the (social) costs of 
external indebtedness are not adequately taken into account in 
market prices (for example, the fact that additional debt 
increases the rate of interest or the surcharges on the debt 
as a whole). To sum up, in the absence of suitable controls, 
the market does not opérate as a suitable regulatory mechanism 
over international capital movements. 
Domestic interest rates also remained higher than 
external ones in a number of countries in the región as a 
result of structural and short-term economic policies which 
failed to exert sufficient control over the behavior of major 
groups of large enterprises with links between one another and 
with the financial sector. Participation of banks in the 
ownership of non-financial enterprises provided the latter 
with the guarantee that they would not be excluded f rom the 
market. Mbreover, less security was required of them, as a 
result of which, since they were risking less, they wére 
prepared to pay high interest rates and to get deeper into 
debt. It should be added that in a number of countries in the 
región stringent anti-inflation policies were tried out, with 
a component of restrictive monetary policies. This entailed 
increases in the rates of interest, excessive demand for 
credit, or both. 
To sum up, responsibility for the growth of Latin 
America's external debt is to be shared out between creditors 
and debtors. As far as creditors are concerned, they are 
responsible for having lent considerable funds while failing 
to examine the solvency of borrowers. As for the debtor 
countries, their responsibility lies in having applied 
policies which stimulated external indebtedness or failed to 
exert adequate control thereover. 
The increase in the level of the external debt has 
brought about problems which are new to the countries of the 
región or has sharpened already existing difficulties. On the 
one hand, domestic policy is encountering further 
restrictions, since the greater the funds invested in a 
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country by banks, the greater their interest in appraising 
that country's domestic policies before granting further 
loans. On the other hand, the greater the level of the debt, 
the greater the need for debtor countries to dbtain further 
funda to finance the payment coramitments thereby involved. 
Moreover, the rise in the level of the debt increases the 
likelihood of the countries in the región becoming net 
exportéis of financial and real resources. 
Further problems arise from the fact that most of the new 
debt originates in private international sources. On the one 
hand, credit is subject to condítíons of a commercial nature, 
i.e., higher costs and shorter repayment periods; on the other 
hand, the debt is subject to floating interest rates whose 
fluctuations affect the total debt and not only the new debt 
taken out. Finally, the fact that private debt is involved 
does not prevent reasons of a political nature weighing in the 
decisions of lenders, as was once optimistically thought. Once 
the level of the debt exceeds a reasonable limit, it becones 
as serious political problem for the major financial credit 
institutions. 
Finally, the increase in the external debt leads to an 
increase in the domestic debt owed to the intermediarles of 
the latter, generally the local financial system. The latter 
observes an increase in the vulnerability of its assets when 
the external debt becomes a problem. 
The increased vulnerability of the balance of paymsnts 
and the financial systems of those countries whose debt 
expands may suddenly spark off a crisis if unexpected changes 
take place under particular conditions. This was the case at 
the beginning of the 1980s, when the industrialized economies 
were experiencing a deep recession. This recession went hand 
in hand with the application of anti-inflationary policies 
which caused sharp rises in interest rates and paralyzed 
financial flows. This caused stagnation and even a reduction 
in international trade. 
The conjunctural shrinkage in trade caused by the 
recession in the industrial economies and by the reduction of 
financial flows, carne on top of, and acted in the same 
direction as already existing structural factors. The 
industrial redeployment of the developed economies, a 
conseguence of the extremely rapid and uneven rates of 
technological change which they have experienced in recent 
years, has suffered from áreas of friction and backwardness, 
which have helped to genérate a trend toward unemployment, and 
consequently protectionism, weakening trade even further. 
The conseguences for the región have been catastrophic. A 
sharp deterioration occurred in the terms of trade (more than 
16% between 1981 and 1985); this fact alone entailed a loss of 
resources worth US$ 15 billion in 1985. The rise in interest 
rates also had extremely serious consequences: on the one 
hand, because the rise in the rates were unusual; real rates 
in the last f ive years have been at their highest levéis in 
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the last half century, on the other hand, because the debt was 
extremely large, with the result that interest payments 
exceeded the cost of oil iuports by the developing countries. 
Moreover, international financial flcws were reversed, partly 
as a result of the rise in extemal interest rates, and partly 
as a consequence of the crisis which broke out in the 
econcmies of the región and of the resulting policy changes. 
Thus, bank credit fell by US$ 11.4 billion net in 1982 and 
became negative in 1985; foreign investment fell from US$ 5.2 
billion between 1977 and 1982 to half that sim in 1983 and 
1984, and capital flight became more pronounoed, as can be 
deduoed from indirect estimates. 
Since the middle of 1982, Latin America and the Caribbean 
nave thus faced the deepest intemational crisis since the 
great depression of the 1930s. Fresh solutions nave to be 
sought for this crisis and for its consequences. Should things 
follow their present path, there is every reason for holding 
out the darkest long-term economic and social outlook for the 
región, in accordance with the projections which haye been 
mentioned. Only a sharp stiroulus to world economic growth, 
together with the materialization of mechanisms to alleviate 
the debt burden could be capable of brightening this gloamy 
forecast. 
C. SCME GUIDELINES FOR ACTTON 
Policy should be based on the following premises: 
a) Creditors and debtors share responsibility for the 
inaammensurate expansión of the extemal debt of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
b) The transformation of the debt problem into the 
present crisis is the result of factors (policies applied in 
the industrializad countries, intemational recession, 
protectionism) which are campletely outside the control of the 
countries in the región. 
c) Strategies so far applied to bring about a solution, 
based upon the recessionary readjustment of the economies of 
the región and on case-by-case rescheduling of debt payments, 
do not solve the problem and lead to situations which are 
uribearable for the debtor countries. 
The strategies so far applied have sought to gain time, 
and, in principie, have ignored all of these premises. The 
measures adoptad from 1982 onwards clearly fall into the 
category of measures designed to provide breathing space while 
the normal operation of the world economy resolves the 
problems of rates of interest, terms and volumes of trade. 
They are principally coroposed of case-by-case renegotiation of 
the extemal debt, strengthening of the role played by the 
International Monetary Fund and its asymmetrical condition-
ality guidelínes, and cióse co-ordination between creditors. 
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Successive rounds of renegotiation of the external debt 
have corrected same of the initial shortcomings. Despite 
granting more time for payment of the principal part of the 
débt, the first round of renegotiations, held in 1983, raised 
its cost by increasing margins and commissions. Subsequent 
rounds have eliminated these surcharges and even reduced the 
cost of the debt to a limited extent, by accepting changes in 
the reference rates, lower margins on interest rates, more 
modérate commissions and other expenses connected to the 
process of renegotiation (or their elimination), rescheduling 
of amortization payments over a number of years, longer 
periods of grace and maturity and the possibility of changing 
the currency in which the debt is expressed. The World Bank 
has expanded its joint financing and fpr the first time 
granted partial guarantees which would make it possible to 
lower the risk taken by the country and stimulate increased 
funding from private sources. However, there has been little 
sign of a revival on the part of the latter. 
There is no reason for expecting significantly more from 
case-by-case renegotiation. As was indicated in a study 
carried out by ECTAC,88_/ recent data have quenched same of the 
optimistic expectations inspired by the 1984 results. The 
térros of trade continué to worsen, there is no sign of 
expansión in world trade and rates of interest practised 
remain excessively high for debtors. 
The data used in the above projection clearly suggest the 
need for a radical change in strategy if Latin America and the 
Caribbean are to return to positive rates of economic growth, 
however modest these may be. The conditions prevailing in the 
world econamy, protectionism and interest rates will need to 
undergo a considerable change if the strategies designed to 
gain time are to have a positive long-term impact. In 
addition, heavy further financing would be required. Latin 
America cannot allow its fate to hang on these hopes. It is 
essential to examine strategies which carne to grips with the 
problem immediately and to attempt to lessen its impact. 
This type of strategy is based on serious and responsible 
consideration of the three premises indicated above. In this 
respect, there would seem to be two approaches: restrict debt 
servicing payments in accordance with certain criteria as to 
capacity, or directly reduce such payments. From the financial 
point of view both come down to the same thing, as the first 
apprcach makes it possible to indefinitely accumulate debt 
servicing which is in excess of the limits adopted. 
It is possible to reduce the debt either by lowering 
interests (to below market rates), or by directly reducing the 
principal. In this case too, both measures are the same from a 
financial point of view, although they differ in accounting 
term. As far as the balance of the creditor institutions is 
concerned, reduction of interests is merely reflected over 
time, while a reduction of principal is immediately and fully 
reflected in the balance. This difference may be significant 
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as far as the stability of the creditor institutions is 
concerned. 
A number of proposals have attempted to tackle the 
problem of the extemal debt by limiting servicing in 
accordance with the payment capacity of the debtor. The most 
important of these are set out in the Oaxtepec Communigué and 
that put into practice by the Government of Perú. 
The Oaxtepec Communigué maintains that rules should be 
laid down to provide for the sharing of risks between 
creditors and debtors, and a máximum ceiling established for 
net transfers frcm debtor countries so as to ensure minimum 
growth of their product and allow them to stabilize their 
eoonomies. 
The policy adopted by the Government of Perú consists in 
defining a criterion as to payment capacity in terms of a 
percentage of exporte, in the case of Perú itself, the 
percentage was set at 10%, and payments to institutions which 
grant the country net additional financing above the payment 
reguirement were excluded from the limit. 
Two other types of proposal fall within this same overall 
category: those which propose transforming debt bonds into 
shares in productive capital, and those which suggest 
transforming part of the extemal debt into local currency. 
Ihe f irst of these involves conversión of the debt into shares 
or other securities in the capital of the debtor countries1 
firms. Interest payments are thereby transformed into profit 
transfers (obviously, only if profit is made). In view of the 
sums involved, if this proposal were adopted on a fairly large 
scale it would lead to a notable change in the structure of 
ownership in the debtor countries. Transformation of a 
considerable part of the extemal debt into local currency 
could have similar consequences, which would also have an 
impact on the balance-of-payments trade account, as the local 
currency would probably be directed towards the purchase of 
capital stock and internationally tradeable goods. 
Alternatively, a number of solutions based on a reduction 
of the debt capital have been put forward. This would achieve 
a reduction in the weight of servicing even if interest rates 
did not decline. Ihe proposals to reduce the capital are based 
on the fact that the longer the terms of trade take to improve 
and the rate of interest to decline, the more the problem of 
"liquidity" in debt payment is transformed into a problem of 
"solvency". In accordance with the principie of joint 
responsibility for the generation of the debt, external 
creditors should thus accept part of the corresponding capital 
loss. 
There is a broad range of options for applying this type 
of proposal. Tliey include the conversión of the external debt, 
at lower nominal valúes, into other financial or real assets, 
through market mechanisms, multilateral government measures or 
unilateral action. Another possibility involves promoting the 
establishment of a secondary market on which banks are able to 
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trade their debt certificates. At present, this method has 
been above all applied in the case of the smallest creditor 
banks, and would only constitute relief for debtor countries 
if they themselves recovered their external debt certificates 
at lower prices than on the market. Another mechanism could 
involve transfer of bank certificates to a multilateral body, 
which would exchange them for longer-term bonds at a lower 
valué to that of the existing certificates. 
Proposals which aim to reduce the rates of interest are 
fram a financial point of view equivalent to those which 
involve a reduction of the capital, though it is possible to 
spread their impact on the creditor institutions over a long 
period, provided existing norms do not oblige the latter to 
reflect the full üpact of a fall in the accounting valué of 
these assets. A proposal of this kind is based on the granting 
of an official multilateral guarantee to the external debt, 
which would allow the banks to lower the interests charged in 
exchange for greater portfolio security. 
Other alternatives aim at a more direct reduction in 
interest rates, even should this affect the creditor 
institutions, applying similar mechanisms to the external debt 
to those applied when a creditor bank has to.negotiate with a 
debtor firm facing difficulties over its payments. A proposal 
has also been made to establish a special financing service, 
or to extend an existing service, with the aim of financing 
increases in the interest rates when these are above their 
histórica! averages. Such funding would be granted at a lower 
rate than the market rate, which would automatically lessen 
the debt burden. 
One interesting mechanism would consist of the automatic 
capitalization of interests when the interest rate exceeds a 
certain ceiling. Capitalization would also lighten the debt 
burden in so far as the capitalized interests would not in 
turn genérate interests at the market rate. Interest 
capitalization may be considerad as equivalent to the 
utilization of variable maturity instruments. These make it 
possible to adqpt variable interest rates, while maintaining 
constant payments for servicing, altering the number of 
periods during which debt service payments must be made. Wherv 
rates rise, the debtor's interest payment commitments rise, 
but this increase is offset by lower repayments of principal, 
and the difference is carried forward. This type of instrument 
is extremely limited in its application in the case of 
restructuring the existing external debt; however, it could 
prove attractive for future new loans which would be dealt 
with differently from existing ones. When interest rates are 
above historical averages, interest capitalization solutions 
possess a further advantage: like the financial services 
created to this end, they help to soften the impact of changes 
in international interest rates on the debtor countries. 
A new proposal, which differs from strategies at present 
used was made by the United States Treasury Secretary, 
198 
Mr. James Baker, in October 1985. This involves seeking means 
of achieving further growth of approximately 31 per year in 
the debt accumulated over three years. Financing would be 
provided by the international commercial banks and 
multilateral development banks, in exchange for increased 
conditionality over the use of these funds by the debtors. As 
existing rates of inflation are higher than 3%, the Baker 
prcposal would require a reduction in the real level of the 
debt, and would make it possible to finance only around 
one-third of the interests which the debtor countries must at 
present pay. It would be necessary to cover the remainder with 
a positive trade balance, implying a sustained transfer of 
real resources from the debtor countries towards the 
creditors. 
The proposal also implies a generalization of 
yet-to-be-defined macroeconomic conditionality to all sources 
of funds, which could lead to difficulties with regard to the 
utilization of these funds and high risks resulting fram the 
possibil ity of errors in defining the terms of the 
conditionality. 
Nevertheless, the proposal represents the first 
significant new element in the approach adoptad towards the 
debt by the creditor countries. It recognizes the need for 
determined action by the governments of the industrialized 
countries to seek a solution to the problem of the debt within 
a framework of economic growth in the debtor countries. 
Finally, the alternatives to the existing proposals which 
nave gradually been put forward by the signatories to the 
Cartagena Agreement should be given attention. These 
countries, which include all the región's principal debtors, 
nave began to jointly examine the problem of the external debt 
and to seek a number of common bases for a solution which, in 
so far as possible, does not involve upsetting world financial 
markets. The position adoptad by this group of countries has 
evolved towards increasingly specific proposals, which tend to 
conciliate the aims of economic growth with transfers of real 
and financial resources. 
The signatories to the Cartagena Agreeraent nave put 
forward an Emergency Proposition for negotiations on the 
external debt and growth. This in particular includes the 
return of interest rates to their historical levéis, an 
increase in the flow of funds and differentiation between the 
treatment of the existing debt and that of future debt, with 
the aim of subjecting the latter to market conditions and the 
former to preferential conditions, from debtor's viewpoint. 
One criterion proposed is the maintenance of real levéis of 
credit from commercial banks, and a net annual increase of 20% 
in funds directed towards the región by multilateral-
development bodies. Moreover, it is suggested that 
compensatory financing from the International Monetary Fund be 
extended, so as to offset the impact of exogenous factors such 
as the deterioration in the terms of trade and the persistence 
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of high interest rates. The need to avoid the application of 
oonditionality which obliges the econcray to be adjusted to the 
prevailing external disequilibrium is established. 
Simultaneously, the tight relationship between finance and 
trade is recognized, together with the need for an end to 
protectionist measures which restrict the debtor countries' 
freedam of access to the main world markets. The proposal also 
includes the need to set a ceiling on net transfers of 
resources liriked to a minimum target of growth of product, and 
includes the possibility of limiting debt service payments to 
a proportion of incame from exports. Finally, the proposal 
indicates that unless the set of proposed measures is adopted, 
the región could find itself facing a situation of extreme 
gravity which would necessarily oblige it to limit its net 
transfers of resources in order to avoid increased social and 
political instability which could reverse the processes of 
democratic stabilization. 
In conclusión, it is worth reasserting the notion that 
specific policies are reguired to lighten the debt burden if 
it is wished to help solve the economic crisis affecting the 
región. This is the principal and unavoidable conclusión to be 
drawn from the present situation. 
It might be assumed that with annual growth rates of 
above 4% in the economies of the OECD countries, the debt 
problem might gradually disappear. While such rates of growth 
nave not been unknown in the past, the present instability of 
the world economy gives reason for viewing with skepticism any 
possibility of their being attained and firmly maintained at 
the present time. While the reduction in interest rates and in 
the price of oil point towards a revival, other indicators 
(for example, the United States economy) suggest a trend 
towards stagnation. Mbreover, both protectionism and the 
existing restrictions in international credit markets deny any 
hope that the dynamism of the world econcray, should it retum, 
will be, as before, transmitted to the developing economies. 
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REGIONAL INTEGRATICN AND OOOPERATION 

'•\ i . NBGOTIRIIIGNS AND INSTRÜMEWIS POR KEVTTAIIZINS 
•; RBGIONMa T^ÁÜE 
?
 A. BACKÉK0UND' 
1. Political catnndtments 
As a consequence of the most intense and painful economic 
crisis which latín America has faced since the Great 
Depression, governments have given proof of their political 
determination to take joint action in order to once again 
provide countries with prospects of development, and bf a 
fairer and more symmetrical insertion within the world 
economy. 
The first high-level political declaration is the Quito 
Declaration and the corresponding Plan of Action,¿/ adopted at 
the Latin American Economic Conference in January 1964. This 
Declaration stated: "latin America and the Caribbean are 
facing the most serious and intense economic and social crisis 
of tíu4 oentury, one vhich is characterized by unique and 
uhpareóedented features". "The crisis demands urgent solutions 
by ifieans of joint actions founded on regional co-operation and 
on the forging of a common position aimed at strengthening the 
región's capacity for response". There is no doubt that this 
conference was of particular impórtanos in that it represented 
latin America and the Caribbean's return to the path of unity, 
through an attempt to strengthen their systems of co-operation 
and integration and to revive the regional market as a basis 
for initiating a process of economic revival, founded on the 
efforts of all the countries themselves. 
Many of the proposals made by the Quito Plan of Action 
were subsequently incorporated into the legal regulations of 
AIADI, by resolutions adopted at the Second Meeting of the 
Oouncil of Ministers of the Association, in April 1984. 
Ihe commitments made in the Plan of Action cover the main 
aspects of the región*s extemal trade and establish specific 
guidelines for reviving the integration process. As can be 
seen in table 32, the ¡extent to v*iich these commitinents have 
in practice been fulfilled has been extraordinarily low. 
Moreover, neither have subsequent AIADI resolutions been 
implemehted, despite the ,fact that in a number of cases they 
merely represented nominal commitments. The Regional Tariff 
Pref erence is an excellent example of this type of agreement. 
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Tabte 32 
COMMITMENTS HADE UNDER THE QUITO PLAN OF ACTION FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Ccanitsent 1984-1965 assessaent 
Non-tarfff restrictions 
to intra-Latin Awerican 
trade (NTR) 
- No further introduction of MTR's 
- Elinination or gradual reduction 
of existing NTR's 
Resolut ion 5 of Second Council of ALADI 
Meatoers sets a period of three years 
f o r the eliennation of existing NIR's 
f rcm 27 Apr i l 1984 
I t has ptroved ispossible to bring 
t h i s resolut ion tnto effect 
almost two years after i ts 
approval 
Latín Aserican Regional 
Tartff Preference (RTP) 
Establishment of RTP within ALADI 
Negotiation over the par t ic i -
pation of other Latin Aserican 
and Caribbean countries in RTP 
The Second Council of Ninisters of ALADI 
approves the Regional Agreesent on 
Regional Tar i f f Preference 
The levé is approvad for RTP vary 
between 2 and 10X and i t s f i e l d 
of appl f catión tan restricted as 
a r e s u l t of the lengthy l is ta of 
exceptions def inad by countries 
Bilateral negotiationa Intenslf(catión of bi lateral or 
Multilateral trade negotiationa for 
the purpose of achlevtng a rapid 
increase in regional trada 
A round of negotiationa uas to be 
launched within ALADI in Apri l 
1986 
Tabla 32 (concl.) 
1984-1985 atsessaent 
Gcvernaent procureaant Proaotion of operational aechaniaas aaklng 
i t poaaible to take advantage of governaant 
procuraacnt eapaclty by seeking to iaport 
frca regional suppliers 
A regional preference in favour of Latin 
Aaerican and Caribbean suppliers and 
corporationa through publlc tender 
No progresa haa been aade touards 
redirecting governaant procureawnt or 
applylng preference to regional 
suppliers 
Naking use of regional 
supply and deaand for 
Taking advantage of regional supply and 
üeauíri to faci l í tate purchases and sales 
of the región within the región i tself ; 
to intensify industrialization and to 
subetitute extra-regional imports 
Creation of Latin Aaerican aarketing enterprises 
Creation of an efficient system of trade inforaation 
Uhfulf i l led 
Counterpurchase Analysis of existing opportunities 
for counterpurchase 
No significant agreenents have tiaen 
reached in this área. 
National legislation is incoaplete 
and restrict iva with regard to t h l s 
Strangthaning of 
coapensatory aachania 
laprovenent and extensión of the coverage 
of the system of recipracal payaent and eredlt 
Strengthening of export financing •echantsas 
unaaterialized projects exist u f t h f n 
ALAD1 
The Declaration of the Mcticévideo Meeting in March 1985, 
signad by Presidents and high-level governaient representa-
tives, reasserted the urgent need to modify the prevaillng 
iramdbility.2/ The Declaration stated that "A practical means 
of asserting this solidarity is to combine efforts to make use 
of the broad channel open to reciprocal trade in the región to 
make use of the area's own internal bargaining power for its 
own benefit and to restore the valué of the latin American 
market for latin Americans, in so far as possible redirecting 
our purchasing power towards our own suppliers", 
As eme means of materializing these aspiratdons, it was 
stated: "We undertake to carry out this year a round of 
negotiations to prenote greater reliance on regional supplies, 
endeavouring to satisfy national demand for goods and services 
with growing amcunts of produets fren our own countries under 
fair trading oonditions". The regional round of negotiations 
will begin with a high-level political naeting between the 
member countries of AIADI, vhich will be neld in Buenos Aires 
from 7-11 April 1986. Its aims will be to approve the 
definitive agenda of the round, to set its opening date and 
define a timetable for the meetings to be héld and the 
political guidelines for regional co-operation which will 
govern them. 
2. The evolutjon of intra-rectional trade 
Estimates available for 1985 indicate tnat the región1 s 
external trade continúes to display adverse trends. latin 
American importa shrunk by 2%, after having undergone a slight 
reoovery in 1984. Exporta in turn declined by approximately 
6%, after an 11% increase in 1984. 
In 1981 intra-regianal trade reached 16 228 million 
current dollars. Three years later it only represented 
US$ 11 443 million. Estimates for 1985 revea! that a further 
decline of approximately 5% pxobably oceurred. The relative 
importance of intra-regional exporta in comparison with total 
exporte declined from 16.6% to 11.7% between 1981 and 1984. 
The declining dynamism of trade within the integración 
programmes has been widespread, and such trade has been of 
less importance within total trade. The market of the various 
integración programmes has displayed a disturbing recessive 
trend. In any case, the levéis of trade attained in 1984 were 
lower than those recorded at the beginning of the decade. The 
relative scale of trade within each programme has also 
cansiderably declined. The Central American Oommon Market 
(CACM), which under normal circumstances handled more than 20% 
of the area's trade, in 1984 merely represented 16.6%, which 
gives an idea of the scale of the prcblems affecting 
reciprocal trade. Similar trends were apparent within AIADI 
and the Andean Group, while the decline of trade among member 
countries of CARICEM was less pronounced (see table 33). 
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Table 33 
LATIM AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAM: EXPORTS BETUEEN IMTEGRATION ORGANI2ATIONS, 
INTRA-REGIONAL AND TOTAL EXPORTS 
( H i U i o n s of current d o l l a r s . FOB) 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 o / 1 9 8 4 o / 
ALAPI 
Total exports 
Exports to Latin America 
Percentages of exports to 
Latin America/total 
Exports withfn ALADI 
Percentages of exports 
within ALADl/total 






9 388.7 13 786.7 29 664.2 44 630.1 















60 729.0 79 569.1 87 040.9 80 737.8 
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10 047 .6 
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8 0 4 6 . 6 
9 .1 
80 .1 
Andean Group b/ 
Total exports 
Exports to Latin America 
Percentages of exports to 
Latin America/total 
Exports within the 
Andean Group 
Percentages of exports within 
the Andean Group/total 
Percentages of exports within 
the Andean Group/exports 
to Latin America 
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4 186 .8 
8 8 1 . 0 
Table 33 (concl.) 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 a/ 1984 a/ 
Percentages of exports to 
Latín America/total 
Exports within CACM 
Percentages of exports within 
CACH/total 




































































































Exports to Latin America 
Percentages of exports to 
Latin America/total 
Percentages of exports 
within CARICOM 
Percentages of exports within 
CARICOM/tota l 
Percentages of exports within 
CARICOM/exports to 
Latin America 66.9 83.5 68.8 58 .2 59 .4 5 5 . 1 51.9 66.2 63.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean d/ 
Total exports 8 532.5 11518.6 15 212.2 36 182.8 52 712.2 70 265.6 9 1 3 2 5 . 7 97 9 5 6 . 8 89 858.4 90 895.4 97 636.1 
Intra-regional trade 749.9 1275.3 1969.7 5 964.8 8 536.5 1 1 5 8 3 . 3 13 8 8 2 . 9 16 227 .9 13 481.3 10 696.9 11 443.3 
Percentage of intra-regional 
trade/total 8.8 11.1 12.9 16.5 16.2 16.5 15.2 1 6 . 6 15.0 11.8 11.7 
Source: ECLAC, en the basis of off icial data. 
a/ Estimates. 
b/ Excluding Chile. 
c/ Only includes Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
3/ Including 11 ALA0I countries, five CACM countries, four CARICOM countries, Panamá and the Donrinican Republ ic . 
To sum up, the regional narket and that of each 
integratian programne in particular failed to soften the 
impact of the international crisis, and constituted an 
increasingly small portion of overall trade. It preved 
difficult to sell a large number of produets on other roarkets, 
theréby aooentuating the recession, partlcularly in the sector 
exporting nanufactured goods. 
Moreover, the international setting renains unfavourable 
for Latin America and the Caribbean. The región has beccroe a 
net exporter of furris, the high levéis of external 
indebtedness have nade it nacessary to adopt highly 
recessionary readjustment policies and protectionist 
trenas have becoma inore pronounoed in the central 
oountries, rendering even inore difficult the necessary 
expansión of exports. All of these factors aggravate 
the political, economic and social conditions facing 
oountries. Tnere exists a broad consensus within the 
región that even the major countries will be unable to 
meet on their own the ccmplex challenges facing then at the 
present tima. Consequently regional unity represents a 
necessity for all, whatever the economic and political models 
which each may choose in accordance with its own natianal 
reality. 
ttoreover, experience has demonstrated the need to act 
simultaneausly in both the international and the intra-
regional spheres, if there is to be any hope of making use of 
regional bargaining capacity to counteract protectionist 
trends and improve the terms and conditions of negotiatians on 
the external debt. Any effort in this direction wculd need to 
be based upan the Latin American market's potential for 
handling its own flows of trade. Proper use of the regional 
narket inplies a considerable change of attitude as has been 
stressed time and time again at many high-level political 
forums. Consequently, it is time for Latin America and the 
Carihbean to begin drawing up the political mandates. In 
other words, priority must be given to full utilization of 
the countries' own resouroes, by setting up as autonomous 
as possible a system for intra-regional trade, capable 
of contributing to national efforts at revival and 
development. 
Another important background factor vihich must be borne 
in mind is the pressure which a number of developed countries 
are exerting for the organization of a new round of negotia-
tions on goods, external investment, technology and sezvices. 
With regard to this latter item in particular, the majority of 
the countries in the región still lack a olear positian with 
regard to their interests and potential, despite the fact that 
the Tenth Latin American Council stated that this new round of 
negotiatians will be held in a oontext dominated by managed 
trade, which should spur the región into adopting a cemmon 
positian. If this is to be achieved, it is essential that the 
región strengthen its own internal economic links. 
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B. AIMS AND OOÜRSES OF ACITON POR A POSSIBLE 
REGIONAL NBGOTIATICN 
1. NeqotiatiiKT framework 
It has been acknowledged within AIADI that "regional rounds of 
negotiations represent the f orum in which member countries 
will endeavour to transform these declarations (in political 
agreeraents) into measures, action and prograitroes to facilítate 
sustained reoovery and expansión in their reciprocal trade and 
galvanizo the integration process, by means of solutions which 
take into account the unfavourable circumstances affecting the 
región".3/ 
Achieving these airas, which have been agreed upan and 
encouraged by the governments themselves, reguires the 
simultanecus adoption of measures designed to: 
i) augment and stimilate intra-regional trade so as to 
reoover at least the 1981 levéis as rapidly as possible; and 
ii) define a coherent policy for removing regional barriers, 
i.e., involve all Iatin American and Caribbean countries in 
these efforts, in aocordance with article 25 of the 1980 
Montevideo Treaty, and with the political mandates indicated 
above. 
In arder to make proper use of regional potential, 
resolute political determination is required both at the 
gcvernmental level and on the part of operational agents, so 
as to considerably increase the levéis of regional supply and 
restore as quickly as possible the levéis of trade reached at 
the begirming of the decade. Efforts should also be directed 
at generating an intensive expansión of intra-regional trade, 
in arder that it may achieve autonomous growth. 
In order to achieve these ends, in the short tezm 
governments could take decisions designed to spark off a 
process of concertation and negotiations possessing the 
aforementioned characteristics. The above-mentioned meeting 
high-level govemmental political representatives, which will 
be organized by AIADI from 7-11 April this year could provide 
the starting point for this process of negotiation. Within a 
process of this kind and scope, it is vital that participation 
from the ministries responsible for extemal trade as well as 
from the main State enterprises be of the highest executive 
level. It is also important that the heads of the central 
banks make a determined commitment to the objectives of the 
process. Oonsequently, from the very beginning every appro-
priate body in each country should become involved, both in a 
political and operational sense, as this is the only way of 
ensuring the required viability for the process and of short-
ening the time required to transform declarations into action. 
An examination of the trend in reciprocal trade, and in 
particular of the deterioration experienced since 1982 reveáis 
which lines of trade have been most affected by the regional 
216 
crisis. Thus, fea: exaitple, AIADI has cteerved that the most 
marted declines in trade are to be found in trade between 
Argentina, Brazil and México with the other ocuntries. It 
follows that an initial analysis vithin AIADI could centre en 
the potential for trade between medium-sized and less 
developed ocuntries an the one hand, and the three largest 
oountries on the other. There are three reasons for this: 
firstly, trade between Argentina, Brazil and México (AERAMEX) 
and the other AIADI member oountries has constituted and still 
constitutes the majar share of intra-regional trade; secondly, 
the imbalance in trade within AIADI is basically due to the 
relationship between these two groups of oountries, and 
thirdly, it was principally this relationship which was 
affected by the slump in intra-regional trade between 
1981-1983. 
Another área of trade which has deteriorated is that of 
trade between medium-sized countries and less econcmically 
developed countries. As mentioned above, within the Andean 
Group, the CACM and to a lesser extent CARICOM, there has been 
a maríoed slump in trade between the main member oountries of 
each subregional organizatian. Probably the most striking case 
is that of the Andean Group, sinoe in addition, there has been 
a marked failure to apply the instruments designad to foment 
trade. 
Just as it is quite obvious that the negotiating precess 
must be basad on the principal axes of regional trade, it is 
also logical that it concéntrate on those flows which possess 
or which may possess the greatest potential for trade between 
all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
This requires that indicators or levéis of reference be 
given with regard to potential armual trade. If those 
countries which import most express their determination to 
purchase certain voluntes of selected produets within the 
región, this will rapidly instígate the process of 
oonsultation through the application of a new negotiating 
style centred on enoouraging the revival or creation of 
enduring intra-regional trade flows. 
In order to initiate the process in the roarmer described 
above —principal axes and countries which import a great 
deal— it is necessary for the largest countries in the región 
to manifest their intention to purchase therefrem and thereby 
to assume the leadership of the initiative. This requires that 
the initiative be given full political support and that 
high-level technical teams particípate in order to bring it 
into effect. The natural partners for such a precess would be 
the Andean Group, CACM and CARIOCM, which, in associatian with 
the other member countries of AIADI are capable of previding 
adaguaba levéis of supply of a number of produets to satisfy a 
high proportion of the demand emanating from the largest 
countries in the región. 
The fact that Brazil and México, and to a lesser extent 
Argentina, which represent the largest countries in the región 
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possess considerable control over their external trade and are 
capable of decidedly influencing the origin and destinatian of 
their imports and exports constitutes a major consideration. 
Consequently, such capacity could help raaterialize those trade 
flows which would in the long run be covered by the 
negotiations. 
If the negotiations are to be initiated with the basic 
alia of restoriñg and creating new trade flows, it will be 
necessary to alter measures which restrict this alia. It would 
first of all be necessary to define integral projects for 
negotiation and secondly, to identify precisely vhich measures 
could ensure the viability of these trade flows. Such an 
approach would be in perfect harmony with the propositions set 
out in the various political agreements and, moreover, would 
be compatible with the flexibility characteristic of the 1980 
Montevideo Treaty, should this be adopted as the nucleus of a 
series of regional negotiations. Ihis would provide countries 
with a sufficiently broad frame of action, allowing them to 
choose a combination of measures to guarantee the negotiations 
as well as the trade flows on which agreements were to be 
reached therein. The ad hoc adoption of the necessary measures 
would minimize interference with national policies as well as 
with governmental agreements with other countries or outside 
bodies (GATT or IMF, for example). 
In order to choose the products or groups of products 
which would be covered by the proposed negotiations it is 
necessary to set out a number of options. The main 
consideration in determining the choice should be to ensure 
fixed levéis of trade together with a viable structure for 
redirecting exchange.4/ 
In this way, it would be possible to combine conditions 
of potential supply and demand ensuring a specific 
reorientation of trade. Such demand should in so far as 
possible be satisfied by an expansión in exportable supply, 
and efforts should be made to avoid a shrinkage in exports to 
third-party countries. In addition, demand in the largest 
countries should include products which the other countries in 
the región export to the rest of the world, since they offer a 
degree of campetitiveness which would make it easier to bring 
about the process. 
2. Specific necrotiatim factors 
In addition to being highly selective and concentrating on the 
most significant types of trade, reorientating exchange 
towards Latín American and Caribbean suppliers should help to 
solve a number of major problems in the region's extemal 
trade. One of these concerns commodities which are 
experiencing a significant drop in demand and in prices. It 
consequently seems reasonable to satisfy as large a part as 
possible of regional requirements by creating a relatively 
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stable market and lowering transport and Insurance costs. A 
number of studies reveal the existence of considerable scope 
for redirecting trade in these products. For exanple, in 1984, 
according to figures provided by 0ECD,5/ countries in this 
organization imported approximately US$ 26 billion worth of 
goods frcm Latin America and the Caribbean. At the same time 
the región's imports of these same products reached 
US$ 2.5 billion. Agricultural products, and in particular 
purchases of soya bean and soya bean oil mate up 80% of these 
purchases; in 1984, these represented more than 
US$ 1.2 billion. Purchases of meat, túitoer, leather and irán 
ore are also significant. The región is a net exporter of 
these products and consequently, it seems quite feasible to 
considerably lower its imports frcm outside countries. 
Such imports constitute approximately 22% of total intra-
regional trade and around 32% of trade between AIADI member 
countries. 
A second major feature concerns the utilization of the 
States1 purchasing power. Estimates made by the Institute for 
Latin American Integration (INTAL) evalúate State imports in 
1982 at an average of 40% of total external purchases.6/ 
Subsequent studies reveal that out of the US$ 71 billion worth 
of imports made by AIADI member countries in that year, 
purchases by State-owned entities constitute approximately 
US$ 29 billion. If imports of fuel (US$ 14.5 billion) and 
agricultural products (US$ 5.5 billion) are excluded, there 
remain approximately US$ 9 billion of which a high proportion 
are manufacturad goods. For a number of technical reasons it 
is not possible to provide projections relating to recent 
years. Nonetheless, these figures provide a rough estímate 
frcm which it is possible to oonclude that if such trade were 
redirected towards regional supply it would nave a significant 
reactivating impact upon the proctuctive sector. 
A third problem concerns revival of the industrial 
sector. The shrinkage both in demand and in the availability 
of currency nave had a marked impact upon this sector's 
evolution, and consequently measures such as the above would 
contribute towards easing its predicament. Reactivation in 
this sector needs to be conceived and designad so as to 
improve opportunities for industry, so that their impact may 
be of benefit to all countries. 
With regard to those countries in the región which 
possess a more developed industrial sector, intra-regional 
exports of manufactured goods could provide an opportunity for 
intensifying and rounding off the process of industrialization 
which has already taken place, particularly with regard to 
intermedíate inputs for the manufacturing sector itself and 
for those manufacturing sectors which are closely linked to 
it, as well as in capital goods. As far as those countries 
with médium to low levéis of industrial development are 
concerned, exports may enable them to specialize in those 
áreas in which they already possess camparatlve advantages or 
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in which it may be possible to bring sudh advantages into 
being on the basis of the most significant doraestic demand, 
such as for example, mining, agriculture, fishing and other 
basic sectors, or by directing manufacturing production 
towards mass-produced consumer goods. So far, attempts in the 
región to harmonize development with industrial activity have 
left much to be desired, but this in no way means that it is 
not worthwhile and even necessary to strive to achieve this. 
It should be remembered that the basis of the European 
Boonomic Coraraunity was the Steel and Goal Qanmunity, which at 
the time represented strategic sectors for cxansolidating 
European industrialization. Conseguently, it would be 
desirabie to bring about co-ordination in those branches of 
industry which are crucial for sustaining more autonomous and 
dynamic growth in this sector. A clear and intense effort to 
direct intra-regional trade flows in manufactured goods could 
contribute to achieving this. 
Clearly, there is considerably more potential for exports 
from the less-developed and smaller countries towards the rest 
of the región than in the opposite directian. This may 
restrict any attempt to expand intra-regional trade. 
Oonseguently, as is the case in the majority of integration 
treaties and in the various political agreements, it would be 
necessary to specify special treatment for medium-sized and 
less developed countries. 
Imbalances in trade are due to a variety of causes. The 
heterogeneity of countries1 productive output, the varied 
levéis of development, the considerable importanoe of a number 
of products, such as petroleum, for example, are same of the 
reasons which account for countries having trade déficits or 
surpluses within an integration system. It is necessary to 
bear this in mind in preparing the negotiations to revive 
reciprocal trade, in order to ensure that it does not hamper 
the recovery of trade and the expansión of new trade flows. 
The problem of imbalances is more significant in the case 
of those products in which trade is protected by customs 
preferences, which means that intra-regional imports are more 
costly than imports from outside countries. Oonseguently, it 
is desirabie that a relative balance be attained in such 
trade, at least in the médium term. 
On the other hand, such merchandise trade as is carried 
out on egual terms to those prevailing in the international 
market will show similar imbalances to those which exist 
between each individual country and the rest of the world. A 
number of commodities provide excellent examples. Increasing 
regional supplies of oil, copper or wheat, etc. neither 
increase ñor reduce trade balances if the transactions are at 
international prices. The same hol.j:- true for a number of 
manufactured goods and inputs which it may from time to time 
be possible to purchase within the región, to satisfy the 
particular reguirements of a country, and which are not 
protected by preferential trade terms involving higher costs. 
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A final feature of particular ixoportance is the 
necessarily multilateral manner in which the issue of the 
trade balance must be dealt with, since a bilateral approach 
may have extremely restrictive results. In view of the 
economic characteristics of countries, it is understandable 
that certaiii disequilibria exist between a certain nvniber of 
them taken two by two, although such inbalances may be offset 
within a multilateral arrangement. 
It is impossible to consider trade in isolatipn fren 
problems of payment and finance. These factors may either 
facilítate or act as a brake on trade negotiations. AIADI and 
CACM have been examining a number of options in this respect 
for a certain period of time. Particular attention was given 
to this issue at the Latín American Economic Canference where 
the Council of Ministers adepted a special resoluticm on the 
subject, although a solution has yet to be found. 
Consequently, it seems appropriate for the countries which 
prometed this measure for financing trade to instígate a 
movement with similar political thrust involving active 
participation on the part of the central banks. In saite of 
this, it is liXely that solutions to problems of funding and 
credit of a general nature will be out of step w.th the 
adoption of arrangements concerning trade. In order ta solve 
the problem resulting therefrom it is vital that the hsads of 
the central banks meanwhile contribute towards the pref aration 
of suitable formulas for increasing trade in the goods which 
are the subject of negotiations, in accordance wdth the 
prevailing circumstances in the región. Ihey shouüd also 
examine the posslbility of injecting further funds to iticrease 
the system's liquidity. 
The proposed system would initially be set up witiin the 
sphere of AIADI, but would in no way be exclusive. On the 
oontrary, from the regional viewpoint it is increasingly 
urgent that a determined and systematic policy be put into 
operation, with different levéis of intensity, so as to 




II. THE SEARCH FOR MDDES OF OCNVERSENCE BBIWEEN 
INTEGRATTON AND CO-OPERAJTON 
A. THE OCNCEPTS OF INTEGRATION AMD OD-OPERATION AND A 
NUMHER OF ÁREAS OF DIVERGENCE 
Hiere are no broadly accepted interpretations of the tenas 
integration and oo-operation; cxsnsequently, nelther is there a 
clearly marked border between these concepts. They frequently 
appear to be synonymous. On other occasions, they signify 
different approacíies within a single prooess or set of 
circunstancies. For a number of people, oo-operation is the 
antechamber of integration; such a relationship acknowledges a 
degree of evolution as well as degrees of or possibilities for 
oonvergenoe. For others, there is an opposition between both 
ooncepts and however far they are explored, they nay in no way 
meet. 
Etymologically speaking, integration is the act and 
impact of integrating, i.e., oompleting by additian of parts 
or making up the parts wnich lack to make up a vínole. 
Co-operatian, on the other hand, represents the act and 
consequences of co-operating, i.e., of working together with 
one or several others to achieve the same end. 
The use nade of these terms at the international level 
reveáis somei*at clearer distinctions. IJie concept of 
integration is directly associated to external trade, and is 
confined to the legal norms laid dcwn by GA3T. Conseguently, 
it alnost exclusively designates the concepts of free trade 
área, custcms unión or ccramon market. 
Broad use is made of the concept of co-operation by 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Prior 
to 1971, this constituted the central feature of the process 
of links and interdependence pursued in order to consolidate 
mutual economic relations. The subseguent adoption of 
the "Programme for deepening and inproving collaboration 
and developing socialist economic integration" states that 
v*en "co-operation in the economic, scientific and technical 
spheres is intensified, integratio: strides forward".7/ In 
other words, co-operation is conceiv^d as part of an overall 
process of integration. 
Broad and varying use is also roade of the concept of 
oo-operation in the international sphere. It constitutes a set 
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of norms and principies which generally regulates economic 
relations between nations. With regard to links between 
developed and developing countries, typical examples are norms 
such as preferential terms of trade, non-discriitiination and 
official development assistance. Such measures are clearly 
voluntary and their aims are not always met. Recent trends in 
the international economy nave jeopardized a whole set of 
principies which once were of considerable importance. 
In particular, the concept of co-operation has been 
adopted within the frameworic of economic relations between 
developing countries. Economic co-operation (ECD) and 
technical co-operation (TCD) between these countries has 
beccme an increasingly vital element for stimilating South-
South relations. Sucii co-operation, which also extends to 
other developing regions, is not the concern of this article, 
as the analysis has centred on intra-Latin American relations 
alone. Ñor is the guestion of what is known as "hemispheric 
co-operation" dealt with, as this is preferably fomented 
within the frameworic of QAS. United States1 participatian 
endows this initiative with special features, different frcm 
those which are the concern of this article. 
As a starting point, it is necessary to focus attention 
exclusively on the regional sphere and begin examining the 
viability of greater convergence between the spheres of 
integration and co-operation, so that both types of action may 
as far as possible be directed at similar aims. 
Simultaneously, greater inter-penetration and interaction 
between the organizations active in each sphere is desirable. 
Cohén and Rosenthal §/ have stated that "although so much 
has been written on the subject of integration, 
interpretations of what it implies are far frcm unifonn". They 
identify four simplified levéis of definition, ranging from 
"the total abolition of customs barriers between different 
national economic units (the partial elimination of such 
barriers would be only economic 'co-operation,)" to "the 
unification of several economies in a single whole, with total 
mobility of factors within this expanded economy, and total 
unification of policies under the direction of centralized 
institutions". 
The authors conclude: "For the parpóse of t^6 present 
note, any set of joint activities, promoted by common 
institutions, which raises the level of economic 
interdependence among a group of countries may be considered 
an integrating process. The degree of intensity of this 
prccess will be as great or as limted as the member countries 
may desire". 
In practice, in the región the concept of economic 
integration has been associated with the conventional aims of 
a free-trade zone, customs unión or common market. The most 
advanced stages involve a certain number of supranational 
features which governments have usually been reluctant to 
accept; when these have been partly accepted, they have been 
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subject to tight restrictions. This is the case in the Central 
American Camión Market (CACM) or the Andean Grocq?, which 
possess a nunfcer of these features. In both cases, such 
features were the outcaie of the evolution which they 
underwent, and not the result of a delibérate initial design. 
Regardless of the supranational aspects, which are 
themselves a complex issue, there is no doubt that within 
Latin America the concept of integration has always been 
closely associated with the expansión of markets and 
oonsequently with the abolition of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers. It is assumed that a unified economic zone would 
make it possible to mate full use of economies of scale with 
the conseguent increases in output and productivity. Generally 
speaking, it was thought that the creation of a broad market 
structure would, through free competition, provide a healthy 
stimulus for the eoonomic development of the associated 
countries, particularly in the industrial sector. It was thus 
accepted that the expanded market of the integrated countries, 
and the free interplay of supply and demand would constitute 
the most efficient factors in the process of resouroe 
allocation. 
A number of oanpensatory mechanisms were adoptad by the 
CACM and the Andean Group, such as the Régime for Industries 
in Central American Integration and the Sectoral Programmes 
for Industrial Development. These mechanisms, which acted at 
the level of specific projects, were designed to act as a 
complement to the action of the market and facilítate egui-
table distribution of the benefits of integration. Regret-
tably, extremely limited use was made of these instruments, 
and in both cases, with varying degrees of intensity, preferí 
ence was given to a commercial approach which finally became 
the most characteristic feature of latin American integration. 
To sum up, integration plans centred their efforts on 
designing and putting into practice all the necessary 
mechanisms to facilitate the expansión of markets, such as the 
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, a oommon external 
tariff, compensatory payments systems, etc. It wasassumed that 
this would spark off a gradual and cumulative process which 
would bring about successive stages of increasing intensity. 
Harmonization of certain basic policies in the field of 
external trade would make it possible to oo-ordinate other 
policies and in the long term culminate with the establisnment 
of subregional economic units. 
This was at the root of the "universal" visión of 
integration and the implicit assumption that it would almost 
automatically become a major factor in the conception and 
execution of national policies or plans. Conseguently, there 
also aróse an erroneous assumption as to the irreversible 
nature of the process. These visions as a whole helped 
genérate excessive expectations with regard to the progress 
actually made, which, although significant, remained 
considerably more modest. 
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With varying degrees of importance and emphasis, this 
view predominated within the región for a considerable period 
of time. It basically represented an imitative approach which, 
to sane degree, aimed at reproducing within Latin America a 
number of the institutional features of intemational 
relations, principally between developed countries. Thus, for 
example, the structure of the Montevideo Treaty by which AIALC 
was set up, was particularly influenoed by the norms of GAIT. 
In other more advanoed cases, the EEC provided a model. 
However, the traditional approach merely facilitated the 
reproduction of norms of a conmercial nature. Sectoral 
approaches, such as the European Coal and Steel Cammunity 
first, and the agricultural ccsnmunity second, were neither 
considered ñor correctly applied. 
The tendency to identify integration and free trade led 
to a restrictive view of the potential of concerted regional 
actian. Econcmic interdependence was almost exclusively viewed 
from the oonmercial viewpoint, and success or failure was 
measured in terms of the evolution of reciprccal trade. In 
many cases, it was forgotten that the direction of trade and 
fluctuations in its level are the similtaneous result of a 
number of factors, and that the measures chosen to bring about 
integration only affect same of these, and not always the most 
significant. 
As a result of this conceptual inflexibility, several 
initiatives, preferably of a sectoral nature, aimed at 
increasing interdependence between countries were described as 
being nothing more than co-operation. In other vrords, the 
orthodox view of integration assigned them a smaller role, as 
they lacked "universal" character. In addition, this directly 
called into question co-operation itself, both from a 
conceptual and an instrumental angle. This erroneous 
interpretation also led to assumptions as to the impossibility 
of convergence between the two processes. 
Practioe revealed that the identification of integration 
with free trade did not reflect the región 's historical 
political and economic reality. In so far as new and far-
reaching áreas of turbulence appear every day in the 
intemational environment, and affect the regional setting, 
such identification appears even more inadeguate. The search 
for new alternatives gives priority to the concept of 
co-operation, or otherwise to the concept of integration in a 
far less conventional sense than in the past. 
B. THE CRISIS OF INIEGRATION AND THE RISE 
OF OO-OPERAITON? 
The actual evolution of integration processes, viewed from the 
above standpoint, began to reveal sharp contradictions shortly 
after they began to move towards the fulfillment of their 
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respective adiós. The benefits of the procesa were not shared 
cut equitably: as vas to be expected, the most developed 
countries reaped most of the advantages. The less developed 
countries had practically no supply of exportable goods, and 
oonsequently were denied acoess to the new markets. In its 
most orthodox and oonventional approach, integration failed to 
instígate a dynamic prooess leading to its transformation into 
a factor of sane importance for the design and application of 
the principal national economic policies. On the contrary, it 
became an end in itself thereby accentuating its distance from 
the reality of countries. The rigid instruraentalist approach 
oould not claim to superimpose itself on national policies or 
to modify them, ñor oould the scanty conmitments actually nade 
draw operational agents to their cause. Simultaneously, it 
proved impossible to break the vicious circle set up by the 
insignificanoe of intra-regional trade, inadeguate to justify 
any subordination of the relevant national policies to the aim 
of integration. 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the crisis was widespread. 
AIALC was endeavouring to reassemble, altering its course by 
means of the Caracas Protocol. Ihe conflict between 
EL Salvador and Honduras had grave repercussions for the CACM. 
Hope centrad on the political thrust and on the innovative 
structure which was beginning to see light with the Andean 
Group. 
Towards the beginning of the 1970s, awareness of the 
crisis was sharpened by external factors. ihe inconvertibility 
of the dollar, the slack growth of international trade, the 
rise in oil prices constituted factors which among others 
began to bring about substantive changes in established 
international economic patterns and to nave a negative impact 
upon the regional economic outlook. 
In a number of cases, as pointed out by Rosenthal 9/ for 
Central America, the "crisis" of integration did not concern 
so much the distance between aims and achievements as the 
divergence between achievements and expectatians. 
Circumstances were different in the case of other prograitmes. 
Real crises broJce out —and still persist— undermining the 
conceptual cperating bases of integration. In a large number 
of cases, these crises prevented the instrumental measures 
which would bring the bread market into being from reaching 
culmination; reversáis even oceurred in the processes, and 
agreements which had been painstakingly achieved were 
cancelled. Ihe way was open for excessively bilateral flcws 
which, by definition, run oounter to the type of 
multilateralism inherent in the integration processes which it 
had been attempted to construct in latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
Ihe roots of the crisis affectinc integration are to be 
found in its inability to adapt and respond to the new 
circumstances affecting trends in the international eoonomy. 
Ohis is why countries gradually redirected their efforts 
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temareis bilateral or sectoral arrangements, within a new 
conceptual and instrumental framework closer to the inore 
traditional form of co-operation. 
Moreover, it must be recognized that, particularly during 
the previous decade, the región faced an extraordinarily 
complex set of circumstances which, in addition to modifying 
the political structa», contad a hignly hostile environraent 
for the promotion of latin toerican interdependence. Powerful 
political movemants basad on the doctrine of national 
security, the adoption of neo-liberal models taken to their 
extreme, and easy access to funds, directed government —and 
entreprenrairial — action along diametrically opposed paths to 
those leading to regional unity. 
The need to créate and intensify regional 
interdependence, both for political and econenic reasons, "led 
to the increasing popularity in Latin America of a more 
pragmatic approach to integration, which a nuntoer of authors 
designated as "informal integration" or "integration by 
projeets", which occasionally renounced the universal approach 
and final airas, and replaced, or ccmplemanted them, with joint 
action in those áreas of economic activity in which there «as 
scope for co-operation between two or more countries. This 
approach no doubt exerted considerable influence over the 
conception of SEIA, as well as that of A1ADI".10/ 
It was in the energy sector that this new approach began 
to take shape. The international environment became 
increasingly unsettled as a result of the problematic outlook 
for energy at the beginning of the last decade. Although the 
latin American State Petroleum Enterprises Mutual Aid 
Associatian (ARPEL) had indeed been in existence since 1964, 
the scale of the problem required a comprehensive political 
framework for concertation. The Lima Agreement, by which the 
latin American Energy Organization (OIADE) was set up, was 
signad in November 1973 after speedy negotiations, and was 
open to all sovereign States in latin America and the 
Caribbean who desired to join. Thus, an extreme interpretation 
of subregionalism carne to an end, and a pluralist dialogue 
began concerning the principal problems in the energy sector. 
lhe change in conceptual approach was no easy matter. 
«hile the Lima Agreement introduced a set of innovative 
measures in the regional sphere, the Agreement itself, and to 
a much greater extent OIADE's First Programme of Work, were 
heavily influenced by conventional forms of integration. In 
the short term, priority was given to the creation of a latín 
American energy market and the establishment of a financial 
organization to carry out projeets in the energy field as well 
as others directly connected with energy. The organization's 
functions included offsetting, on the Latin American market, 
any eventual maladjustments resulting from the different 
amounts of resources available. 
The first major reorganization of the pperational and 
conceptual base of OIADE carne to an end in 1980, with the 
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adcption of the San José Declaration, v*iich established an 
operational programas of work. This organization's experienoe 
indicates that a considerable period of time was necessary 
before settling upon ths main guidelines for developing co-
operation in the energy field. 
Simultaneously, a number of mechanisms for co-operation 
bagan to appear. These included the Latin American and 
Caribbean Group of Sugar-Exporting Oountries (GEPEACEA), the 
Union of Banam-Exporting Ocuntries (UBEC) and the 
Hultinational Caribbean Shipping Line (NAMUCAR), which 
constitute the inmediate background for the programme of 
co-operation established as part of SEIA's Action Committee. 
After 1975, these became regular Instruments for promoting 
co-operation. During SEIA's first five years of existence nine 
ccranittees were set up, covering a variety of major sectors. 
Sane of these culminated with the creation of a permanent and 
autonamous co-operation agency (in the case of fertilizers, 
the Latin American Hultinational Fertilizer Marketing 
Corporation, MULTCFERT; in that of fishing, the Latin American 
Organization for the Developmant of Fishing, OLDEPESCA). 
Others completed their activities after having partly 
fulfilled their airas within a fixed term (Guatemala and 
Nicaragua). In the case of other Committees it proved 
impossible to establish a sound framework for co-operation and 
their activities proved fruitless, as in the case of food 
supplements. 
The phase of review and the search for further 
alternatives culminated with the signing of the Montevideo 
Treaty in 1980, which established the Latin American 
Integration Association (AIADI). lilis Association concentrates 
on expanding trade between its members. It has renounced 
traditional approaches and opened the way for a new style or 
form of integration, or more correctly, of trade co-operation 
in Latín America. 
C. CHARACIERISTTCS AND O0NDITIONS OF REGIONAL 
CO-OPERATION 
Efforts to bring about co-operation in Latín America and 
the Caribbean display a wide variety of experiences 
covering a diversity of sectors and approaches. Naturally, 
a number of initiatives have had satisfactory results, 
others failed to mature and same proved negative. With 
regard to co-operation itself, crises also occurred in 
expectations, as well as real crises and complex processes 
of consolidation. It is far from easy to provide an overall 
description of the broad range of experience; however, 
it is possible to identify a number of requirements for 
regional co-operation on the basis of the various attempts 
so far made: 
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a) The principies of equality, sovereignty and 
independence of States, of solidarity and non-intervention in 
domestic matters, and of respect for the different political, 
eoonomic and social systems clearly constitute essential 
factors for the success of a co-operation programme. 
b) A central aim for co-operation is the provisión of 
assistance in the execution of given national policies or 
plans through the development of specific projects involving 
two or more Latin American countries. This implies 
acknowledgement gf the need for common interests between 
participants and a clear understanding that the pursuit of any 
venture will lead to greater benef its —or lower costs— if it 
is carried out by concerted action between countries. 
c) Consequently, co-operation has a complementary role to 
play with regard to national policies; i.e., it represents 
only one roeans of achieving the particular concrete aims. It 
may be expanded and intensified, provided countries share 
múltiple and specific common objectives. In its narrowest 
sense, co-operation focuses countries' interests on a concrete 
activity or project, which may even be of a temporary nature. 
Co-operation will expand and intensify as the nuraber of joint 
projects increases or if there exist broad áreas for possible 
concrete action within a given sector. 
d) It seems desirable to make a clear distinction between 
such co-operation as exclusively links Latin American and 
Caribbean countries with one another and international 
co-operation in a broader sense. This in no way prevents the 
joint or concerted negotiation of different types of 
agreements with industrialized countries. However, this form 
of international negotiation must not be considered part of 
regional co-operation as described here, but rather within the 
context of international economic relations.ll/ 
e) Institutional aspects opérate at two interrelated 
levéis: the national and the multilateral. At the national 
level, it is vital to identify and involve operational 
partners who will carry out the domestic policies; this 
ensures the maintenance of a direct link between the agreement 
(bilateral or multilateral) and real requirements, as has been 
clearly demonstrated by those co-operative ventores which have 
made most progress. At the multilateral level, co-operation 
may acquire various institutional forras, which will reflect 
the type of agreement involved and also, to a relative degree, 
the domestic structure of the participating countries. 
Consequently, there is a considerable degree of variation, 
which it is hard to incorpórate into predetermined models. 
Mbreover, it should be pointed out that the Panamá 
Agreement, which gave birth to SELA, stipulates that more than 
two countries must sit on the Action Committees, and 
consequently automatically eliminates bilateral co-operation. 
It is most likely that this stipulation originated in the fear 
of excessive bilateralism. Nevertheless, binational co-
operation today constitutes an increasingly significant trend, 
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particularly with regard to across-the-bürder co-operation. 
Moreover, a nuniber of major projects, for example, Itaipú, 
represent cases in which long-term eaanomic interdependence 
has been established. The launching of thls project has even 
had an incidence upan the rate of development of Paraguay and 
Brazil. Such ventares take place under the auspices of 
international treaties which are in practice of a perroanent 
nature. 
One characteristic of processes of regional co-operation 
is that they address áreas which are not normally included 
within conventional integration programmes. In a nuniber of 
cases, this has only taken place indirectly, when a given 
sector has been subjected to nontis of a general nature, as may 
be the case of, for example, a liberalization programnve. 
In addition to accounting for a significant difference 
between integration and co-operation, these considerations 
also provide an explanation for the high level of dispersión 
inthe field of co-operation. There is a tendency for each 
initiative to act as specifically required by its sector or 
field of action. A nuniber of common approaches exist between 
various initiatives, but these pursue sepárate paths as the 
execution of a particular project develops. 
Without attempting to draw up a typology of co-operation, 
it is possible to distinguish between: 12/ 
a) Sectoral co-operation, for example in the field of 
transport and infrastructure, in energy, in joint exploitation 
of natural resources, etc. 
b) Entrepreneurial co-operation in the public and private 
sectors, as in the case of the Latin American Iron and Steel 
Institute (IIAFA), ARPEL, the Latin American Asscciation of 
Capital Goods Industries (AIABIC), etc. 
c) "Functional" co-operation, for example in health (the 
Hipólito Inanue Agreement of the Andean Group), education and 
culture (the Andrés Bello Agreement). 
d) Trade co-operation, for example through the joint 
promotion of exports, co-ordination of imports, the 
establishment of networks for the exchange of trade 
information, and the organization of trade fairs and 
exhibitions. Examples of this are UBEC and MULTIFERT. 
e) Technological co-operation, in the form of initiatives 
such as the Latin American Technological Information Network 
(RITIA), the Andean System for Technological Information 
(SATT), the productian of enriched foodstuffs and, in general, 
the Andean Projects for Technological Development (PADT). 
f) Political co-operation, in the form of joint stands 
in defence of democracy and self-determination, and joint 
action to put an end to wars or to avoid them (the Contadora 
Group). 
Trade co-operation is closely linked to action 
characteristic of an integration process. Hbwever, it is 
neoessary to point out that major instrumental differences 
exist. Within trade co-operation there is no question of using 
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tariff policy as an overall means of prorooting trade ñor as 
the central axis of a specific process of resources 
allocation. When tariff ineasures are adopted, they are of a 
limited and temporary kind, with no global or multilateral 
pretentions. The promotion of exports to outside countries was 
the central activity of the Multinational Banana Trading 
Company S.A. (CCMUNBANA). MÜLTIFERT channels considerable 
voluntes of fertilizer imports from international markets, and 
should the enterprises which participate in the multinational 
possess surpluses, these are sold on the regional market 
regardless of the existence of tariff or nan-tariff barriers. 
A common factor of these types of co-operation is their 
permanent nature, as they generally involve long-term or 
enduring measures. Nevertheless, temporary forras of 
co-operation exist which may be particularly important; the 
fact that co-operation is tanporary is no indication of its 
relative iirportance, but rather of the fact that it is liriked 
to the attaínment of pnedetermined aims oonstituting the 
oo-operation prograitirae being promoted. The San José Agreement 
is one example of considerable political and econcmic 
significance, and is exemplary of this type of co-operation. 
Under the terne of this international agreenvent, México and 
Venezuela assumed responsibility for supplying hydrocarbons to 
countries in Central America and the Caribbean. In addition 
they set up a financial department to help lighten the burden 
of payments for petroleum. This worthwhile initiative was 
íiístigated in 1974 by Venezuela, and when México joined in 
1980, the nuniber of beneficiary countries was increased.l3/ 
The agreement is on an annual basis and has been regularly 
renewed, in spite of the readjustments which are taking 
place on the petroleum market. The prevailing price trends 
could lead to the introduction of major changes in this 
agreement. In spite of this, it has to be recognized that it 
has played an extraordinarily significant role during a 
critical pericd in both the regional and international 
spheres, which has had a particularly serious impact upon the 
petroleum importing countries in the Caribbean and Central 
America. 
An inherent feature of the legal and functional structure 
of SEIA's Action Cammittees is their temporary nature. 
Although in many cases the issues covered were far-ranging, 
considerations of tine made it necessary to focus attention 
upon those áreas in which there was greatest potential for 
harmonious action. A nuniber of Cammittees adopted permanent 
modes of co-operation covering almost all the aspects of the 
original programme. This was the case of 0IBEFESCA. In other 
cases, the permanent aspect of co-operation merely represented 
part of the original platform: MUIHTFERT has taken over the 
nost important responsibilities of the Action Committee on 
Fertilizers in the commercial field, but exeludes 
consideration of production; the circumstances which prevailed 
at the time made it impossible to identify opportunities for 
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co-operation in the field of fertilizer manufacture. However, 
the issue may be raised again by countries at the opportune 
moraent. 
It naist be emphasized that permanent action in the field 
of c»-operation requires the prior constitution of a 
oonsistent system of interrelations, in order to provide 
adequate long-term support. In other words, a high level of 
coincidence is neoessary between national and nultinational 
objectives, as well as systematic interaction between the day-
to-day activities of countries and the co-operation 
organization together with ampie participation on the part of 
the national operational agents. 
If the present outlook for co-operation is considered, it 
is clearly apparent that the absence of any of the above 
central reguireraents will lead to the process being left in 
abeyance or failing to produce the planned results. On the 
contrary, if these conditions are fully met, co-operation will 
be most effective and is capable of relatively self-sufficient 
developraent, notwithstanding the occasional slump. 
We are not aware of any systematic presentation of 
significant experience allowing alternative paths for present 
or future co-operation efforts to be plotted. Ñor does there 
seem to exist any inventory of initiatives which, for a 
variety of reasons, failed to materialize, ñor a list of the 
reasons why other projects failed to sufficiently mature. At 
the same time, befare the Panamá Agreement carne into 
operation, steps towards co-operation lacked a protective 
legal and institutional framework which would also ensure 
their dissemination and provide them with multilateral 
f eatures even though they concerned action restricted to a few 
or even two countries. Once SELA carne into operation, 
countries were theoretically obliged to channel their 
initiatives through this organization. As this has only been 
partly the case, co-operation has remained extremely 
spontaneous and generally speaking bilateral, making it 
difficult to systematize experiences (be they satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory), or to foraent further action and lay down 
miniraum guidelines for co-ordination between co-operation 
organizations as well as between these and integration 
programmes. 
Latín America and the Caribbean are far from possessing a 
coherent and sound co-operation policy which would ensure 
maximization of the benefits deriving from the various 
initiatives taken over time. 
It would be possible for a policy of co-operation to 
endeavour to interlink the many projects in operation and, in 
general, to draw the full benefits from the principal 
experiences recorded. In addressing the concept of a regional 
policy for co-operation it seems first of all neoessary to 
specify that there is no question of restricting national 
initiatives by incorporating them into particular legal and 
institutional plans. Secondly, neither there is any question 
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of establishing a centralized legal code establishing 
compulsory steps which in many cases are merely formal and 
vAiich, moreover, may even distort certain projects. On the 
contrary, a policy of regional co-operation —at least in its 
initial stages— should attempt to darify the various 
initiatives, maintain an up-to-date register of projects 
making it posslble to gather experience, facilítate a variety 
of forms of collaboration by reinforcing the action of each 
organization and avoiding the duplication of efforts? 
establish or strengthen bodies to promote further action and 
In general, endeavour to render the process as efficient and 
operational as possible. 
The keystone of the system could be provided by the 
platform for co-cperation which countries adopt periodically 
withln the framewark of SEIA. Withln the médium term, this 
should constitute a regional goal and reroain so in spite of 
the fact that this institution's 10 years of experience have 
revealed the difficulties of putting this idea into practice. 
Potential at the subregional level is another matter and will 
be examined below. 
The specific features of each co-operation initiative 
contain considerable dlversity. This dispersión leads to each 
isolated co-operation activity remaining in a tight circle, as 
a result of too pronounced' and excessive a sectoral outlook, 
vrtiich freguently makes it impossible to carry out an 
appropriate regional assessment of the progress made or the 
difficulties encountered. Without losing sight of the specific 
nature of co-operation, it seems logical to move, vrtien so 
required, towards a new outlook seeking a broader framework 
and attempting to project and put into practice an intensive 
process of intra-Iatin American co-ordinatian. 
These observations are of particular importance in the 
case of bilateral co-operation. A large number of initiatives 
between any two countries, particularly in certain frontier 
áreas have not been integrated into a specifically regional 
outlook. They freguently facilítate trade, directly increase 
interdependence and in a number of cases possess clear 
potential for being restructured, and es^anded to a trilateral 
or even multilateral level. Hbwever, their bilateral character 
exeludes tham from broader processes, and they seem to lay 
outside the desired pattem of regional interrelation. 
D. SCME EXEEKEENCE OF O>-0EERAn0N 
1. Selected cases 
Five concretet escamples of co-operation are presented below. 
They were selected as they represent experience in different 
fields and possess considerable potential for stimulating 
initiatives with the same aims or derived therefram. In 
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addition, tbey cxinstitute examples of the broad thematic and 
instrumental spectrum of regional co-operation and of the 
approaches vihich may be adopted therein. 
a) Oo-operation in the nuclear energy sector 
The strategic iaportance of the peaceful use and military 
applications of this sector is well known. Its considerable 
inpact in the scientific, technological and econamic fields 
influences a variety of activities. 
Development of nuclear energy requires heavy investment 
and access to technologies which are closely protected by 
developed countries or which they sell only under extremely 
restrictive conditions. There is a clear monopolistic trend 
restricting the possibility for the majority of countries in 
the región to acquire this type of knowledge. Consequently, 
one particularly inportant goal for the countries of the 
región with an interest in this área is the attainment of a 
fairly autonomous level of technological development, which, 
for the reasons given above, will only prove feasible within a 
sound framework of regional co-operation. 
Oonseguently, considerations of a political and 
geographical nature are of particular significance. Border 
disputes and in general relations between States reguire that 
the issue be addressed with particular care. Tlie bilateral and 
multilateral efforts underway in the región and the aims 
already achieved, reveal the potential for progress in 
particularly inportant and sensitive áreas, once rigid 
geopolitical concepts have been set aside. 
The recent Declaration by the Presidenta of Argentina and 
Brazil on nuclear energy (Iguazú, Nbvember 1985) which 
considers expanding co-operation to other Iatin American 
countries and seeking means of ensuring the región*s concern 
with peace, security and development, constitutes a 
particularly inportant step forward. 
Ihe most inportant peaceful use of nuclear energy is for 
the generation of electricity in nuclear power plants, and its 
development has led to the establishment of a set of 
interlinked activities. These essentially concern the 
manufacture, construction and operation of nuclear power 
plants, the production of nuclear fuel together with a number 
of caonplementary features of this set of activities. Ihe 
peaoeful use of nuclear energy has diversified and spread into 
new fields, thereby increasíng its technological and econamic 
significance. 
Local construction of nuclear power plants requires 
active participation on the part of the conventional 
electrical, mechanical and metallurgical sectors, which must 
carry out the necessary mqdernization in order to provide 
inputs requiring camplex technologies and stringent quality 
standards. This progress in turn overspills into more 
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traditional áreas, such as that providing equipment for the 
food industry, the chemical industry, forging and welding 
large aanponents, special non-destructive tests, control 
instruments for industries, processes and others, as a result 
of which the impact of the technological development 
associated with the nuclear industry affects many other áreas 
of productive activity. 
Autonomous technological development in the nuclear 
energy field involves the solution of extremely complex 
scientific problems involving considerable risks and 
conseguently requires considerable investments in térros of 
financial, human and material resources, far in excess of 
those at present available in the vast majority of countries 
in Latin America and the CaribJoean. If priority is given to 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy, it beccmes vital to foster 
concerted efforts between a number of countries in the región 
in order to strive to attain autonomy both in so far as 
manufacturing capacity is concemed and with regard to the 
development of autanomous technolcgies, in view of the 
intematianal monopoly which the developed countries possess 
in this área. 
Nuclear co-operation in the región was stimulated by the 
rise in the price of hydrocarbons. On the basis of the 
capacity of Argentina and Brazil, a number of forros of 
bilateral co-operation bagan to develop or to intensify. These 
have oontinued to progress in spite of the overall 
difficulties affecting relations between certain countries. 
The case of Argentina and Chile is particularly significant, 
as the co-operation agreements remained in forcé even during 
the periods of greatest border tensión. 
The Programme of Co-operative Regional Arrangements for 
promoting nuclear science and technology in Latin America 
(ARCAL), constitutes the first attempt at multilateral 
co-operation in the sector. It aróse from an initiative within 
the Andean Group designad to bring about greater development 
in the nuclear field through co-operation. Subsequently, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Guatemala, 
which had been participating as observers, became member 
States. In addition, at the present time Cuba, Costa Rica and 
México are observers. 
Annual co-ordinating meetings at which information is 
also exchanged take place within the framework of ARCAL. In 
1984 it was agreed to develop further initiatives relating to 
radiatian protection, nuclear analytical techniques, the use 
of reactors, the radiation treatment of foodstuffs, etc. In 
1985, plans were approved to carry out the first projects over 
a period of five years. 
ARCAL has completed its organizational phase and is 
progressing towards the execution of concrete projects, on the 
basis of complementary uses of resources and knowledge. The 
programme unquestionably relies on the support granted by 
Argentina and Brazil, which have attained high levéis of 
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technological development in the sector and consequently, are 
in a position to provide the technical backing required by the 
prograiame. The región is making the first tentative steps 
tovards a majar programme of scientific and technical 
oollaboration in an área of particular importanoe. Ihis effort 
must be extended to the broad área of joint ains which the 
región pursues. If this initiative is' inoorporated therein, it 
could lead to an intensification of nuclear co-operation, 
setting it at the service of a whole range of regional needs. 
At the bilateral level, the active role played by 
Argentina, which possesses the appropriate infrastructure as 
well as agreements with various Latin American countries is 
particularly noteworthy. Agreements are in forcé with Brazil, 
Chile and Perú. 
The Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) 
was established in 1950. From the beginning it was clearly 
realized that if the sector was to develop it was necessary to 
achieve a certain degree of technological autonomy, both for 
the sake of the technology itself and in view of the 
particular conditions affecting technology transfers in this 
sector. The Commission has almost continually pursuéd an 
approach closely in line with the above, involving a clearly 
defined policy of pursuing openings in Latín America, by roeans 
of training courses, seminars and, in general, the 
dissemination of its experience. The CNEA has achieved a high 
technological level which provides a foundation for the 
bilateral and multilateral co-operation pursued by Argentina. 
Nuclear co-operation between Argentina and Brazil has 
been on the increase, particularly in recent years. Inter-
institutional agreements are in forcé allowing for joint 
activities in the field of experimental physics, the exchange 
of information and of specialists. Since 1980, oonmercial 
operations nave begun in the field of zirconium alloy tubes, 
rental of uranium conoentrates and the supply of reactor 
elements. 
. The recent Declaration on Nuclear Policy signed by 
Presidente R. Alfonsín and J. Sarney (November 1985) expresses 
the hope that binational co-operation in the field of the 
peaoeful uses of atomic energy will be extended to other Latin 
American countries. Consequently, it was agreed to establish 
working parties, under the supervisión of both govemments and 
composed of representatives of the respective nuclear 
enterprises, in order to premióte technological and nuclear 
development as well as the creation of mechanisms to protect 
the interests of peace, security and development in the 
región. 
Co-operation between Argentina and Perú is centred on the 
activities of the Huarangal Project 'hose aim is to build a 
nuclear research centre. Argentina lias provided technical 
knowledge and has directly participated in the construction of 
the reactor. This co-operation irakés the broadest possible use 
of Peruvian entrepreneurial capacity. Argentine enterprises 
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are also participating in the project, generally in 
association with or in an advisory capacity to local firms. 
Oo-operation between Argentina and Chile includes 
horizontal co-operation, the exchange of specialists, 
technical training, agreements on radioisotopes and nuclear 
fuels, industrial applications as well as oollaboration in the 
field of nuclear medicine. Co-operation began in 1976 and in 
1984 was extended to cover the supply of fuel elements. Under 
the terms of this agreement, Argentina guarantees priority to 
Chile in the supply of enriched uranium. 
The three examples of bilateral co-operation briefly set 
out above reveal a considerable number of joint activities in 
a sector of particular iirportance. Intensification of the 
multilateral patterns established by ARCAL and the expansión 
of bilateral relations should help to extend the present bases 
for operations within this type of co-operation. Its 
projectian into the regional sphere is of particular 
iirportance in view of its majar scientific, technological and 
econcmic impact. 
b) The Latin American Association of Capital Goods 
Industries (AIABiq 
Imports of capital goods into Latin America rose from 
US$ 4 834 to US$ 27 618 million between 1971 and 1981. Merely 
US$ 1 540 million (little more than 7% of the total) were from 
the región itself. 
A number of investigations have revealed that many 
countries in the región, including medium-sized and even a 
number of small countries possess installed capacity and 
technical skills capable of satisfying all or part of the 
demand for imported equipment. 
It has also been demonstrated that the región's 
industrial capacity has not been properly divulged; that in 
major áreas there is virtually no circulation of information 
between enterprises in different countries and finally, that 
there is often even considerable ignorance of national 
potential. This is particularly notorious in a number of 
medium-sized countries. One of the conseguences of this 
situatian is the failure to seize the opportunities which 
appear for joint production ventures. 
Finally, there is an outstanding tendency to use 
traditional sources of supply in the developed countries. This 
trend exists even when external supply offers no particular 
financial advantages. 
In these circumstances, a group of entrepreneurs began to 
seek ways of generating effective reciprocal support to 
facilítate their operations and provide the potential 
purchasers with guarantees based on their collective 
experience. This led to the establishment of AIABIC whose 
fundamental aims are to promote the development of the 
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netallic construction industry and to strengthen the poeition 
of Iatin American enterprises involved in the design and the 
manufacture of capital gcods. 
In order to achieve these aims it vill be principally 
necessary to: i) prenote increasing participation on the part 
of industry in each countiy and in the región in supplying the 
equipnent required by the Iatin American narket; ii) stimulate 
awareness and oontaets between enterprises, the exchange of 
Information, experienoe and techniques; iii) co-ordinate 
entrepreneurial action in the sector and oollaborate vith 
finos in seeking solutions to the financial problems affecting 
activities; and iv) instígate a sustained effort to reduce 
dependence on outside engineering. 
Special mentían should be made of the agreement to 
co-ordinate the action of the associated enterprises, in order 
that the experience, technical development and capacities of 
the most outstanding among them provide support for fledgling 
enterprises or for those which require specialized advice or 
technical backing. 
This is the most characteristic feature of the 
organizatlon. It establishes a guiding principie for joint 
action and may beoome a factor to galvaniza common action and 
facilítate the use of local and regional sources of supply. 
AIABIC represents a particularly promising 
entrepreneurial form of co-operation. Its prospeets will grew 
provided it succeeds in increasing the number of participating 
enterprises and proves capable of establishing functicnal and 
operational links with other efforts taking place in the 
sector. From this viewpoint, in addition to reinforcing its 
action, it appears important for it to seek operational 
methods allowing it to make use of the capacity of integration 
organizations, development banks (CAF, CABEI, CDB) and other 
co-operation bodies through joint action, making use of the 
various instruments available to the institutions in order to 
ensure the viability of its aims and projeets. 
c) Amazon Co-operation Treatv 
The Amazon Co-operation Treaty 14/ is an agreement of a 
general kind. It contains a platform made up of long-term 
concepts which provides major definitions of principies and 
opens the way to a series of options and different courses of 
action. Oonsequently, its true nature and scope will emerge 
from the way in which it is applied.15/ 
The principies embodied in the Treaty essentially 
constitute a reassertion of the rights and responsibilities of 
each country over its respective raazonian áreas. They 
constitute a clear Latin American response to any further 
attempt at internationalization or future foreign intervention 
in and utilizaticn of this vast área. Similarly, the Treaty 
attempts to fully intégrate these territories into the 
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respective develppment plans, in accordance with the 
priorities and aspirations of each participating nation. 
Consequently, bilateral or multilateral oo-operation must play 
a role in providing help and assistance for the efforts made 
by each country to explore and conserve these resources. 
The central elements of the Treaty are of an eminently 
political character. In addition to the features mentioned 
above it should be added that prcmoting and organizing a 
continuous and long-tenn process of rapprochement, contact and 
negotiation between the parties constitutes an undeniable step 
forward, not only in view of the pronounced heterogeneity and 
economic importance of the participants, but also in view of 
the undenied and well-known border disputes which exist. These 
becaroe sharper at the beginning of 1981 as a result of the 
conflict between Ecuador and Perú, and remain subject to 
varying tensión, as a result of, among other factors, the 
dispute between Guayaría and Venezuela. 
In canjunction with the serious economic and financial 
difficulties which the participating countries face, these 
conflicts have delayed the effective application of the 
Treaty. In addition, the pronounced iiribalances between the 
countries, their different geographical áreas and disparity of 
interests constitute a set of major restrictions which it will 
be only possible to overeóte in the long term and within an 
extremely flexible framework based upan total respect and 
support for the policies which each country, acting in a 
sovereign manner, desires to promote within the Treaty. Future 
prospeets are therefore a fundamental element in assessing the 
significanoe and scope of the Treaty. 
Consequently, within the médium term two fields of action 
appear to deserve priority. The first of these concerns co-
operation in the field of exploration research, technological 
development and training of human resources reguired in order 
to face the political, economic, scientific and administrative 
challenge involved in exploiting the enormous resources 
contained in the Amazon región. This implies an awareness of 
the delicate ecological balance existing in the área on which 
irreversible damage may be inflicted. 
A second área of particular interest concerns development 
of the transport and Communications infrastructure and 
improvement of services. The impact of co-operation in this 
área has unquestioned repercussions as a result of the 
existing cross-frontier connections and the variety of 
possibilities they offer. 
During this initial stage of the Treaty's application, 
limited progress has been made in both áreas. A number of 
actions characteristic of a nascent process of horizontal 
technical co-operation have been undertaken. In many cases 
they have taken place within the multilateral framework 
provided by the Treaty. Nevertheless, they have primarily been 
brought about thanks to bilateral arrangements. The Treaty 
even provides for this, and explicitly acknowledges —for 
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obvious geographical reasons— that bilateral factors will be 
of considerable iirportance in the action undertaken. 
Although the outlook and action of the Treaty covers the 
long term — i t is of indefinite duration—, the l M t e d nature 
of the achievements nade during its f irst years is a source of 
concern. Clearly, these do not correspond to the inherent 
potential of resources in the Amazon área. A nuinber of 
explanatory factors have already been mentioned. A further 
significant factor is the absence of a Secretariat with the 
capacity to formúlate proposals and become an element capable 
of inspiring and stimulating co-operation. From this angle it 
is clearly possible to identify a weakness which may unduly 
prolong the period necessary for this major initiative to 
mature. The idea of a pro-tempore secretariat, occupied in 
turn by the various foreign ministries, to soroe extent 
reflects the spirit of the Treaty, but nonetheless indicates a 
disturbing institutional weakness. 
Finally, it is worthwjiile stressing two factors which 
appear to be central. The Treaty, together with all the 
activities in the geographical área it covers grants 
preference to a long-term approach. Hcwever, in order to reap 
benefits in the future it is necessary to intensify and 
rapidly progress in the prccess of present-day co-operation. 
The second fundamental factor is that it seems 
unadyisable to continué examining the problems of the Amazon 
in isolatian from other initiatives designed to underpin Latin 
American interdependence. The links which have been forged 
between Andean countries and members of AIADI as well as with 
other Latin American member nations of SELA, open the way to 
joint action and initiatives which could prove to have 
unsuspected potential. Naturally, there is no question of 
reducing the autonomy of the Amazon countries with regard to 
their central objective. Ñor is it claimed ttiat the other 
countries in the región should have even indirect access to 
the exploitation of these resources. It is merely suggested 
that if relations between the Amazon countries are considered 
within a regional context, it is quite likely that a variety 
of sources of co-cperation will appear capable of becaming 
majar factors in the prccess of creating and intensifying the 
reciprocal relations necessary to attain regional unity over 
the long term. 
From this viewpoint, if the Executive Secretariat of 
AIADI and the Board of the Cartagena Agreement were for 
example to make a détermined commitment to intensifying co-
operation in general and such co-operation as could be 
develcped within the Amazon Co-cperation Treaty in particular, 
they could provide the appropriate technical support to the 
pro-tempere secretariat. This would constitute a step towards 
linking this form of co-operation with other projects 
undertaken by these organizations. It would also make it 
possible to partially offset the lack of ccntinuity with 
regard to these initiatives which is occasionally apparent at 
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the governmental level, enabling them to becctne incentives for 
the signing of other intergovernraental agreements. 
d) Andean Reserve Fund (FAR^  
FAR 16/ provides a particular example of a type of 
financial co-operation developed within an integration plan. 
It was designed to assist the member countries of the Andean 
Group in solving their global balance-of-payments déficit, to 
improve the liquidity of investment and of international 
reserves and to help hamonize exchange, monetary and 
financial policies within the framework of the Cartagena 
Agreement.17/ 
It is clearly apparent that the Fund covers a far broader 
range of activities than those directly linked with intra-
subregional trade. This is merely one factor taken into 
consideration in addressing the demand for credit fonnulated 
by countries. 
In spite of the adverse financial circumstances affecting 
Andean countries, FAR has gradually established itself and 
preved capable of extending the scope of its activities. In 
turn, the Andean countries have worked jointly in a 
satisfactory manner which has increased confidence in this 
instrument. This is clearly illustrated by the evolution of 
its paid-in capital. This was initially US$ 240 million and 
then rose as a result of successive increases to 
US$ 357.5 million tovrards the middle of 1985, with a total 
capital of US$ 437.8 million. These increases are in line with 
the policy of maintaining the level of capital in real terms 
by periodically capitalizing part of the profits and gradually 
increasing ordinary reserves so as to increase the ratio of 
paid-in capital against reserves to a mínimum 10%. 
The credit granted in support of the balance of payments 
reached US$ 450.5 million in 1985, representing an increase in 
the región of US$ 100 million over the previous year. Most of 
this credit was granted to Colombia —US$ 229 million—, for 
payment in 12 consecutive quarterly payments starting in 1986. 
Nevertheless, Colombia was able to pay off this loan in full 
at the beginning of that year. This is of particular 
significance if it is borne in mind, that, in financial terms, 
credit granted by FAR is considerably cheaper than that 
granted by international banks and conseguently reflecta a 
desire to give priority to strengthening the Fund in 
preference to other financial commitments. 
The issue of securities, known as Andean Pesos, provides 
another significant example of the activities of FAR. In 
December 1984, the Board authorized the issue of this paper 
for use as a means of payment between the central banks of the 
member countries and by other authorized bearers (JUNAC, CAF 
and the Andean Parliament). Andean Pesos may be used for any 
kind of payment, if both parties agree. They are autcroatically 
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accepted in payient for trade balances between the Andean 
ocuntries and within AIADI's systera of payments and 
ccnpensation. Ihe mechanism cperates as an automatically 
renewed credit and constitutes a net increase in regional 
liquidity on the basis of an issue nade by the Tura. During 
1985 its use vías United, vihich explains why EAR authorities 
are takirg a nuníber of measures to extend and stiirtulate 
its use. 
FAR has recently begun to participate in renegotiation of 
Bolivia's external debt, providing technical and financial 
support. This participation is of particular importance in 
that it involves direct oollaboration with a member country in 
its relations with the IMF, the World Bank and international 
banks. 
FAR is a relatively medium-sized institution in 
ccnparison with the scale of the balance-of-payments problems 
facing ocuntries; nevertheless, it possesses the necessary 
guarantees, adeguate management capacity as well as clear 
support from the central banks of the member countries. 
Ihe Latin American Econcmic Conference reccnroended to 
ALADI that, in conjunction with other regional financial 
bodies it should as soon as possible present a study into the 
possibility of establishing a Reserve Fund to finance balance-
of-payments diseguilibria. FAR could play a major role in this 
respect, as it represents a satisfactory exairple of regional 
financial co-operation with unguestioned potential for 
extensión, either directly or indirectly, to either other 
áreas of finance or other countries in Latón America and the 
Caribbean. 
e) Latín American Orqanization for the Development 
of Fishincf (OIUgESCA) 
Following seven years of joint activity within the Action 
Oommittee on Sea and Fresh Water Produce of SETA. 18/ the 
participating countries decided to establish a permanent 
organization responsible for stiinulating the development of 
fisheries in the región by means of intra-regional 
co-operation in the sector. 
Ihe activities carried out by the Cornmittee f irst of all 
revealed the need for the countries of Latín America and the 
Caribbean to jointly face the problems affecting the fisheries 
sector in arder to satisfactorily meet food reguirements and 
the imperatives imposed by the Law of the Sea and the Strategy 
for Fisheries Management and Development adopted by the World 
Conference on Fisheries Management and Development held by FAO 
in June 1984. 
Secondly, these activities revealed the striking degree 
of multilateralism in the sector. The majority of projects or 
initiatives undertaken revealed a real possibility for duly 
supported joint actions, providing broad scope for the 
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intensification of a process which has proved particularly 
dynamic frcm its very beginning. 
A third factor of considerable importance for 
co-operation in general arises from the working arrangements 
which were established at the very beginning of the process. 
This concerns the deep involvement of government experts or 
country's research institutions in the various projects or 
initiatives. This has generally ensured considerable 
convergence between co-operation progranmes and national 
plans, thereby guaranteeing an independent process of 
evolution. Hardly any changes nave been nade to the progranroe 
of work since the Comnittee began operating. It consequently 
deals with the main preoccupations of the countries who 
initiated this forra of co-operation. 
0U3EPESCA aróse out of the need for regional co-operation 
and was able to make use of the work which had already been 
carried out thanks to a preparatory process and to continué it 
into the future in accordance with the guidelines laid down by 
the countries themselves. In spite of the progress nade and 
the degree of consolidation achieved, progress in the 
evolution of the committee towards a more permanent 
organization has been oonsiáerably slower and more arduous 
than anticipated. In practica, although a transition mschanism 
exists, countries have díminished their degree of 
participation and the organization has beooroe less dynamic. It 
is probable that the reguirement for legislative ratification 
in order to enter the Organization is one factor which to a 
large extent explains this lower level of activity. 
At the purely regional level, OII3EPESCA maintains cióse 
links with AIADI and to a lesser extent with the Permanent 
Commission for the Conservation and Exploitation of the 
Maritime Resources of the South Pacific (CPPS). Together with 
ALADI, the organization has been examining the desirability of 
establishing a commercial fisheries agreement —in the form of 
a partial agreement—, which proposes two basic types of 
action. On the one hand, increasing intra-regional trade in 
fisheries products, so as to raise low-cost and reliable 
regional supply; this would directly lead to the properly 
organized replacement of supplies from outside countries by 
Latin American supplies. In addition, an attempt is being 
made to agree on oomnion positions in international markets so 
as to maintain and as far as possible improve the present 
terms of access to markets, ittprove price levéis and generally 
foment a gradual rationalization of exports to international 
markets by increased participation in channels of 
commercialization. 
Cantacts with the CPPS are of more recent date. Ihe 
countries gave an express mándate for the establishment of a 
working party in order to prepare a regional agreement on tuna 
fish. Ihis agreement, which is in its preparatory stage, would 
be designed to establish norms and regulations to cover 
fishing of this major resourceí, 
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In spite of the difficulties which OIDEPESCA is 
ejqperiencing, there is no doubt that regional oo-operation in 
this sector has proved its viability and focused the attention 
of governinents. If these efforts are to be intensified, it is 
first of all necessary for the countries which belong to the 
Ocmmittee and other important countries on the Atlantic 
seaboard to join. Argentina has already expressed its 
intention to do so. Secondly, a further stiraulus would be 
provided by an intensification of the organization's relations 
with integration prograintnes. The trade agreement, which 
attempts are being made to establish as part of AIADI, 
represents a step in the right direction. Similar initiatives 
could be taken within CfiRIOCM, the CACM and the Andean Group. 
Such a diversif ication of action within a relatively disparate 
geographical área does not involve major changes in the 
organization's programmes of work as such changes are already 
underway. 
2. Experience of a general nature 
Generally speáking, the process of regional co-operation is 
associated with institutions such as the latin American Energy 
Organization (OÍAIS), the Group of latin American and 
Caribbean Sugar Exporting Countries (GEELACEA), and the Union 
of Banana Exporting Countries (UBEC), etc. For the purposes of 
this study, an attempt will be made merely to specify the role 
played by institutions of this type in the process of 
co-operatian and promotion of regional interdependence and an 
attempt will also be made to provide an outline of their 
relations with national sectoral policies. To this end, there 
follows an examinatian of a number of common features of a 
general nature, which may be drawn from the manner in which 
the main co-operatian institutions opérate. 
The first cantón factor is the cióse correlation between 
the evolutian of co-operation and international circumstances 
as well as those prevailing on certain specific markets. An 
increase in the activity and even an intensification of the 
evolutian of these organizations is deeply influenced by these 
circumstances. GEPIACEA has traditionally ay-ordinated the 
latin American positian in negotiations to renew or modify the 
International Sugar Agreement. Such co-ordination in fact 
constitutes a priority issue in the group's programme of 
activities. In other cases, such as that of 0IAEE, activity 
also appears particularly intense at times of conflict 
within the hydrocarbon market. This indicates that the 
external variable would seem to opérate as a stiraulus to 
regional solidarity and conseguently to co-operation itself. 
This holds true, although to a lesser extent, in the case of 
OIBEFESCA. 
From this viewpoint and under present circumstances the 
sectoral policies of participating countries do not seem to be 
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the only determining factor in the co-operation process, which 
may help to explain a number of periods during which joint 
action has been at a standstill. 
Another fairly comroon feature of these organizations is 
the stress laid on horizontal technical co-operation. In all 
cases and with varying degrees of intensity, prograitimes have 
been organized in this área. These have led to a number of 
fairly significant achievements, among which is the 
intensification of reciprocal knowledge among countries 
which directly helps to broaden the very foundations of 
co-operation. This is particularly true when national experts 
belonging to different subregional groups are involved and 
whose contacts are, for various reasons, usually restricted to 
direct contacts within their own field. 
As far as the process of Latin American interdependence 
is concerned, horizontal technical co-operation may be likened 
to the concept of seed capital. This roeans that it produces 
óften intangible results which gradually increase the 
achievements of co-operation by interconnecting operational 
agents in different countries. The exchange of information and 
knowledge in specific áreas establishes links between national 
policies thereby facilitating their connection to multilateral 
programmes and strengthening co-operation itself. Restricting 
or failing to take advantage of this type of opportunity 
obviously weakens both the process of co-operation and 
reciprocal links between countries. 
Generally speaking, co-operation organizations have 
lacked the capacity to ensure the participation of all 
countries interested in a particular sphere and in a position 
to take a share in joint ventures. GEPLACEA is the 
organization with the most fully developed regional vocation, 
as 23 Latin American and Caribbean sugar-exporting countries 
belong to it, thereby ensuring that it is fully 
representative. A broadly representative group of countries 
also belong to OIADE. The geographical scope of the remaining 
organizations is rather limited. Neither Ecuador ñor Brazil 
have ever belonged to the Union of Banana Exporting Countries 
(UBEC). While cióse contacts exist with Ecuador, it has to be 
recognized that the main exporter does not belong to the 
Union. OLDEPESCA has failed to persuade any of the Atlantic 
seaboard countries or Colombia to join. It should be borne in 
mind that mention has only been made of the most important 
countries in the sector. 
These observations indicate that regional efforts suffer 
frcm a high degree of dispersión or a pronounced lack of 
cohesión. They may also reflect the fact that the programme of 
activities of particular co-operation programmes does not 
coincide with the sectoral interests and priorities of the 
majority of countries in the región. 
There is no question of claiming that it is necessary for 
all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to belong to 
a co-operation programme in order for it to prove operational. 
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This would be in direct contradiction with the very nature of 
such prograitimes. Nevertheless it is necessary to assert the 
desirability of a minimum fcundation capable of providing 
satisfactory and efficient support for such progranroes. Any 
worthwhile attempt to regionalize a oo-operation should begin 
by exaiining the way in which cnuntries organize their 
participation. This requires assessments designad to adjust 
and alter the respective programmes of activities so that 
they may be satisfactorily harmonized with national plans, 
with the political and operational decisions taken by all 
participants as well as with a permanent system for promoting 
co-operation. 
Another coronan feature is the lack of resources and 
limited executive capacity of the technical secretariats of 
the majority of organizations, who tend to give priority to 
administrative aspects. This operational weakness leaves 
limited opportunity for seeking elements of co-operation with 
the desired incidence and potential. in order to organize a 
technically viable and politically attractive prograiime of 
activities, a period of preparation is necessary as well as 
intense consultation with those national institutions which 
will be involved, so as to ensure satisfactory correlation 
between national policies and co-operation programmes. 
Considerable support on the part of countries is necessary if 
these programmes are to be carried out, but it is necessary to 
bear in raind that the evolution of processes is facilitated by 
the existence of secretariats possessing minimum capacity and 
resources. 
In addition, institutional aspects may be of decisive 
iirportance to a number of processes. Thus, the creation of the 
Council of Hinisters of OIADE (six Ministers belong, it covers 
a large geographical área and holds highly operational 
guarterly meetings) made it possible to advance with 
surprising speed and facilitated the preparation, adoption and 
bringing into operation of major projects such as the Iatin 
American Programme for Energy Co-operation (PIACE). 
Co-operation is not a process which takes place 
spontaneously. A number of focal points capable of initiating 
co-operation are necessary if its pursuit is to prove 
feasible. Among these, institutional aspects are of particular 
importance since, among other things, they allow multilateral 
programmes to be harmonized with national programmes. 
Despite the progress made at the instrumental and 
political levéis, the conceptual and operational problem 
remains a source of preoccupation. As has been pointed out 
above, each organization seeks to achieve the greatest degree 
of autonomy possible. There is no shortage of examples to 
confirm that it is often far more efficient to pursue joint 
activities with other organizations, nevertheless, 
co-operation has in practice been left in the background. 
On the contrary, stress should be laid on the sharing of 
efforts, giving priority to the most efficient alternative, 
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prcKioting reciprocal support and ensuring the process is as 
cperational and multilateral as possible. 
In other words, it would be desirable to define and 
foment a new approach to processes of Latin American 
co-operation in order to amalgámate efforts, oombíné and 
multiply capacity, link together initiatives of all kinds and 
produce a new cperational framework for /integration and 
co-operation. 
A further dimensión of co-operation arises from 
entrepreneurial agreements, be these public or private. 
Entrepreneurial associations formed as part of AIALC, such as 
the Association of Latin American Industrialists (AIIA), 
the Latín American Preserves and Allied Manufacturers1 
Association (AUCA), etc., involve a certain degree of 
co-operaticn. Generally speaking, their activities are 
centrad en the organizaticn of annual meetings or congresses 
and they usually limit themselves to exchanging information 
on national conditions. In a nuníber of cases they also 
examine possibilities for bringing about trade negotiations 
—normally making use of the instruments provided by 
AIADI— which are subsequently submitted to governments. 
Ihose institutions which group State and private 
enterprises of particular importance frero the economic angle 
constitute a second level. In addition to those tasks 
described above, they carry out studies and generally provide 
technical support for the sector's activities. The recent 
activities of the Latin American Iron and Steel Institute 
(IIAFA) on the subject of protectionism in the industrialized 
countries and the proposal for a partial agreement within the 
steel industry, under the auspices of AIADI, provide examples 
of the type of co-operation pursued by this Institute in 
recent years. 
In addition to emphasizing and stressing the importance 
of such initiatives, there is every lüoelihood that these 
organizations possess considerable under-utilized potential. 
As most of them cover sectors which are of importance to the 
countries in the región, it is well worth examining means of 
allowing them maximize their potential to help revive the 
regional econamy. 
Co-operation which takes place in the field of certain 
specific entrepreneurial activities represent a third level of 
co-operation. Transnational corporations provide clear 
examples of this type of direct co-operation between specif ic 
enterprises. It is probably this type of co-operation which 
has suffered most frem the tensión and problems which have 
affected co-operation. Latin American transnational 
corporations have suffered a marked regression. The short-
lived but successful transnational Corporation PANCAFE, was 
obliged to cease its operations before the United States would 
sign the International Coffee Agreement. The Multinational 
Banana Trading Company (CCMUNBANA) has had to temporarily 
cease operations as a result of the impossibility of 
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oantrolling a sufficient share of supplies of the fruit to 
compete with transnational corporations. The Carifcbean 
Multinational Shipping Line (NAMUCAR) has experienced a 
marked decline in freight carried, thereby jeopardizing its 
already precarious situation. Apparently, the Latin American 
Multinational Fertilizer Marketing Corporation (MUUT1FEKT) is 
the only transnational which remains fairly active, although 
it too is facing serious problems. 
Consequently, co-operation based on the creation and 
subsequent operation of transnational corporations would seem 
to be at a crossroads. There is a bread consensus that thls 
constitutes a worthwhile and important alternative for 
co-operation, but experience is revealing the pitfalls which 
lie in its path. 
A variety of situations exist at the bilateral level. 
Same entrepreneurial arrangements are facing camplex 
circumstances such as those described above. Binational 
enterprises directly associated with the production phase are 
another case, as in the example of the firra Mañaneros Colambo-
Venezolano S.A. Initiatives directly connected with 
infrastrueture activities constitute another case unaffected 
by tte trends described above. Generally speaking their 
continuity is ensured by the very nature of their activities 
—which are to a certain extent strategic and generally 
protected by specific political agreements operating within 
the framework of long-term international treaties or 
agreements. 
A ccramon factor or feature of these foros of co-operation 
is their isolation from or lack of links with organizations 
responsible for co-operation and integration, which may be 
explained by the lack of concrete political co-ordination in 
the región, which would make it possible to co-ordinate and 
structure such activities. 
m view of the extreme diversity of the countries which 
are potential participants in joint action as well as the 
diversity of the co-operation ventures themselves, it is 
desirable for them to opérate within groups which are smaller 
in size than the región as a whole, which in no way prevents 
subsequent more global co-ordination. A more decentralized 
plan could bring about gradual progress in relatively allied 
áreas or within subregions with similar problems and 
priorities. The establishment of modules for promotion and 
execution could stimulate a worthwhile movement towards 
co-ordination. For example, it is clear that OIADE and ARPEL 
—and even CIER— could harmonize their activities so as to 
avoid pursuing what in fact represent parallel operatians and 
reorganize their collaboration in those áreas of common 
interest. 
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E. CO-OEERATICN WITHIN INIEGRATTCN 
The Central American Coraron Market and the Andean Group no 
dcubt represent the most ambitious integratian programmes flxm 
the instrumental viewpoint and with regard to their airas. 
Efforts to reinforce economic, technological or cultural 
interrelations between the participating nations endeavoured 
to overeóme the institutional constraints inherent in the 
international treaties which were at their root. With varying 
degrees of intensity, and despite the serious huidles they had 
had to face in recent years, they nave nade progress in both 
fields, in a whole range of áreas which lie beyond the merely 
comercial approach generally adopted by integratian 
processes. 
The scope of activities in these programmes reflects the 
conviction that integration is a conplex precess which must 
reach into the various áreas of interest of the national 
societies which nave entered into asseciation. A number of the 
measures they nave adopted constitute a natural conplement to 
the policy of expanding the market, as is the case of certain 
financial measures or of arrangements to facilítate transport, 
for example. Nevertheless, this trend towards increased scope 
covers a number of issues which are directly linked to the 
creation of interdependeney between countries, with no direct 
links to trade policy. The agreements relating to electrical 
interconnection in Central America, the Andean Projects for 
Technological Development —PADT--, agreements in the fields 
of health or of educación are different examples of a single 
process. 
It is probably in the field of financial and monetary 
co-operation that progress has been most significant. 
Institutions such as the Central American Bank of Economic 
Integration (CABEI), the Carihbean Development Bank (CDB) or 
the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) nave adopted totally 
different aims and procedure from those of a mere cctnplement 
to free competición within the expanded market. They are 
designed to facilítate and render viable investment processes 
themselves; in many cases they give priority to their impact 
on national and subregional development. In other words, they 
are multilateral financial bodies which do not merely restrict 
themselves to integration projects, but which cover a far 
broader range of activities. 
In the case of the Andean Group the existing 
infrastructure in the field of agreements on payments 
and reciprocal credits within AIALC-AIADI helped further 
its activities. These agreements, together with the exten-
sivo network of interrelations which has grown up over 
many years between the central banks of South America, 
México and the Dominican Pepublic, no doubt facilitated 
subsequent initiatives such as FAR and more recently the 
Andean Peso. 
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Despite geopolitical tensión and the econaraic crisis 
affecting its mariber countries, the Central American Comman 
Martet has maintained or intensified co-cperation activities. 
Among these it is worth mentioning the renewed efforts nade by 
Miiásters of Planning to carry out' joint action, the creation 
of the Canmittee on Technical Co-qperation, the achievements 
of the Central American Electrification Council, as vell as 
those of the Coinmissions on maritime and rail transport 
together with a whole variety of initiatives in various 
fields. Mentían should also be made of the recent adqption of 
the Central American External Tariff. 
The Caribbean Community (CARICCM) is another integration 
programme responsible for significant joint undertakings, in 
addition to those pursued in order to consolídate a comroon 
martet. The ultímate alm of these nieasures is to establish a 
community of nations and a variety of áreas are covered, such 
as transport, food and agriculture, industry, energy and what 
is known as "functional oo-operation". Activities in this 
field include health and population, education and culture, 
tax administration, sport and youth. 
"Ene majority of CARICCM's meniber countries take a part in 
the financing of petroleum, fertilizers and asphalt supplied 
by Trinidad and Tobago to the less-developed countries in the 
Oomnunity. They also belong to the Caribbean Development and 
Oo-operation Oommittee (CDOC) which has, in association with 
regional bodies, prepared a number of measures in support of 
these nations. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Latín American 
Free Trade Association (IAFTA) —known as the Latín American 
Integration Association (AIADI) since 1980— paved the way for 
a considerable number of measures in the field of co-operation 
and was responsible for establishing a lengthy list of 
entrepreneurial bodies representative of the various sectors 
of Latin American economic activity. Many of these bodies were 
established thanks to the favourable environment for 
integration which predominated during the first years of 
LAFTA's existence. 
As an illustration, it is worth remerobering organizations 
such as the Latin American Manufacturers' Association (LAMA), 
the Latin American Preserves and Allied Manufacturers • 
Association (ALICA) and the Latin American Iron and Steel 
Institute (ILAFA); the Latin American State Petroleum 
Enterprises Mutual Aid Association (ARPEL) and the Regional 
Electricity Integration Commission (CIER); the Latin American 
Railways' Association (AIAF), the Latin American Road 
Transport Association (AIATAC), the Latin American Shipowners, 
Association (LASA), the Latin American Civil Aviation 
Commission as well as monetary and financial institutions such 
as the Centre for Latin American Monetary Studies (CEMIA) 
—prior to AIALC— the Latin American Association of Finance 
and Development Institutions (ALIDE) and the Latin American 
Banking Federation (FEIABAN). 
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Industrial ccnplementarity, monetary and financial 
co-operation as well as co-operation in the fields of 
transport, cannunications and infrastructure are sane of the 
áreas in which joint action within the formar AIAIC is 
outstanding. However, there is little doubt that the 
Association's central preoccupation lay with the creation of a 
free trade área and the development of the Instruments 
directly designed to achieve this aim. 
As has often been observed, the present-day AIADI rather 
constitutes an qpen programme: ncn-member developing countries 
may participate by means of partial agreements, with no 
constraints imposed by deadlines —except those agreed upon by 
the Council of Ministers for certain instruroents— with 
considerable flexibility as regarás the methods and types of 
agreements to be reached, and with limitad multilateral 
oomponents. It oould almost be described as a broad-ranging 
oo-operation agreement in the field of trade and trade 
instruments, rather than a classical model of integration. 
Moreover, new forms of integration — o r of co-operation— 
have been sought within the operational mechanisms of complex 
and many sided integration programmes, such as the CACM, the 
Andean Group and CARICCM, in order to tackle ccsnmon problems 
deserving priority. This approach, known as "project 
integration", is of increasing importance in these programmes. 
Even prior to the crisis, the Andean Group, for example, had 
adopted it in so important an área as agricultura. This 
sector, whose range of production is quite similar in the five 
countries, had clearly been left in the background by the 
Andean countries. Tariff mechanisms had not produced 
satisfactory results and the seriousness of the food problem 
at the national and subregional levéis made new approaches 
vital. These led to the application of an ad hoc agreement 
relating to protection of the food supply. 
The aim of any integration process is to Increase 
economic interdependenoe among member countries, so as to 
assist in executing development plans by a gradual process of 
interlinking. Reciprocal trade is a major indicator of 
progress in this directlon and not only concerns trade 
measures but also a variety of links between the economic 
agents of member countries. Ideally, interrelations should 
involve all participante. However, the región has gon© over 
from highly multilateral programmes to more markedly bilateral 
ones. Co-operation may help to stimulate new forms of 
imiltil ateralism laying down plans for various forms of 
interdependence which may in the médium term lead to a more 
orderly and dynamic escansión of reciprocal trade. This issue 
will be dealt with in the following section. 
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F. MEANS OF ÍKOMOTING REGIONAL OO-OEERATION 
Following the Latin American Econcmic Conference held in Quito 
in January 1984 a high-level political process has been 
underway designad to reassess and give priority to the 
capacity and potential of Latin American integration and 
co-operation. At various meetings —many of which were headed 
by the highest authorities of the countries in the región— 
the majority of the most pressing problemq nave been addressed 
and the adoption of a variety of measures based on joint and 
co-ordinated action between countries has been promoted. 
However, the operational organizations and bodies in the 
región have failed to bring about achievements and progress 
corresponding to the political frameworlc defined by 
governments, and even less to the needs arising from the 
serious economic situation affecting all countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. On the contrary, generally speaking 
the operational capacity of these bodies is clearly at a 
standstill, and in same cases has been seriously weakened. 
The roots of the problem seem to lie in two interrelated 
áreas. The first of these concerns the distance, as regards 
the governments as a whole, between the declarations 
expressing political will and the concrete action they need to 
subsequently undertake. Governments draw up and adopt 
ambitious programme platforms which the executive units fail 
to instrument, possibly as a result of differing visions of 
national interest when projected into the multilateral sphere. 
Thus the gap between the political determination expressed by 
the high government officials and actual economic action makes 
it impossible to bring about a process of co-ordination in 
strategic áreas in order to solve the present complex economic 
situation and that which the región will face in coming years. 
Under present circumstances, aggravated by the structural 
shortcomings of the regional economy, multilateral forums have 
given priority to strengthening the processes of integration 
and co-operation. However, progcess in the* instrumentation of 
the agreements adopted (Quito Action Plan, Montevideo Meeting, 
AIADI Oouncil of Ministers) have been modest and particularly 
slow. This lack of concrete achievements aggravates the loss 
of credibility in the región's capacity for concerted action 
and confirms entrepreneurial skepticism, which in turn 
eliminates ene of the región's most specific and vigorous 
alternatives for overcoming the crisis and reviving its 
productive systems. 
A second área of preoecupation is with the methods 
adopced to promote regional integration and co-operation. In 
recent years considerable effort has been centred on partial 
and rather conventional aspeets of intra-regional trade. 
Notwithstanding their relative ürportance, these have been the 
central preoecupation of organizations, and other measures 
relating to trade and co-operation which could stimulate and 
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accelerate the process as a whole nave either not been tackled 
or nave been left in the background. 
Thus, for example, the majority of integration programóles 
nave devoted considerable time and resources to setting up a 
system of tariff preferences, while neglecting aspects such as 
State purchases or the improvement of the new payments 
mechanisms which at the present time may prove decisive 
factors in directing trade flows. Similarly, due importance 
has not been given to co-operation over the most 
characteristic instruments of integration. The potential of 
co-operation has been squandered, by considering it to be an 
independent process, spontaneous in nature and almost always 
bilateral. This is partly due to the institutional clearage 
existing between the bodies which promote co-operation and the 
secretariats of the integration programmes. 
When SEIA vas established, an attempt was nade to set up 
a permanent centre for the promotion of Latín American 
co-cperation among the 25 States belonging to the System. 
However, for a considerable period of time countries and the 
Permanent Secretariat have given priority to activities of 
co-ordination and consultation. The Action Committees have 
been bereft of the support necessary for their consolidation, 
and new steps in this field are few in number. Irrespective of 
this situation imposed by actual circumstances and the lack of 
interest on the part of many countries towards participation 
in the proposed measures, the fact is that an organization 
such as SEIA ittust satisfy the reguirements of a large number 
of extremely diverse countries, and is thereby obliged to 
approach co-operation frcm what may be described as a 
horizontal angle, i.e., it needs to be sufficiently bread and 
flexible to facilitate the participation of nations of 
extremely variad degrees of development situated in the 
different geographical áreas of the región. 
With this in mind, it may be stated that SEIA and its 
Permanent Secretariat simultaneously face two problems. First 
of all, the overall weakness of economic liriks between 
countries, as a result of the crisis and of its dissociative 
effeets, has restricted its capacity for concrete action. 
Secondly, as a result of the heterogeneity of the member 
countries and of the geographical size of its sphere of 
action, SEIA has been faced with the obligation to design 
extensive programmes, thereby making it difficult for its 
co-operation projeets to address specific issues. 
Conseguently, countries have failed to channel many of their 
ventures through SEIA's institutional framework, thereby 
preventing it frorn playing its proper inductive, activating 
and co-ordinating role. 
This situation has a number of drawbacks which basically 
concern the transpareney of these efforts, and the possibility 
of their being co-ordinated and interconnected — s o as to 
effectively accumulate capacity— and of satisfactorily 
organized programmes being submitted to governments. In this 
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respect, stressing the need for a focal point does not mean 
that it is necessary to set up a dcminant centre, to direct 
co-operation as a whole, but rather to establish a 
co-ordinatlng nucleus in order to overcoroe a number of 
problema such as those mentioned above. 
Erovided there was a firm intention to promote 
co-operation among the secretariats of the subregional 
integration programmes —SIECA, CARICCM, JUNAC, AIADI--, the 
work carrled out by SEIA would be reinforced. Its basic task 
could focus on the promotlon of Interconnectlon between these 
efforts, encouraging their extensión into the international 
sphere, promoting projects vínose very nature requires their 
extensión into a broader sphere than the subregional one, and 
ensuring that countries which are members of no integration 
programme are given the qpportunity to join any number of 
specific projects. 
There exists a series of co-operation projects whose 
interest is limited to specific geographical áreas, and which 
are consequently non-priority from SELA's viewpoint. From a 
legal angle, infrastructure projects, joint exploitation of 
shared natural resouroes together with a whole range of 
bilateral initiatives are beyond the scope of the Banana 
Agreement's regulatians. In other cases, such as the 
International Entrepreneurial Group of Central and Western 
South America (GEICOS), there exist forras of co-operation 
which are not included within the System1 s present 
programme base, in view of its connection with the 
particular reguirements and programmes of subregional 
frontier áreas. 
Such projects —entrepreneurial, bilateral or 
subregional— often have a marked incidence on economic 
relations, as they promote regional interdependence; in some 
cases, they may significantly affect external flows (use of 
transport facilities by landlocked áreas, for example). 
However, few regional institutions possess clear programmes to 
stimulate and foment such co-operation. On the contrary, such 
projects depend solely on the capacity of participating 
countries to carry them out. Hie latter find it difficult and 
costly to maintain permanent lines of action designed to 
identify and promote co-operation projects, thereby delaying 
or weakening the creation of new liriks of mutual interest in 
the región. In so far as present integration programmes 
possess a permanent activity or mechanism focused on 
stimulating and promoting such activities, the process is 
likely to gather Ímpetus and make more ambitious integration 
projects viable, by extending the network of relations between 
member countries. 
A further line of action would involve the systematic 
promotion of operational relations between the various 
co-operation bodies or programmes. The central idea is to 
establish effective and concrete forros of co-operation, 
facilitating the development of joint efforts to tackle 
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particular issues and taking advantage of the particular 
features of each group. 
As was mentioned above, many of these undertakings are 
the outcome of bilateral agreements. Placing such relations 
within a multilateral context represents a major challenge for 
the development of an activity such as that being tentatively 
outlined here. Prended countries realize that this merely 
involves promoting and rendering viable initiatives which they 
themselves nave conceived or desire to prenote, and that no 
attempt is being roade to transform the negotiating process 
itself into a multilateral one, there is every likelihood that 
support will be found for defining a strategy. The advantages 
and drawbacks of this new dimensión of bilateral relations 
raust be the object of a careful and detailed analysis. 
To sum up, what is being proposed is the systematic 
promotion of co-operation ventures in the field of trade, 
infrastructure, joint exploitation of natural resources, 
energy, transport and canmunications, science and technology, 
banks and financing, the productive sectors, joint 
enterprises, etc., by the following means: 
a) At the level of the subregional integration 
programmes, the creation or strengthening of bedies 
specialized in co-operation, where this is justified, whose 
main aims would be: i) to gather and analyse information on 
co-operation activities carried out by the member countries, 
to assess their results and consider the direct and indirect 
impact they have had upan the process of interrelation between 
countries, so as to aeguire experience of the modalities for 
co-operation; ii) to examine the background and causes behind 
those co-operation activities víhich failed to material ize as 
scheduled (for economic, political, ecological, etc., reasons) 
as such restrictions may have changed; iü) to carry out a 
survey of co-operation ventures within each country, in both 
the publie and private sectors, so as to cheose those of 
greatest interest for two or more countries and which have not 
yet been carried out, iv) to suggest to governments and 
promote further ventures, based upan systematic examination of 
the real circumstances and shortcamings of nations and groups 
of nations, and on their potential for contributing to the 
tasks of subregional integration. 
b) To strengthen SELA in order that it may fulfill its 
role as regional co-ordination of activities in the field of 
subregional co-operation and collaborate with those countries 
which do not belong to any integration programme so as to 
facilítate their participation in a variety of co-operation 
projeets. 
The advantage of giving co-operation activities a 
multilateral bent lies essentially in the greater stability 
which may be provided for countries by the existence of a 
framework of commitments and powers which have been 
collectively endorsed by the nations belonging to the system. 
This is important for long-term ventures, particularly in view 
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of the political instability characteristic of the región. Por 
less-developed countries, the existence of a permanent 
prcrootion mechanism may provide valuable help in their 
negotiations with larger countries, in viev of the ejqperience 
and background information which each oo-operation body oould 
accumulate. 
As far as the secretariats of the integration programmes 
are ooncerned, systematizing their action to promote 
co-operation oould help to open up a new and significant 
oourse of operations, giving a renewed Ímpetus to their 
contacts with the governments of their member countries in 
different spheres, as a complement to their usual activities. 
There is no lack of awareness of the implicit danger of 
bureaucratizing co-operation in one way or another. 
Nevertheless, everything will depend on the flexibility and 
efficiency of the units incorporated into the integration 
programmes. In any case, the idea is to constitute small 
technical groups operating in cióse contact with either 
governments or the prívate sector at those levéis in which 
bilateral or multilateral co-operation ventures origínate or 
are instrumented, such as mínístries, public or prívate 
enterprises, uníversities, etc. 
In the case of AIADI in particular, buíldíng a mechanism 
such as that outlined above is particularly important, sínce 
despite the length of time which has gane by, neither the 
member countries ñor the General Secretariat possess any such 
instrument. The latter could deepen its activity in those 
fields which either directly or indirectly stimulate 
reciprocal trade or strengthen regional interdependenoe. It 
could carry out its task without preventing the Association 
fram cantinuing to focus its efforts on the trade sphere. 
There is no guestion of proposing an option which involves a 
dispersal of resources; on the contrary, an attempt is being 
made to develop a line of activities to provide structural 
support for the work carried out by the Association in the 
field of trade, bearing on those tasks which enhance regional 




III. THE SERVICES SECTOR IN INIRA-REGIONAL TRADE 
A. THE SERVICES SECTOR IN THE BALANCE 
OF PAYMENTS 
The services sector is of increasing iitportance in the 
economies of both developed and developing countries. It 
represents almost two-thirds of gross domestic product in the 
developed countries, and in Latin America and the Caribbean 
approximately 50% of regional productive activity.19/ 
The international services trade has also experienced 
vigorous growth, and towards the beginning of the 1980s was 
egual to ane-third of the merchandise trade, and was worth 
US$ 600 billion in absolute terms in 1980.20/ 
Generally speaking, the services trade has favoured the 
industrialized countries. The mernber countries of AIADI21/ 
nave recorded an increase in their déficit on non-financial 
services, with imports of around US$ 30 billion and exports of 
approximately US$ 20 billion in 1981. 
The trend in the services trade of A1ADI countries during 
the first half of the 1980s is set out in table 34, brdken 
down into major items. 
With regard to exports, the predominance of Travel 
(tourism) towards the beginning of the decade is apparent; 
however towards 1985 transport and insurance, travel and other 
services were on an egual footing. This occurred within the 
context of a continual decline in income from services, from a 
máximum of US$ 18 billion in 1981 to US$ 13.5 billion in 1985. 
As far as imports are concerned, most expenditure 
throughout the whole of the period was on Transport and 
Insurance, even though in absolute terms its level declined, 
reflecting the crisis, from US$ 11 billion in 1981 to US$ 7.3 
billion in 1985. A significant decline also occurred in 
expenditure on Travel which fell by half between 1980-1981 and 
1985. 
ünder the item Other official and private services, a 
certain degree of inelasticity may be observed, in spite of 
the shrinkage of aggregate demand and demand for imports from 
meníber countries. This item includes what are known as "new 
services", particularly activities in the field of 
informatics, teleocranunications, design engineering, and 
consultancy services. 
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One área of particular interest is that of transport and 
insuranoe. This represented 30% of AIADI's exports of non-
financial services and 40% of inports, and accounted for a 
significant share of the balance-of-services déficit.22/ 
Table 34 
ALADI COUNTRIES: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SERVICES 
(BiUions of dollars) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Exports 16.2 18.0 13.3 11.9 14.1 13.5 
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This interest is also reflectad in the canmitraent nade by 
the Quito Plan of Action to "identify specific áreas for the 
promotion of regional and subregional oo-operation plans with 
respect to services, especially in the transportation, 
insurance and reinsuranoe sectors".23/ 
B. TRANSPORT AND INSURANCE 
A more detailed examination of the Transport and insurance 
sector has been considered desirable, bearing in mind, in 
addition to its weight in the balance of payments, its links 
with external trade in gocds, and the experience accumulated 
on the subject.24/25/ 
To this end, an analysis was made of currency income and 
expenditure on transport and insurance by the principal 
countries in AIADI as well as of expenditure on other services 
supplied by firms outside the área. 
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The min results are set out in table 35, táiicti presents 
the cUstribution of the global trade of the meniber countries 
under cxsnsideration, according to the nationality of the rosara 
of transport. 
Table 35 
ALADI COUNTRIES: D1STRIBUTI0N OF THE VALUÉ OF 1MPORTS AND EXPORTS 






















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data provided by countries. 
a/ The data coVer the following periods: 1982 for Argentina and Uruguay, 1981 for Brazil 
and Colombia, and 1978 for Chile; data relating to Perú corresponds to 1982 (exports) 
and 1977 (inports). 
b/ In a number of countries, in particular Brazil, this includes transport by foreign 
ships chartered by national shipping conpanies. 
This analysis leads to the following conclusions: 
i) national finos' share of the transport of inports, 
measured by valué, represents approximately 30% in medium-
sized countries (Colombia, Chile, Perú and Uruguay), slightly 
more in the case of Argentina (40%) and considerably more in 
Brazil (80%). In the case of Brazil, the national flag 
includes foreign ships chartered and operated by national 
shipping cctnpanies; 
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ii) the share in the transport of imports frcan other 
AIADI countries of f irms frora within the área fluctuates 
between 7 and 16% in the medium-sized countries, and slightly 
more in the case of Argentina and Brazil; 
iii) there is ampie roam for substituting expenditure on 
imports of transport services in the medium-sized countries 
within AIADI and in Argentina, where the share of outside 
firms in the transport of imports ranges from 50% to 65%; 
iv) dependence on extra-zonal transport services is far 
greater in the case of exports from member countries. In every 
case, the percentage of exports carried by ships sailing under 
extra-zonal f lags is higher in valué térros than the equivalent 
percentage of imports. This suggests that there is potential 
for pramoting exports in the field of transport services; 
v) the share of national transport enterprises in their 
nations' exports, in valué terms, is similar among the medium-
sized countries and Argentina (from 20 to 25%), and higher in 
Brazil (40%). As in the case of imports, foreign ships are 
chartered and operated by national shipping companies and 
included with those sailing under the national flag; 
vi) with regard to the cost of transport, the results 
indicate that the average rate for freight and insurance is 
between 8 and 9% of the CIF import valué. Ihis rate is 
considerably lower in the case of purchases of fuel. 
As regards intra-zonal trade, table 36 presents the 
distribution of the valué of trade among AIADI member 
countries, by nationality of the means of transport. 
Analysis leads to the following conclusions: 
i) national and zonal transport represents a considerably 
higher share of the valué of trade with AIADI countries than 
of total trade. In particular, the percentage for transport by 
other AIADI countries is higher; 
ii) dependence on extra-zonal transport is considerably 
lower, with the exception of petroleum purchases made by 
medium-sized countries, whose fleets of oil tankers are quite 
small; 
iii) there may be roam for substituting the cost of 
transport imports from the rest of the world, particularly in 
the case of medium-sized countries. In this respect, greater 
regional integration with regard to transport of fuel could 
lead to increased trade between AIADI countries and a saving 
of convertible currency; 
iv) with regard to the transport cost of intra-zonal 
trade, the average rate between member countries is lower than 
in the case of outside purchases made by those three countries 
for whom information was available (Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile). This would seem to ref lect the greater geographical 
proximity of AIADI meiriber countries, or the type of import 
products involved. 
These results are preliminary, in view of the 
heterogeneity of the information and as the statistics covered 
different periods for each country. Thus, information relating 
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Table 36 
ALA01 C0UNTR1ES: D1STR1BUTION OF THE VALUÉ OF I NTRA-ZONAL IMPORTS 
AMD EXPORTS BY NATIONALITY OF THE MEANS OF TRANSPORT 8/ 
(Percentages) 
Countries National 



















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data provided by countries. 
a/ The data cover the follOHing periods: 1982 for Argentina and Uruguay, 1981 Brazil and 
Colombia, and 1978 for Chile; data relating to Perú correspondí to 1982 (exports) and 
1977 (inports). 
b/ In a nunfcer of countries, in particular Brazil, this includes transport by foreign 
vessels chartered and operated by national shipping companies. 
to 1982 was available for Argentina and Uruguay, to 1981 in 
the case of Brazil and Colombia, and 1978 in that of Chile. As 
far as Perú is concerned, the information is mixed as it 
relates to 1982 in the case of exports and 1977 in that of 
imports. A number of countries were excluded for lack of 
statistics. In order to evalúate the concrete feasibility of 
substituting imports or exports of extra-zonal transport by 
national or zonal transport it will be necessary to carry out 
a deeper analysis, and examine the voluntes of external import 
and export trade (in addition to the monetary valué), by 
analysing the transport provided by different means of 
transport and extending the investigation to those countries 
which were not considerad. In addition, it is essential to 
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provide for a special classif ication of products on the basis 
of the type of transport they require (general bulk transport, 
refrigerated, liquid, etc.). 
It will also be necessary to investígate the other items 
in the services sector. This will assist in defining the role 
which the tertiary sectors should play in external econcroic 
relations, in countries1 development strategies and in 
regional integration and co-operation. 
In this respect, there is strong pressure at the present 
time for multilateral negotiations on services, foreign 
investment and téchnology transfer to be initiated within 
GATT. The United States is principally responsible for 
instigatíng these negotiations with the prime objective of 
establishíñg free trade in services and téchnology, as well as 
the free flow of direct foreign investment. 
The position taken by Latín America with regard to 
intemational negotiations on services is clear and has been 
adopted within the framework of SELA:26/ GATT exclusively 
covers lerdianclise trade, it is in no way competent in the 
services sphere and it is undesirable that the issue of 
foreign investment and téchnology should be examined in the 
multilateral negotiations. Any treatment of the issue should 
be subordinated to the aims of the región's economic 
development, and greater kncwledge is vital and must precede 
any discussion in the intemational sphere.22/ 
It is consequently vital to carry out groundwork in order 
for action to be possible, and to define a strategy for the 
development of the sector at the national level as well as for 
the exploitation of the potential for regional co-operation 
and integration. Ihe Quito Plan of Action has already provided 
guidelines as well as action deserving priority which point in 
this directicn. 
Ihe preliminary analysis carried out revealed first of 
all that there is widespread interest in co-operation and 
integration within the transport and insurance sector. Ihe 
type of co-operation which may be considered includes 
selective substitution of imports of extra-regional transport 
services by national or regional transport; co-operation over 
the joint transport of certain products, such as crude oil or 
grains (coffee, cereals, fertilizers, etc.), taking advantage 
of mixed transport vessels of the tanker-bulk transport — o r 
ore-carrier type, and granting preferential treatment to Latin 
American and Caribbean firms providing services. 
Notes 
1/ Ihe Quito Declaration and Plan of Action were adopted 
at the Latin American Economic Conference. Ihis marked the 
culmination of a process initiated by the President of 
Ecuador, Dr. Osvaldo Hurtado, at the beginning of 1983 when he 
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requested the Secretariats of ECIAC and S H A to suggest bases 
for a Iatin American response to the international economic 
crisis. This document led to the Santo Domingo Agreement 
(Dcminican Republic, August 1983). A Pollow-up Group 
established by ccuntries carried out the groundwork for the 
Oonference which vas held in January 1984, with technical 
assistance frcm ECIAC and SEIA. Twenty-six representativos of 
Iatin American and Caribbean Heads of State or Government and 
Personal Representatives of the Heads of the State attended. 
2/ The Declaration of the Montevideo Mseting was signad 
by the Heads of State and high officials frcm 16 ccuntries in 
the región, at the investiture of the President of Uruguay, 
Dr. Julio María Sanguinetti (March 1985). 
y AIADI, Una propuesta para la rueda de negociaciones 
(Doc. 152.2), 25 June 1985 (preliminary versión). 
4/ In carxying out an exercise of this kind, reference 
should be nade to the achievements of AIADI as set out in the 
following ECIAC dccuments: "Algunas modalidades del comercio 
regional: intercambio compensado" (LC/R.440), Santiago, Chile, 
3 June 1985, and "Potencialidad de exportación de Argentina, 
Brasil y México hacia los países medianos y menores de la 
Asociación latinoamericana de Integración (AIADI) y el 
equilibrio comercial" (IC/R.450), Santiago, Chile, 23 August 1985. 
§/ The figures are provided by OECD data, and 
conseguently the región*s exports are expressed CIF and 
imports FOB. This method of calculation makes the figures less 
comparable, but provides a more up-to-date overall view. The 
ccuntries examined ínclude all of Iatin America and the 
Caribbean. The products are: coffee, fruit, tobáceo, meat, 
fish, cocea, sugar, rubber, soya beans, leather, timber, wool, 
cotton, henp, lead, zinc, iron ore, bauxite, tin and copper. 
Semi-manufactured goods derived frcm the above are also 
included, such as powdered cocoa, refined sugar, soya oil and 
calos, and unwrought lead, iron and copper ingots, and 
unwrought copper alloys (blister and refined). 
6/ IDB-INIAL, Compras estatales e integración económica. 
Buenos Aires, December 1982. 
2/ J.M. Vacchino, Integración económica rpqH"nalr 
Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1981, pp. 323 and 334. 
£/ Isaac Cohén Orantes and Gert Rosenthal, "Reflectians 
on the conceptual framework of Central American economic 
integración", CEPAL Review. Nó. 3, Santiago, Chile, first 
semester 1977. United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 
E.77.H.G.3. 
9/ Gert Rosenthal, Algunas lecciones de la integración 
económica en Am*rif« Tatina: El caso de Centroamérica. 
internal mimeographed document, Novenber 1983. 
10/ G. Rosenthal, Algunas lecciones.... op.cit. 
11/ Co-operation between developing ccuntries pursues its 
own paths, which may in sane cases coincide with the 
modalities and spheres of action of co-operation betMeen 
ccuntries in Iatin America and the Caribbean. 
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12/ Eduardo Gana and Jan Heirman, Integración y 
cooperación regionales, internal mimeographed document, p. 11. 
13/ During the same period, Trinidad and Tobago brought a 
relatively similar scheme into operation covering sane 
countries in the English-speaking Caribbean. 
14/ Signed in Brasilia, 3 July 1978, by plenipotentiaries 
frcm Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Perú, 
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